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I. Statement of the problem of the Dissertation.
The problem of this Dissertation is "The Pessimism
of Windelband: Its Origins and Development." Wilhelm Win-
delband, the founder of the "Southwest German Sohool" of
Neo-ICantians, was an unexcelled historian of philosophy,
a systematic thinker of great ability, and, especially in
his earlier period, a caustic critic of pessimism as a
philosophical standpoint. Later, however, he reached a
position which, though he himself never described it thus,
may properly be characterized as critical pessimism. If
to tills the further consideration be added that Windel-
band f s writings "auf der ganzen Wel t ihre Wirkung getan
haben,"'*’ it becomes evident that the problem of this Dis-
sertation has a substantial claim to being worthy of in-
vestigation.
T7 Ruge, WW, 1. (See Bibliography for explanation of
























*:••) n::',r ).»••• f '•••• r
r
-»• -•-» ?/ rc:j rr . i -;' l












i: • ; ' E V :*•:.** nr.; •> : . *•> l *; *<, *1 * > rX-x > r i I
: lOfl’i ; 1 » •' . > .1 ' : :r»; [ : *;<
eiiriJ' JJt
• i tn; i
-lofxrjtW Ssuit bohJia od notfortoh' >























. J ; ; r *r f ' : I :
II. A sketch of the life of Windelband 1
A. Birth.
Wilhelm Windelband was bom May 11, 1848, in Potsdam.
He was the son of an official of the Prussian government.
B. Education.
1. The schools he attended.
Windelband studied at the humanistic Gymnasium in
Potsdam, and at the Universities of Jena, Berlin, and
Gottingen. At first, like Lotze, he studied the natural
sciences and medicine; later he turned to history and
philosophy.
2. His principal teachers.
The men who, as his teachers, exercised a decisive
influence over Windelband were Kuno Fischer and Hermann
Lotze, then of Jena and Gottingen respectively. "...Sie
haben seine philosophisohe Entwicklung bestimmt, soweit
.. 2
sie von ausseren Einfliissen abhangig war.* Fischer was
primarily a historian of philosophy, and, as such, a mem-
ber of the Hegelian school. His influence, augmented by
that of Eduard Zeller and Johann Eduard Erdmann, likewise
Hegelians, was sufficient to enlist the genius and industry
of Windelband for the history of philosophy. Lotze, on the
1 . This sketch, except where other references are
given, is based on Hickert, WW; Huge, WW; and
Bauch, WW, Kant-Studien, 20(1915), VII- XIV.
2. Hickert, WW, i
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other hand, was a metaphysician. His influence aroused in
Windelband a profound and permanent interest in system-
atic investigations. Thus, with reference to the histor-
ical and systematic, Windelband^ two great teachers sup-
plement each other. “In Windelband, dem von Kuno Fischer
historisch geschulten Denker, wird durch Lotzes Anregung
neben dem Entwicklungsprinzip die Tendenz machtig, zum
Fes ten und Bleibenden vorzudringen."
1
With reference to
the firm grounding they gave Windelband in the Kantian
critical philosophy, however, they agree. “...Sie fuhrten
ihn auf die gemeinsame Grundlage ihrer eigenen philoso-
2
phischen Anschauungen, n&miich auf das System Kants... 11
The permanence of the influence of Kuno Fischer and Lotze
is apparent throughout Windelband i s life. The historical
and the systematic constitute the two poles of all his
thought, "die beiden Brennpunkte, um welche sein Denken
-3
sich mit gleicher Energie bewegte.
3. His dissertation and degree.
In 1870, at the age of twenty- two years, Windelband
4
received his doctor^ degree under Lotze at Gottingen.
His dissertation. Die Lehren vom Zufall
,
is described by
Rickert as "eine verheissungsvolle Studie, die Ansatze
IT Rickert, WW, 2.
2. Huge, WW, 4-5.
3. Rickert, WW, 5.
4. Thormeyer, PW, 117.
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zu Rianchem enthalt, was er spater weiter ausfiihrte, unci die
bekannter zu sein verdient, als sie is t. 1,1
C. Military career.
Windelband served as a volunteer rifleman in the France-
2
German War of 1870-1871. After the close of the war he
spent a winter in Italy, principally in Rome and Venice.
D. Academic career.
1.
Privatelozent at the University of Leipzig, 1873-1876.
o
In 1873 Windelband became a Privatdozent at the
4






aroused great interest.' Her-
mann Uirici honored it with a long and careful criticism.
His review is a typical instance of the unusual attention
given by eminent scholars to Windelband 's earliest works.
During the summer of 1873 Windelband lectured on "GruntL-
probleme der Erkenntnis theorie, Darstellung und Kritik der
Kantischen Philosophic und Kants Kritik der reinen Vemunft.”
The winter of 1873-1874 he spent in Pisa.
IT Rickert, WW, 6.
2. Windelband, GK, Vorwort, 6. (Vorwort by Wolfgang Win-




In all later references to Windelband 's works his
name will be omitted.
3. UGE, title page.
4. Only a few of Windelband
1
s works can be mentioned in
this Chapter. See Bibliography for complete list.
5. Rickert, WW, 5.
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2.
Professor at the University of Zurich, 1876-1877.
In 1876 Windelband became ordinary Professor of Philos-
ophy at the University of Zurich. He assumed his duties
1 «
there with an Antrittsrede
,
delivered on May 20, Uber den
gegenw&rtigen Stand der psychologischen Forschung
,
"in der
er a Is einer der ersten die dringend notwendige und leider
heute noch nicht vollzogene Trennung der empirischen
„ 2Psychologie von der Philosophic verlangte. Another lecture
gdelivered in 1876, "Pessimismus und Wissenschaft,"
1
is of
great importance for the problem of this Dissertation. It
will be considered more closely in Chapter Two. It is men-
tioned here to indicate how early Windelband was interested
“ p”M7f
3.
Professor at the University of Freiburg, 1877-1882.
Ih 1877 Windelband moved to the University of Freiburg.
There he turned his attention to the history of philosophy.
The result was his Geschichte der neueren Philosophic , in
two volumes, published in 1878 and 1880. Hickert says that
the second volume, which treats the Bliitezeit of German
philosophy, fl ist heute nach funfun^dreissig Jahren noch
4
uniibertroffen." In 1881 Windelband was in Paris, "urn dort
„ 6
an der Bibliothek Q,ucllenstudien zu machen.
TT PF, title page.
2. Kickert, WW, 5.
3. PM, II, 218-243.
4. Hickert, WW, 6.
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4.
Professor at the University of Strassburg, 1882-1903.
In 1882 Windelband was called to the University of
Strassburg to succeed Otto Liebmann, who had gone to Jena.
This call, taken together with the series that preceded it,
indicates Windelband ’ s rapidly growing fame as a teacher.
His first important publication of the Strassburg period
was the Praludien (1884), a series of essays and addresses





in which Windelband *s
2
own views find expression, practical philosophy occupies
"eine hervorragende Stelle," 1 and Kantian thought is given a
_ „ 4
"Hichtung auf die Wertlehre Hermann Lotzes." These essays,
together with those added in later editions, are of the
highest significance for the subject of this Dissertation.
c ft
Windelband*s reply* to E. Lass’s criticism of the PrSludien
7
is his "einzige eigentlich polemische Schrift. He says in
the course of this reply that the writing of it is "sehr
gegen meine Neigung. In 1884 Windelband found some weeks
spent in Oxford stimulating and profitable.
In 1892 the most important of Windelband* s historical
T7 PRA, I, Vorwort, III.
2. Ilickert, W, 8 .




5. UTK, Phil.Mona tsh.
,
20(1884), 161-169.
6. Lass, tJT'K, Vlertei jahrss.f .wiss.Phil.u.Soz. , 8(1884)
1- 17 .
7. Huge, WW
, 30, n. 1.
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7works appeared, Geschichte der Philosophie
,
later published
under the title, Lehrbuoh der Geschichte der Philosophie *
As Kektor of the University of Strassburg, Windelband
delivered in 1894 "die beruhmt gewordene Hede iiber ’Geschichte
1
und Naturwissenschaft. f " Windelband also served as Mitheraus-
geber of the Kant-Studien
,
the publication of the Kant Gesell-
schaft, from its first appearance (1897) until his death.
5. Professor at the University of Heidelberg, 1903-1915.
In 1903 Windelband accepted a call to the University of
2
Heidelberg. There he was for a short time the colleague,
and then the successor, of his great teacher, Kuno Fischer,
3
who lectured for the last time in tue summer of 1903.
While at Heidelberg, Windelband lectured also at Mannheim
4
and Frankfurt am Main. A series of the Frankfurt lectures
has been published as Die Philosophic im deutschen Geistes-
5
leben des XIX. Jahrhunderts .
Windelband, accompanied by his wife, Dora Windelband,
attended the Second International Congress of Philosophy,
which convened at Geneva, September 4-8, 1904. He was one
of the outstanding figures of the Congress. He read two
f
papers, "Die gegenwartige Aufgabe der Logik und Erkenntnis-
theorie in Bezug auf Kultur- und Naturwissenschaftell, " and









5. Hickert, WW, 13.
6. Congr&s interna tionale de philosophie, p. 31.
Geneve: Henry Kondig. 190
5
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"Fichte und Comte." He was also elected President of the
Third International Congress of Philosophy.
1
The Third Con-
gress was held at Heidelberg, September 1-5, 1908. Windel-
o
band presided, and read one paper, ”Zum Begriff des
Gesetzes
In 1914 Windeiband published his last great work, his
Einleitung in die Philosophie . This volume Huge rightly
describee as "das umfangreichste systematische Werk in der
„ 3grossen lleihe der Verfiffentlichungen Messer says of it,
"
. . .Es ist tatsachlioh 3ein System, wenigstens in den
Grundziigen, was or in dem Buche rait dem bescheidenen Titel
4
bietet." This work is of special significance for the
problem of this Dissertation because it is in it that Win-
delband’s pessimism becomes most pronounced.
During the winter semester of 1914-1915 Windeiband con-
ducted " eine einstiindige Vorlesung iiber Geschichtsphiioso-
.
5
pliie," a study to which he was stimulated by the World
War. This was the end of his teaching. "Die letzte Stunde
dieser Vorlesung Ist gleichzeitig die letzte, die er iiber-
haupt auf den Eatheder gestanden hat. A fragment of this
last course of lectures has been published as Geschichts-
philosophie, eine KiMegsvorlesung .
IT Ibid. Opposite p. 105 is a picture of Windeiband.
2. Windelband's wife and son, Wolfgang, also attended
this Congress.
3. Huge, WW, 28. Cf. llickert, WW, 17.
4. Messer, HP, Deuts.Lit., 36(1915), 2480.
5. GK, Vorwort, 5 .
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9This brier sketch of* Windelband 7 s productive years in-
dicates his high rank both as a historian of philosophy and
as a systematic thinker. In this respect he is, in the
opinion of both Bauch and Huge, a unique figure. Bauch says:
**Kein sys tematischer Denker auf den Gebiete der Philosophic
war zugleich auch in den Masse Historiker, und kein Historiker
der Philosophic war zugleich auch in dem Masse sys tematischer
-1
Denker, wie Wilhelm Windelband." From the point of view
of the popularity of Windelband* s writings, but not other-
wise, Dvomikovic is correct in evaluating "die Bedeutung
seiner philosophie-geschichtlichen Werke weit hoher...als
die systenatisclie Ausbildung der werttheoretischen Variante
2
des Neukritizismus." The systematic works of Windelband,
though less complete than the historical, constitute an
almost equally significant achievement.
E. Last years.
Windelband* s last years brought him a series of bitter
experiences which probably served to strengthen the pessi-
mistic tone of his thought.
1.
Broken health.
For several years previous to his death Windelband suf-
3
fered severely from illness. His Einleitung in die Philoso-
IT Bauch, WW, Kant-Studien, 20(1915), VIII. Cf. Huge,
WW, 3.
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phie, the most pessimistic of all his productions, was writ-
ten in broken health. "Als er es schrieb, war seine Gesund-
heit bereits schwer erschuttert.”
1
The unfinished Geschichts-
philosophie, eine Kriegsvorlesung was dictated by Windelband
while he was confined to his bed. "Er hat daran diktiert,





At first Windelband was elated by the stirring activity
of the first days of the World War. "Auf tiefste war er. .
.
durcli die Vorgange bei dem Ausbruch des Krieges eingriffen
worden. Mit stolzer Freude erlebte er die wundervollen Tage
„3
der Mobilmacliung. . But this elation was brief. The progress
of the war brought him grave apprehension, and then sore
bereavement. "Der Krieg. . .hat. . . in sein Fanilienleben schwer
eingegriffen und damit dem seit Jahren kranken Manne den
letzten. .. Stoss versetzt. Das Tagebuch endigt mit dem Vermerk
iiber den amtlich bestatigten Tod seines altesten Rohnes in
4
den Karapfen um Ypem, am 13. November 1914." Later citations
will show that the World War led Windelband to take an
J-increasingly pessimistic view of history.
3.
Abandoned plans.
Regarding Kuno Fischer, Windelband once wrote: "Es war
T7 Rickert, WW, 17. Cf. Messer, HP, Deuts.Lit., 36(1915),
2480.
2. GIv, Vorwort, 5.
3. Loc. cit.
4. Huge, WW, 6.
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ihm gegeben, seine Aufgabe, die er sich gesetzt, bis zum
„1Ende zu fiihren." Of Windelband himself this statement never
became true. Many of his long cherished plans he had to
abandon. This is true of plans for both historical and
systematic works, but especially true of the latter. Huge
correctly observes that "es handelt sich bei Windelband in
systematischer Hinsicht nur Mm ein P rogramm und um
2 3Anregungen." The * sys tematische Behandlung der Philosophic"
1
projected as early as 1883 was never accomplished. More com-
prehensive works on logic and ethics, "die er plante, sind
-
4
nicht mehr zum Abschluss gelangt. His historical works were
more nearly, but by no means entirely, completed. He intended
to add a third volume to his Geschichte der neueren Philosophic ;
in it he was to have treated the post-Kantian philosophy of
France, England, and Germany. According to Falckenberg,
£Windelband hoped to publish this volume in 1884. But it was
never published. A monograph on Comte designed for the same
series as the Platon "ist nicht mehr zur Veroffentlichung
7
gelangt. Finally, the Geschichtsphilosophie, eine Kriegs-
vorlesung remained, "wie manches andere, dessen Vollendung
ihm nicht gegonnt gewesen ist, ein Torso." Moreover, Windel-
band never succeeded in adjusting harmoniously all the elements
IT KFG, 40. Cf. KFK, Kant- Studien , 2(1897), 10.
2. Hickert, WW, 24.
3. PHA, I, Vorwort, III.
4. Hickert, WW, l7.
5. Falckenberg, HGN, Phi 1.Mona tsh.
,
19 (1883 ), 190.
0. Ibid., 189.
7. Hickert, WW, 13.
8. GK, Vorwort, 6.
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of his philosophy and of his view of life. One finds **hier
und da angebauten aber nicht in die Philosophie eingebauten
-1
weltanschaulichen Momenten. . The fact that Windelband had
to abandon so many important projects, and had to leave the
whole of the life work he had planned so far from complete,
probably contributed to the increase of his pessimism during
the last years of his life.
F. Death.
2
Windelband died October 22, 1915, in his sixty- eighth
year.
III. Windelband* s more noted students.
Windelband* s more noted students represent a wide variety
of interests and a large degree of independence of their
master. It is a noteworthy fact that few of them are histor-
ians of philosophy. Of such Hickert names three: Otto Baensch,
3
,Paul Hensel, and Georg Mehlis. The preponderance of system-
atic interest in the "Southwest German School** is so great
that Huge can say: "Windelbands Schuler. .. sind ausschliesslich
sys tema tisch interessiert gewesen; als Historiker
der Philosophie hat Windelband iiberhaupt Heine Schule im
4
eigen tlichen Sinne des Wortes gemacht.
The oldest of Windelband 's students, and later one of
IT Huge, WW, 4.
2. Bauch, Hickert, and Huge give this date. Iloretz
gives October 23. See Zeits.f .d.ost.Gym.
,
57(1915),
379. An editorial note in Phil. Rev.
, 25T1915), 88,
gives October 25.
3. Hickert, WW, 35#
4. Huge, WW, 8.
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his colleagues, was Georg Jellinek,^ who studied under Win-
delband in Leipzig . He was a noted jurist and teacher of
jurisprudence. Another jurist among the disciples of Windel-
2band is Julius Binder.
Emil Lask, "der bedeutendste unter den Heidelberger
3
Schiilem Windelbands," and the one upon whom Windelband
4
"die grcJssten Hoffnungen setzte," developed the purely
scientific side of Windelband* s philosophy. "Das weltanschau-
liche Moment fdllt hier ganz aus dem Rahmen des philosophisch
-
5




Heinrich Hickert, who in 1915 succeeded Windelband at
the University of Heidelberg, states his relation to Windel-
band thus: "Ich darf mich seit dreissig Jahren seinen Schuler
nennen und habe bis heute nicht aufgehort, von ihm zu lemen,
aber ich bin trotzdem niemals mit allem restlos einverstanden
8
gewesen, was er systenatisch gelehrt und geschrieben hat.
Another close follower of Windelband is Fritz Munch, who af-
firms "die Superioritat des Geltens gegeniiber dem Sein und
T7 Bauch, WW, Kant-Studien, 20(1915), XIV. Hickert, WW,
35. Huge, WVTT^
2. Rickert, WW, 35.
3. Ueberweg, GGP, IV, 452.
4. Hickert, WW, 36.
5. Huge, WW, 4, n. 1. Cf. 8, n. 4, and 38, n. 2.
6. Hickert, WW, 36.
7. Ueberweg, GGP, IV, 456.
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seine Unabhangigkeit von diesem im Sinne Windelbands.
.
Other well known students of Windelband are the philos-
ophers, Bruno Bauch, who, like his teacher, regards philos-
_ 2
ophy as the " Selbstvers t&ndigung des Kulturbewusstseins,"
3 4
and Ferdinand Pelikan;^ the psychologist, Hugo Munsterberg,
and the antipsychologist, Jonas Cohn; ^ the economists,
Gerhard von Schulze- Gavemitz and Max Weber; and the
7theologian, Ernst Troeltsch.
It is possible that traces of the pessimism of Windel-
band are to be found in some of his students. But the inves-
tigation of that problem lies outside the proper sphere of
this Dissertation.
IV. A review of the work of other investigators.
The problem of this Dissertation has never been inves-
tigated. Almost all articles on Yfindelband, and almost all
the reviews of his works, fail to mention his pessimism.
This is true even of Hickert's forty- three page brochure,
Wilhelm Windelband . Four writers, however, do touch in some
way upon the province of this Dissertation. Tney are Huge,
Drews, Maurice Picard, and Georg Daniels.
A . Huge
.





3. Pelikan, WW, Zeits.f .Phil .u.phil .Kr.
,
150(1915), 111.
4. Ibid., 112. HMEertT W,~TTFT.
5. ltickert, WW, 35. Thormeyer, PW, 38.
5. Hickert, WW, 35.
7. hoc. cit.
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delband. In it he refers to Windelband' s doubt as to the
value of the historical process,^ and adds the following
general statement: " • • .Windelbands Welt- und Lebensanschau-
ung lasst sich nicht auf eine des ubliohen Fonneln bringen;
sie ist nicht reiner Optimisnus oder Pessimisraus. • . Sie
charakterisiert sich am ausgesprocliensten als ein durch die
tiefere Einsicht in das Wesen des Historischen gem&ssigter,
resignierender Idealismus, wenn man ihr als Beurteilerin
„ 2
des Kulturzustandes zuhflrt, an dem sie sich erprobt hat."
This brief reference has a two fold significance. First, it
clearly indicated Huge's recognition of an element of pes-
simism in Windelband. Second, it shows that Huge incorrectly
traced Windelband ' s pessimism to historical roots only. That
it had other roots will be shown in Chapter Five.
B . Drews
.
Drews treats Windelband f s pessimism with a brevity al-
most equal to Huge's. He asserts that Windelband^ position
Q
is fundamentally pessimistic. He indicates as the grounds
of this pessimism the dubious character of the intellectual
and moral progress made by mankind, and the alogical element
4
in the world process, and in reality itself. The treatment
by Drews suffers from an overeagemess to find in Windelband
r7 Huge, WW, 55-57.
2. Ibid., 57.
3. Drews, WEP, Preuss . Jahr. , 160(1915), 399.
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agreement with, and support for, the philosophy of Eduard




In Part II of his Values Immediate and Contributory and
their Interrelation Picard deals witn Windelband's theory
of noras. He subjects this theory to various criticisms, and
rejects it as untenable. With the problem of Windelband's
pessimism Picard is not at all concerned. But since, as
will appear in Chapter Five, there is a vital connection
between Windelband's theory of norms and his pessimism, it
it necessary at ti.is point to consider Picard's work.
An examination of Picard's method shows it to be unsound.
His study is based upon an examination of only two of the
essays in the Praludien
,
"Immanuel Kant" (1881), and "Normen
^
2
und Naturgesetze" (1882). These essays by no means exhaust
Windelband's treatment of norms. Consequently, Picard mis-
understands Windelband at many points. He charges Windelband,
on the one hand, with maintaining that " the norms and the
3
laws of nature must work together in reality;" and, on the
other, with viewing nature "as a battlefield wherein different
4
law's, natural and normal, come into collision."
Acquaintance with a later essay in the Prftludien , "Das
Heilige," would have precluded the first criticism. In this
IT Drews, WW, Preuss . Jahr. , 163(1918), 8.
2. Picard, VIC, 125.
3. Ibid., 133.
4. Ibid., 158.
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essay the "Antinomie . ..zwischen den Normen und den
Naturgesetzen"
1
is strongly stressed. "Wir mussen uns klar
machen," writes Windelband, "dass das Nomwidrige ebenso
2
notwendig unserera Wesen entspringt wie das Normgerechte."
Again he says: "Diese Na turnotwendigkei t
des Normwidrigen in den empirischen Rmktionen
der Vemunft ist die allgemeine Fundamental ta tsache, von der
die kritische Philosophic in alien ihren Disziplinen aus-
geht..."' In the light of these quotations, to which many
more equally striking could be added, there is no basis for
the charge that Windelband held that norms and natural laws
must
,
or even always do, work together in reality.
The second criticism, likewise, roots in an inadequate
understanding of Windelband’s position. Norms and natural
laws are H different," and they do "come into collision" in
the empirical world order. But both can not be called "laws"
in any unambiguous sense of the latter term. For Windelband,
Naturgesetze exist, and conformity with them is necessary.
Normen
,
however, are ideal standards; and conformity to them,
so far from being necessary, is in many cases exceedingly
4
difficult, or, indeed, impossible. Aside from inexcusable
ambiguity in terms, norms, in Windelband's sense, can not
be called laws.
TT PRA, II, 300.
2. Ibid., 300-301.
3. Ibid., 301.
4. For a fuller exposition of Windelband* s theory of
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A third criticism of Windelband brought forward by-
Picard is that "Windelband's theory .. .unwarrantably isolates
cognition, feeling, and will." A greater mifrepresentation
of Windelband' s position would be impossible. So far from
isolating cognition, feeling, and will, he relates them in
the most intimate manner. A reading of Beitrdge zur Lehre
vom negativen Urtell
,
of "l3rber Denken und Nachdenken," ^
which was first published under the title, "l5her den Ein-
3
fluss des Wi liens auf das Denken, and of Per Wilie zur
Wahrheit is sufficient to refute utterly this criticism by
Picard.^
It is clear, therefore, that Picard's conclusions are
invalidated by the defects of his method. Windelband'
s
theory of norms, and its bearing on the problem of tnis
Dissertation, will be investigated in Chapter Five.
D. Daniels.
Georg Daniels, in his Das Geltungsproblem in Windelbands
Philosophic
,
makes no reference to the problem of this Dis-
sertation. His work, although far more profound than Picard's,
shares one of the major defects of the latter. It is based
upon a reading of a small part of Windelband's writings. A
few references to Daniels's discussion of problems related to
the pessimism of Windelband will be given in later Chapters.
T7 Picard, VIC, 139.
2. PRA, II, 24-58.
3. Viertei jahrss.f .wiss.Phil.u.Soz. , 2(1878)* 2H5-297.
See, also, 19-24.
4. For a fuller exposition of Windelband's views on this
problem, see pp. 125-129, below.
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In the first paragraph of this Introductory Chapter two
reasons were given to show that tue problem of this Disser-
tation is worthy of careful investigation. It has now been
shown, further, that it still awaits such investigation.
V. The major problems to be considered.
The major problems to be considered in this Dissertation
are the following: Windelband's critique of pessimism, to be
discussed in Chapter Two; tne historical origins of the pes-
simism of Windelband, to be discussed in Chapter Three; the
pessimistic trend in Windelband f s view of history, to be dis-
cussed in chapter Four; and the pessimistic trend in Windel-
band's systematic philosophy, to be discussed in chapter Five.
A summary and criticism of Windelband's pessimistic conclu-
sions will be given in Chapter Six; the conclusions of the
Dissertation in Chapter Seven.
:'••••
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S CRITIQUE OF PESSIMISM
I. The occasion of Windelband 1 s critique of pessimism.
In Germany during the third quarter of the nineteenth
century philosophical interest and activity were at a low
level. A "Ruckschlag gegen die grosse Zeit des deutschen
Idealismus" * had set in. Pessimism and materialism were the
2
two dominant philosophical tendencies. An account of
materialism does not, of course, fall within the scope of
this Dissertation. The pessimism of the period before 1870
is regarded by Windelband as having its "allgemeinen Griinde
in politischen und sozialen Verhaltnissen, und die begierige
.3
Aufnahme der Schopenhauerschen Lehre... The persistence of
pessimism after 1870, when trie political and social condi-
tions were greatly improved, he attributes to the slowness
with which "die Wandlungen des Volksgeistes zun Bewusstsein
4
der begrifflichen Erkenntnis gelangen."
IT PRA., II, 5.
2. Loc. cit. Cf. PDG, 01.
3. LGP, 558. Cf. PRA, II, 5-0.
4. PRA, II, 0. Cf. PDG, 75.
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Wnen Windelband entered upon his career as teacher of
philosophy, he found pessimism widespread and influential.
It was one of the most powerful factors in determining the





Philosophic des Unbewussten (1869) had recently appeared.
The adherents of pessimism were producing a veritable
"Hochflut" of popular literature in support of their philos-
ophy.' In such a situation no one could maintain a neutral
position with reference to pessimism. " . • .Gleichviel, ob
man ihn bek&mpft Oder vertritt, ob man ihn verketzert oder
preist, ob man in ihm einen Wahn oder eine Religion sieht,
man muss ihn als eine Tatsache betrachten und mit ihm
4
rechten." Rechten is probably a typographical error for
rechnen
.j
Windelband "reckoned with" pessimism by subjecting
it to a severe criticism in his lecture, "Pessirnismus und
5
Wissenschaft, delivered in 1876.
Much of the current popularity of pessimism, Windelband
declared, was due to the fact that it had become fashionable.
It gratified personal vanity. " • . .Wer sich...dazu aufschwingt,
die Welt zu beurteilen und sie gar zu verwerfen, der zeigt
_6
eben dadurch, dass er an innerer Bedeutung uber ihr steht.
Hence, the aristocrats were pessimists. Among the masses
pessimism resulted from the fact that the increase in the
IT PRA, II, 218.
2. PDG, 75.




5. See p. 5, above.
6. PM, II, 218.
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number of conscious needs greatly exceeded the possibility of
satisfying those needs. In consequence, pessimism "frisst
sich so als eine Stimmung des Unmuts und der Unbehaglichkeit
in alle Schichten der Bevolkerung hinein."
1
Such pessimism,
however, as rests only on uncritical confoimity to current
custom, or roots only in an unreasonable desire for the un-
attainable, requires no refutation beyond the disclosure of
its irrational and inadequate basis. Windelband, therefore,
directed his criticism against that form of pessimism for
which the support of science was claimed. This was, in his
opinion, "die gefahrlichs te Form seines gegenwartigen Auf-
2
tretens. He undertook to prove that this claim that pes-
simism is " ein beweisbares Resultat wissenschaftlicher Unter-
3
suchungen" is invalid.
II. Pessimism is only a subjective mood.
4
Windelband constantly refers to pessimism and optimism





and Gefuhlsweise . He employs
the term Stimmung consistently, as the citations show, from
1876 to 1914. Disposition and Gefuhlsweise are, of course,
only verbal variations of S timmung . What Windelband means is
IT PM, II, 219.
2. Loc. cit. Cf. Ibid., 224.
3. Loc. cit.
4. Windelband 1 s critique of pessimism applies equally
to optimism. See PM, II, 220.
5. PM, II, 219, 220, 221. LGP, 561. UW, 53. EP, 425,
426, 428.
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that pessimism is only a subjective psychological state.
Such states all of us experience "abwechselnd, zeitweise in
1
uns selbst." Once they have been aroused by external con-
2 3ditions or physiological processes,' pessimistic moods
tend, according to the laws of association, to accentuate
themselves by communicating their own emotional quality to
4
all ideas whatever that enter consciousness.
Normally, a pessimistic mood is "nur vorubergehender
5
Natur. In consequence of temperament or unpleasant person-
al experiences, however, such a mood may become a constant
-
"Neigung des Individuums zu. • .pessimistischer Auffassung.
•
As the pessimistic disposition becomes more firmly established,
there develops an ever stronger tendency to see "die Gesamt-
7
heit der Dinge" in the light of that disposition. ...Dem
traurigen. . .ist alles traurig, er steht in jeder Betrachtung
auf der Scha ttenseite und sucht geflissentlich die Domen
8
der Welt, um sich an ihnen neu zu verwunden." Inevitably,
therefore, the pessimist sees the world "von der triiben, . .
.
9
von der schlechten Seite."* Consequently, the pessimisms




2. Ibid.*, 6. LGP, 558.
3. PltA, II, 221.
4. Ibid., 220, 221.
5. Ibid., 221.
6. Loc. cit. EP, 424.
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In brief, all pessimism is subjective both in origin and in
validity.
Windelband considers pessimistic moods "ins Extrem ge-
„2
trieben" abnonnal. They make those who experience them
3
* schwerbliitig und gleichgiltig." This is one of the caustic
4
criticisms he brought against eudaemonistic pessimism, the
type prevalent when he wrote his critique. Pessimism of this
type is based on the hedonistic assumption that the highest
goal of existence is pleasure, and on the conviction that the
world is ill adapted to the production of pleasure. Such
pessimism Windelband considered "rein pa thologisch." ** In his
essay, "Was ist Philosophie?",
6
written in 1882, Windelband
refused to include the consideration of hedonistic questions,
and their bearing on pessimism, under the term "philosophy."
"Wer das Philosophic nennen will, - habeat sibi ; ich halte
es fur eine Entladung des Lusttriebes, welche in die Ge-
7
scliichte der Pathologie des menschlichen Denkens gehort."
Windelband' s last reference to pessimism as a pathological
phenomenon was made in 1892. It is possible that the dropping
of this tern indicates a diminishing hostility toward pessi-
TT Pitt, II, 222.
2. Ibid., 223.
3. Loc • cit.
4. Ibid., 234.
5. Ibid., 236.
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raism. The validity and value of this criticism will be con-
sidered in section IV of this Chapter.
III. Pessimism does not admit of scientific proof.
As long as pessimism claims to be no more than a mere
subjective mood, it remains, according to Windelband, "durch-
aus unangreifbar." It is a different matter, however, when
2the pessimistic mood is generalized into a world view, for
which objective validity and scientific proof are claimed.
Here pessimism assumes its 'feefahrlichste FonTi,"* and, at the
same time, the fom most open to criticism.
A. The historical connection between pessimism and science.
The blame for the prevailing but mistaken view that pes-
simism is "wissenschaftlich begriindbar und gar schon begrundet"
rests largely, Windelband says, on German philosophers. It
was among them that science became definitely associated
first with optimism, and later with pessimism. Leibniz at-
tempted a scientific proof that the world is "unter den
mdglichen Welten die beste."
5
Hegel *s familiar formula,
"Alles was ist, 1st verniinftig," was generally regarded as a
philosophical expression of idealistic optimism. Then Scho-
penhauer, dwelling on the irrational aspects of the world








6. Ibid., 226 • LGP, 558.
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oped a pessimistic world view, and claimed for it the same
objective validity and scientific proof previously claimed
for optimism.
1
In this respect, Hartmann followed Schopenhauer.
2It is against this "wissenschaftlicli begrundeten Pessimismus"
that Windelband directs two criticisms, designed to prove the
"Unhaltbarkeit dieser Verbindung."
'
B. A Stinmung does not admit of proof.
Pessimism is, for Windelband, only a Stimmung . But "Stim-
mungen kann man weder beweisen noch widerlegen." Moods are
subjective. Scientific proof must be objective. Science, in
order to arrive at valid conclusions must preclude subjective
factors altogether. "Wissenschaftliche Betrachtung ist inte-
resselose Betrachtung, und die erste, an sich freilich nur
erst negative Bedingung des wissenschaftlichen Denkens be-
steht darin, dass alle Einfliisse des Gefiihls und der Stim-
mung auf die Ausgangspunkte ebenso wie auf den Fortgang des
Denkens sorgfaltig ausgeschlossen werden." Obviously, it
is impossible for science to prove what it can not so much
as consider. It is utterly erroneous, therefore, to regard
w den Inhalt der pessimistischen Stimmung als eine von der
Sub jektivita t unabhangige und philosophisch beweisene Wahr-
„7
heit."




5. PM, II, 223.
6. Ibid., 224.
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The weight of this criticism is conditioned upon the
validity of Windelband's reduction of pessimism to a mood
purely subjective in origin and meaning, and of his assump-
tion that the " interesselose Betrachtung" of science is the
only method of reaching philosophical truth. These presup-
positions of the criticism stated above will be examined in
section IV of this Chapter.
C. Science is incompetent to verify the evaluation of the
universe which pessimism involves.
Pessimism, Windelband says, presumes "den Wert des
Universums zu beurteilen."
1
But it can not rightly claim
scientific support for this Judgment, because science is
not competent to provide such support. "...Die Wissenschaft
[muss sichj fur die Beurteilung des Universums, fur ein Ur-
teil iiber den Wert der Welt von vomherein durchaus inkompe-
-2
tent erklaren..." This is true because the only adequate
basis for the judgment that the universe is bad must be a
determination of the degree in which the universe actually
fulfills, or does not fulfill, its purpose. Such a determi-
nation is possible only under two conditions: "dass erstens
das Universum uberhaupt einen Zweck oder eine Bestimmung hat,
und dass zweitens wir denselben mit Sicherheit wissen."* The
first of these conditions may, or may not, be met. The second
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can never be net. There is no possibility of discovering the
purpose of the universe; every such possibility is precluded
-
-1by the "Begriff des Universums selbst. Windelband thinks
it certain "dass die menschliche Wissenscliaft von einem
Zwecke, der die Bestimmung des Universuns ausmachte und das
Kriterium seiner Beurteilung abzugeben vermochte, nichts
weiss und nichts wissen kann. Vom Universum gibt es keinen
2
Zweck, der objektiv nachweisbar w&re." Therefore, not know-
ing what the purpose of the universe is - not knowing, indeed,
whether the universe has any purpose - science is unable to
determine whether the universe is failing to realize its end,
and so proving itself bad. Science can prove nothing with
respect to the goodness or badness of the universe as a; whole.
Consequently, pessimism can never claim the support of science.
The criticism just stated proves, Windelband thinks, that
all those ends which men have assigned the universe because
they themselves regarded them "als den hochsten und wert-
.3
vollsten" are wholly unscientific and arbitrary. Windel-
band names three such ends, which in the history of pessi-
mism have been assigned to the world, and the nonfulfillment
of which has been considered sufficient grounds for pessi-
mism. They are "erstens die Erhaltung ihres eigenen Bestandes,
zweitens die moglichst hohe Giiickseligkeit, drittens die
TT PRA, IX, 230.
2. Ibid., 230-231. Cf. Ibid., 187; EP, 425.
3. PHA, II, 231.
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Rea li si erung sittlicher Prinzipien."
1
The first of these,
Windelband notes, had already been abandoned, for two rea-
sons. On the one hand, it proved inconsistent with itself.
Only he who regards the world as good can consistently de-
plore its disintegration. If the world were really purpose-
less or unsuited to the attainment of its end, "so miisste
das Ende der Welt dem mit ihrem Zustande unzufriedenen Pes-
_ 2
simisten sicher ein Gegenstand der Befriedigung sein.
.
On the other hand, the physical theory of the conservation
of energy seemed to render doubtful tne view that the world
is incapable of maintaining its own existence. The second,
the view that the purpose of the world is to produce "die
moglichst hohe Gluckseligkeit," Windelband rejects not only
as an arbitrary anthropomorphism, but also as a pathological
phenomenon unworthy of the name •philosophy.
,l
"Diesem
Haschen nach dem Gluck und der Lust hat der gross te deutsche
Denker das eheme Wort entgegenhalten: 'Wir sind nicht auf
der Welt, urn gliicklich zu sein, sondem um unsere Schuldig-
4
keit zu tun. ,w The third, the Fichtean view that the pur-
pose of the universe is "die llealisierung der sittlichen
-
5
Ordnung," Windelband considers worthy of admiration, but,
like all the rest, unscientific. Its basis, he holds, is
IT PRA, II, 233.
2. Loc. cit.
3. See p. 24, above.
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to be found In loftiness of character rather than "in der
michternen Beweisfiihrung der Wissenscnaft."
1
In brief, all
the ends that men have assigned, or can assign, to the
universe are alike arbitrary and unscientific. Hence, all
world views based on the relation of the world process to
such ends must be entirely unscientific.
D. Windelband’s conclusions regarding pessimism.
1.
Psychological pessimism.
As a S timmung pessimism is a familiar " Erscheinung auf
dem Cebiete der individuellen und kulturhistorischen
2
Psychologie. . . With respect to its psychological justi-
g
fication it is "durchaus unangreifbar."
2.
Ethical pessimism.
As H eine auf sittliche Zweckbes timmungen bezogene Ver-
4
werfung des gegenwartigen Zustandes," pessimism is "die
treibende Kraft in alien edlen Erscheinungen des Menschen-
lebens." But this type of pessimism is always restricted
to a given condition of human life, and is often combined
with an ultimate optimism. Fichte, for example, was bit-
terly pessimistic regarding the condition of the world as
he saw it; but he was optimistic regarding the possibility




5. Loc . cl t
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of the realization of the moral order. In a similar manner
Christianity combines optimism and pessimism. To such a






As Weltanschauung pessimism is unscientific and unphilo-
sophical. Throughout this essay Windelband goes entirely
beyond the sphere of the special sciences. He discusses
philosophers and philosophical questions, uses the term Wis-
senscliaf
t




conclusions. Of all this he is not unaware. He says explic-
itly: "Die jetzt so viel erhobene Frage, ob Optimismus oder
Pessimismus, ist...gar kein Problem der wissenschaftliche
Philosophie."*
1
Windelband' s criticism, therefore, if valid,
refutes every possible pessimistic world view. The question of
its validity will be considered in the following section.
IV. The validity and value of Windelband* s critique of pessimism.
With respect to pessimism as a Mode
,
and to the uncritical
generalization of a S timmung into a Weltanschauung
,
Windel-
band*s critique is sound and decisive. At certain vital
points, however, it is unsound. Of these, the three dis-
cussed below are the most important.
IT PHA, II, 242-243.
2. Ibid., 225.
3. Ibid., 242.
4. Ibid., 224-227. See, also, pp. 25-26, 27-30, above.
5. PRA, II, 232..
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A. Windelband *s method.
In his critique of pessimism Windelband identifies sound
philosophical method witn what he calls the disinterested
procedure of science. "Objektiv beweisen heisst wissenschaft~
„1lich beweisen. All scientific consideration is, he declares,
entirely free from interest. One of the indispensable re-
quirements of scientific method is the rigorous exclusion of
all influence of feeling. Interest must not enter as a factor
in either the definition of the problem or the effort to solve
2it. Hence, pessimism can never become a problem for philos-
ophy. Such a method has certain serious defects.
First: " Interesselose Betrachtung" is an abstraction.
Irrelevant interests tend to distract thought, and to hinder
the attainment of truth. Such interests must, so far as pos-
sible, be excluded from every inquiry that aims at truth. But
every such inquiry must arise from, and must be sustained by,
an interest in truth. Windelband had recognized this in 1873,
and restated it with strong emphasis in 1877: "Was man...ge-
wShnlich interesseloses Denken nennt, ist vielmehr dasjenige,
welches lediglich durch ein starkes Interesse an der Wahrheit
4
hervorgerufen und geleitet wird." The very purpose to think




2. Ibid., 224. See, also, p. 26, above.
3. UGE, 9. See, also, pp. 125-126, below.
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sicht, etwas zu denken, verschwindet wie eine zerplatzende
Seifenblase vor dem Druck der rastlos weiter dr&ngenden
Triebbewegimgen, wenn sie nicht in einem wahren und eras ten
Interesse des Denkenden ihren Riickhalt hat."
1
In his revised
view Windelband correctly makes Interesse
,
not Interesselosig-
keit, the first condition of thought in general. Truth- seeking
must always be disinterested; but this does not mean, as Win-
delband held in 1876, the absence of all interest whatsoever.
His methodological exclusion of interest, and with it the
problem of pessimism, from the sphere of scientific considera-
tion is, therefore, indefensible.
Second: Windelband' s method, as set forth in his critique
of pessimism, is inadequate for philosophy. The task of philos
ophy is to give the most complete and most coherent explana-
tion possible of the whole of experience. Within this whole
the experience of value occupies a central place. Scientific
method, however, abstracts from all values except the value
of a correct description of its subject matter. Hence, it is
inadequate for the purposes of philosophy. Philosophy must
employ a method which enables it to take cognizance of all
phases of experience, including experiences of value and
disvalue. Windelband himself, as the later Chapters of this
Dissertation will show, soon gave problems of value the cen-
tral place in his own philosophy. By so doing he necessarily
IT PHA., II, 54. Cf. EP, 34.
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rejected the method advocated in his critique of pessimism.
Windelband 1 s attempt to preclude questions of value and
disvalue from philosophical consideration is, therefore,
even by his own acknowledgement, unsuccessful. So far as
sound method is concerned, the problems of pessimism are
problems of philosophy.
B. Windelband* s assumption that pessimism presupposes a
knowledge of the purpose of the universe.
In his critique of pessimism Windelband assumes that the
only criterion by which a judgment of the value of the world
is possible is the knowledge that t^e universe has an end ex-
ternal to itself, ^ a knowledge of what that end is, and a
knowledge of whether the universe is realizing that end. Only
when it is known that the universe is not realizing its pur-
pose can pessimism have a scientific basis. This broad as-
sumption, however, is unwarranted. The end of the universe
need not be external to itself. Its end may well be its own
development, the actualization of its own potentialities.
Further, nothing is said about the nature of the end of the
universe. Nothing, in fact, could be said; for, acoording to
the mode of reasoning Windelband uses here, that end could
be judged good or bad only on the basis of a knowledge, in
turn, of its relation to its external end, and so on in in-
finite regress. According to Windelband *s assumption, if the
IT PHA, II, 230.
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actual end of the world were the constant production of the
maximum amount of pain possible, and if the world were con-
stantly producing that amount of pain, this situation would
constitute a scientific basis for optimism. This considera-
tion makes it plain that Windelband *s criterion, even if it
were possible to apply it, could prove nothing about the
goodness or badness of the world.
In order to reach a valid conclusion regarding the good-
ness or badness of the world, philosophy must do two things.
First, it must determine as completely as possible what ends
the world ought to have . For example, the world ought to have
as an end the progressive realization, and the conservation,
of logical, moral, esthetic, and religious values. Second,
it must determine as completely as possible whether, and in
what degree, the world process is realizing and conserving
the values it ought to realize and conserve. The result of
such determinations must constitute the only adequate basis
for an evaluation, either positive or negative, of the world.
Tills is exactly the course taken later by Windelband himself
in the formulation of his theory of value, and in the develop-
ment of the antithesis between Norm and Na tur
,
a problem
which will be investigated in Chapter Five. Here, again,
Windelband concedes in substance, but never in specific
statements, the correctness of the criticism offered above.
A comprehensive comparison of what is and what ought to be
’
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may lead to pessimism. There is no valid a priori method of
precluding the possibility of conclusions favorable to pessi-
mism. At this point, too, Windelband's critique of pessimism
is unsound.
C. Windelband’s reduction of pessimism to a mood.
Windelband, as shown above, reduces pessimism to a mood.
Induced by physiological processes or unfavorable circum-
stances, the pessimistic mood sometimes establishes itself
as "eine bestimmte Neigung des Individuums."
1
Thus established,
the pessimistic disposition tends to generalize itself into
2
a We 1 tauffa ssung . This, Windelband claims, is an exhaustive
account of tne origin and nature of all pessimism. It is
wholly devoid of all objective grounds, and of all objective
validity.
This account, however, is inadequate. Pessimism, it has
already been shown, may be a rational conclusion following
from a consideration of the relation of the empirical world
process to the realization and conservation of values. Such
a pessimism might be predominantly logical; and the mood of
such a pessimism might be the result, and not the source, of
conclusions regarding the objective world. It follows, there-
fore, that Windelband’s attempt to deprive pessimism of all
objective support and validity by reducing it to a purely
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D. A possible bearing of Yvindelband f s critique of pessimism on
the origin and development of his own pessimism.
The preceding criticism of Windelband *s critique of pessi-
mism serves to establish two conclusions. First, his critique
is, at its most vital points, invalid. Second, Windelband
himself did not remain long unaware of its invalidity. It is
possible that his realization that he had failed to refute
pessimism may have served, to some extent, to convince him
of the soundness of the pessimistic position, or, at least,
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HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE PESSIMISM OF WINDELRAND
Windelband wrote his critique of pessimism in 1870,
1
before
the beginning of the period of twenty years (1878-1898) which
he devoted mainly to the history of philosophy. In 1878 and




umes, was published; in 1888, his Geschichte der alien
3
Philosophie ; in 1892, his Geschichte der Philosophie ;* and in
1898, his Platon . It was subsequent to this period of histor-
ical research and productivity that Windelband* s own pessimism
came to clear expression. These facts serve to suggest the
hypothesis that some of the sources of the pessimism of Windel-
band may be found in the history of philosophy. An examination
of his works verifies this hypothesis. The following survey
indicates the number and nature of these historical origins.
IT See pp. 5 and 21, above.
2. See pp. 5 and 11, above.
3. See p. 6, above.
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I. Heraclitus.
Windelband^ pessimism has two points of contact with
j
Heraclitus: the dualism of the world process, and the goal
of man. For Heraclitus the world is a dialectical process,
an "in sich gespaltene Einheit."
1
Windelband considers this
the profoundest insight of which philosophy is capable. The
dialecticians, from Proclus to Hegel, have described the
antithetical world process, but have not explained it.
"
. . .Wenn sie
L
die Dialektikj . .
. zeigen wollte, wie - nach dan
Wort des alten Heraklit - das Eine sich in sich selbst ent-
zweit und wieder in sich zuriickkehrt, so hat sie diesen
dialektisclien Prozess immer nur feststellen und beschreiben,
aber niemals begreifen oder erklaren konnen. Es liegt im
H 2Wesen der Sache, dass dies letzte Problem unlosbar ist.
The far reaching significance of this Heraclitean dualism
for the pessimism of Windelband will appear later, especial-
ly in Chapter Five.
With reference to the proper goal of man Windelband
agrees again with Heraclitus. "...In der Unterordnung unter
das Allgemeingeltende sielit Heraklit auch das theoretische
o
Ziel des Mensehen." For Windelband the Allgemeingeltende
4
is the Norm ; and conformity to it is the true objective,
and the duty, of man. An element of pessimism is already
\
IT EP, 130. Cf. GAP, 30.
2. EP, 431.
3. GAP, 38.
4. For an exposition of Windelband f s doctrine of norms,
see Chapter Five, especially pp. 108-120.
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present in Heraclitus, who considers the masses of mankind
incapable of reaching this goal, because they are deluded
and enslaved by sense ^indelband eventually became more
pessimistic still. Something hostile to ideals runs through
the whole texture of reality, and renders ail but a partial
2
realization of them impossible.
II. Empedocles.
Another source of Windelband* s pessimism is to be found
in the philosophy of Enpedooles. It is in the philosophy of
linpedocles that there appears not only " ein erstes Zeichen
beginnender Einraischung von Wertbes tiramungen in die Natur-
3
theorie," but also an axiological dualism. H Es kommt hinzu,
dass die Zwfciheit der Krifte nicht nur dem theoretischen
Bedurfnis. .
. ,
sondem auch einer Wertbetrachtung entsprungen
-4ist..." In Qnpedocles, therefore, are found both the begin-
nings of a Wertphilosophie and a Wertdualitftt . The philosophy
of Windelband is preeminently a philosophy of value; and the
problem with which he constantly grapples, and about which his
pessimism centers, is the Wertdualitat of the world process.
The naive Empedoclean antithesis of love and hate is more
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not leave it to be inferred that he is sympathetic with
Empedoclean thought; his own words make it obvious. "Die
naive Wahrhaftigkeit des griechischen Denkens hat sich
dieses tats&ohliohe Nebeneinanderbestehen der Wertgegen-
satze durch keine Riicksichten fortreden lassen. Wenn
Aristoteles uns recht berichtet, so hat schon Rnpedokles
die theoretische Dualitat der Weltkrafte. . .mit einer
_ 1
axiologischen Dualitat gleichgesetzt. .
.
III. Plato.
Three aspects of the pessimistic philosophy of Windel-
band find substantial support in the philosophy of Plato.
They are the preeminence of value, dualism, and pessimism.
A. The preeminence of value.
Plato developed to a high degree a philosophy of value.
Reality, according to Plato, consists of the realm of Ideas,
in which the idea of the Good is supreme. "Die Idee des
Guten [ist] die hochste, alle andem umfassende, beherr-
2
schende, verwirklichende. . To tne Idea of the Good all
other Ideas are related as means to end. "Die Unterordnung
der iibrigen Ideen unter diese hochste ist somit nicht die
logische Subordination des Besonderen unter das
Allgemeine, sondem die teleologische der
3
Mittel unter den Zweck." Windelband, likewise, makes values
” 17 EP, 130.
2. LGP
,
100. Cf. GAP, 121.
3. LGP, 100. Cf. GAP, 121.
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The relation of Windelband to Plato
at this point is indicated by Ilickert as follows: "In den
giiltigen Werten haben wir jene 'andere Welt, 1 die schon Plato
2
suchte, und die Jedem Wandel entzogen ist."
B. Dualism.
The philosophy of Plato is dualistic throughout. This is
true of both his epistemology and his metaphysics. "Deshalb
bildet den Kern des Platonischen Philosophierens der Dual-
ismus, der darin zwischen den beiden Erkenntnisarten, dem
Denken und dem Wahrnehmen, und ebenso zwischen ihren beiden
Objekten, der imma teriellen und der materiellen Welt,
.3
statuiert wird." This is the dualism of the sensible and
4
the suprasensible. A more fundamental dualism characterizes
the causal ground of the sensible world. In the latter the
Ideas can come only to an Imperfect expression. To explain
this phenomenon Plato was obliged "neben der Welt des Seins
Oder der Ursache, der Ideenwelt und der Idee des Guten, noch
eine Nebenursache in dem Nich tseienden
5
anzunehmen." This secondary cause of the world is utterly
unknowable. Plato holds, Windelband says, "es sei weder durch
Wahrnehmung noch durch Denken, also uberhaupt nicht erkennbar
IT See p. 40, above.
2. Ilickert WW, 19.
3. PLAT, 82.
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oder vorstellbar." It stands, therefore, over against the
realm of reason and purpose as something irrational and dys-
teleological. On the one hand, it must "als die Bildsamkeit,
2
ais das Aufnehmende und Empfangende fur alle Dinge gelten."
On the other hand, the limitations inherent in the secondary
cause of the world constitute for the divine reason "eine
natiirliche No twendigkeit welche unter Umstandender Zweck*-
-3th&tigkeit der ersteren im Wege ist.
According to Plato, this dualism can never be transcended.
It is the metaphysical ultimate. The realization of the ideal
is always resisted by something other, foreign, and hostile.
"Ueberall in der Welt des Werdens wirkt neben der ideellen
Zweckursache eine ’Mitursache, * ein Princip der Hemmung und
• 4des Widerstrebens." To explain this dualistic world process
Plato posits, according to Windelband, an ultimate metaphysical
dualism. "In der Bedr&ngnis dieser Gedanken hat schon Platon
das lapidare Wort gesprochen: fAlso kann Gott, da er gut ist,
nicht der Urheber aller Dinge sein, * und hat schon er neben
die gute Weltseele die bbse gesetzt.
Windelband* s sympathy with this Platonic dualism is
obvious in tne following sentence: "Viel zu erast und tief
fasste Platon die Dinge der Erdenwelt auf, als dass er daran
—ITTP', 96. Cf. GAP, 132.
2. EP, 96.
3. GAP, 133. Cf. PLAT, 109.
4. PLAT, 109.
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geclacht hatte, den Hiss, der durch sie gelit, den Gegensatz
des Vemunftigcn und des Notwendigen, des Guten und des
Bosen zu vertuschen: dieser Gegensatz hat metaphysische
Bedeutung und hedarf zu seiner Erklar^ing einer metaphysisehen
Dualitat."* For Windelband, the world as it is stands in
the same relation to norms and values in which it stands,
for Plato, to the Ideas. In part, the order of nature con-
forms to the norms, and makes possible the realization of
value; and, in part, it contradicts the norms, and hinders
2
the realization of value. This dualism is for Windelband,
as for Plato, ultimate and insuperable. "Durch die Wirklich-
„ 3keit geht ein Hiss..." How large a role this dualism plays
4in the pessimism of Windelband will appear later.
C. Pessimism.
A strain of pessimism is explicitly present in the
philosophy of Plato. His political theory is, in its
5 „fundamental tone, pessimistic. "Pla to ... regards the
philosopher as ill adapted to earthly political conditions,
and believes he should take refuge in tne heavenly life of
contemplation." This aspect of Plato’s pessimism does not
weigh heavily with Windelband. "...Es ist ein Pessimismus,
IT PLAT, 109.
2. See Chapter Five, especially pp. 121-152, below.
3. EP, 431.
4. See Chapter Five.
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der nach den Ausgange des peloponnesischen Krieges bei einem
Athener, und insbesondere bei einem Mitgliede der aristokrat-
ischen Partei wohl begreiflieh erscheint."
1
But the Platonic
pessimism has a profounder side. Evil can never be eradicated
from the world. In the These tetus Plato makes Socrates say:
w Evils ... can never pass away; for there must always aeemain
something which is antagonistic to good... Wherefore, we
ought to fly away from earth to heaven as quickly as we can..,"
Windelband shares tnis view of the ineradicable character
of evil; for evil roots in the dualistic nature of reality
itself. It is, at least, possible, therefore, that Windelband
was influenced to some extent by the pessimism explicit in
Plato.
IV. Aristotle.
Aristotelian influence is clearly present in three as-
pects of the pessimism of Windelband. They are the following:
A. The limitations of logic in the deteimination of truth.
Aristotle, Windelband declares, recognized the limita-
tions of logic for purposes of determining truth. Deductive
logic determines truth by establishing "das Verh&ltnis der
Unterordnung des Besonderen unter das Allgemeine."
The truth of the universal, however, must, in turn, be demon-
IT PLAT, 149-150.
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strated by subordination under a still higher universal, and
so on until premises are reached which oan not be derived
1 Hfrom more general ones. "Das beweisen und Ableiten. . . setzt
jedoch in ietzter Instanz Pr&missen voraus, welche selbst
nicht wieder aus allgemeineren Satzen abgeleitet, sondem
.2unmittelbar gewiss, sind." This points to
significant limitations in all logical proof. "Alles Ab-
leiten bedarf eines Urspriinglichen, alles Beweisen eines
unbeweisbaren Grundes, alles Erklaren eines unerkl&rlich
Gegebenen. Die apodeiktische, beweisende und erkl&rende
T&tigkeit der Wissenschaft hat also eine Grenze: die letzten
Griinde des Beweisens sind nicht zu beweisen; die letzten
Ursachen des Erkl&rens sind nicht zu erklaren."' These ulti-
mate, unprovable premises are, in part, "die alles Wissen
beherrschenden Axiome, unter denen Aris to teles den Satz des
Widerspruchs und denjenigen des ausgeschlossenen Dritten
4 „besonders hervorhebt." But they are also, in part, "die
den einzelnen Disziplinen angehorigen besonderen, nur aus
der genauen Bekanntschaft mit den Gegenstanden selbst zu
R
gewinnenden Satze."’ The determination of principles of
the latter type rests upon an inductive investigation of
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ist...nicht eine von dem Syllogismus verschiedene Art des
Beweisens, sondem vielmehr eine Methode des Erforschens
und des Auffindens ." Here the still more serious limita-
tions of logic in establishing material truth become appar-
ent. Complete certainty never attaches to principles estab-
lished by induction. "Ihite Hesultate sind an sich nicht
2
logisch gewiss, sondern nur wahrscheinlich. The uncertainty
which thus attaches to all ultimate principles attaches no
less to all inferences from them.
Windelband follows Aristotle at two important points:
the appeal to immediate certainty, and the disparity of the
form and content of thought. Concerning the former, Windel-
band writes: "Die unmittelbare Gewissheit bildet ein Ausserst
schwieriges, aber auch das wichtigste Lehrstiick der
-3
aristoteiischen Erkenntnistheorie. Immediate certainty
occupies an equally central place in Windelband f s theory
4
of norms, about which his whole philosophy is built. Thus
the doctrine of immediate certainty serves for both Aristotle
and Windelband to supplement a logic acknowledged inadequate
to determine all truth. The latter element, the disparity
between the form and the content of thought, Windelband de-
velops into a thoroughgoing antinomianism. ^ In this form it
becomes a leading motif of his pessimism.
IT GAP, 152.
2. Loc. cit.
3. Loc. cit. Cf. LGP, 113.
4. PllA, II, 74, 85, 98, 103, 109, 122. See, also.
Chapter Five.
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B. The antithesis of teleology and mechanism in the world
process.
Aristotle, like Plato, recognizes two kinds of cause.
They are "die Formursachen und die Stoffursachen. Jene sind
teleologisch, diese mechanisch. Zweckbes timmung
und Na turnotwendigkei t gelten gleichmassig
i
als Prinzipien des Geschehens Fonn, in Aristotelian ter-
o
minology, designates the rational, purposive world principle;
matter, not the Platonic nonexistence or empty space, but an
active co-cause.* Matter is so far related to form that the
latter can "wenigstens im allgemeinen sich darin darstellen. .
•
;
aber es ist doch ins ofern ein Fremdes und dabei Selbst&ndiges,
dass es der llealisierung der Formen zum Teil als h e m -
mendes Prinzip entgegens teht."
4
The imperfec-
tions of the world are due to this hindering principle. The
form is prevented from coming to full realization by the
"Widerstrebcn des Stoffs, dessen Natumotwendigkeit unter
5
Umstanden zu zwecklosen oder zweckwidrigen Bildungen fiihrt."
In this sense of constituting an obstacle to the complete ex-
pression of the teleological world principle "ist die Materie
die Ursache der Unvollkommenheit
6
und der Zufalligkeit in dar Natur." Win-
delband's sympathy with this Aristotelian antithesis is ap-
T7 GAP, 159.
2. EP, 130.
3. LGP, 118. Cf. EP, 130.
4. LGP, 119.
5. GAP, 104. Cf. 159.
6. GAP, 159.
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parent in the following sentence: "Die Materie ist der Grand
aller Unvollkomnenheit, aller Ver&nderlichlceit und Vergftng-
lichkeit; ihrem positiven Vennogen der Hemming und Neben-
wirkung schreibt Aristoteles mit viel grosserem Rechte alle
die Folgen zu, welche Platon dem /*$ oV aufgeburdet hatte."
1
Aristotle emphasizes the antithesis of teleological and
mechanistic principles so strongly that his philosophy issues
in dualism. "Mit dieser aktiven Entgegensetzung (Realrepug-
nanz) nimrat nun die aristotelische Lehre trotz ihrer har-
monisierenden Tendenz einen ausgesprochen dualist-
i s c h e n Charakter an..." This dualism, which ancient
gthought never overcame, 1 Windelband fully approves: "Diesen
Dualismus zwischen der Zweckta tigkeit
der Form und dem Widerstande der Materie hat die antike
Philosophic nicht iiberschritten: sie verband mit der Forderang
der teleologischen Weltbetrachtung die naive Ehrlichkeit der
Erfahrung von der zwecklosen und zweclcwidrigen Notirendigkeit,
die sich in den Erscheinungen der Wirklichkeit gel tend macht."
A more thorough statement of the relation of Windelband*s
pessimism to Aristotle with respect to the antithesis of
mechanism and teleology would anticipate unduly the exposi-
tion of Windelband 1 s closely related antithesis of norms and
nature. ^ It must suffice, at this point, to indicate that in
IT GAP, 159.
2. GAP, 160.
3. Loc. cit. Cf. EP, 431.
4. LGP, 119. Cf. EP, 431.
5. See Chapter Five.
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this antithesis, which everywhere underlies Windelband* s pes-
simism, the relation of nature to noms is the same as that
of matter to form in the Aristotelian philosophy.
C. Contemplation, the highest good.
In his Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophic Windel-
band concludes his discussion of Aristotle with a reference
to the Peripatetic conception of the highest perfection of
man as an immediate grasp of ultimate truth. "Denn dies
*Schauen, * das nur um seiner selbst willen da ist, ohne alle
Zwecke des Wollens und Tuns, diese wunschlose Verserikung in
-1die ewige Wahrheit, ist das Seligste und Heste von allem.
The last sentence of Windelband * s Einleitung in die Philo-
sophic
,
in which he, as Huge says, reveals **den innersten
Kern seiner *Lebensans chaining, *** is a restatement of this
Aristotelian conception: "Deshalb erw&chst uns Menschen
wunschlose Freude nicht aus der Unrast des Willens, mit dem
wir in das verg&ngliche Treiben der Erscheinungswelt ver-
s trick t sind, sondera nur aus der Stille des reinen Denkens
und Schauens, darin sich die Werte der Ewigkeit offenbaren:
/ 3
y{ p/d To tidier Toy Kdi dpicr-coV." With Windelband
this constitutes a pessimistic conclusion regarding the
worth of striving to achieve ideals in a world so hostile
to such achievement.







3. EP, 432. Cf. WZW, 17.
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Hegesias, a member of the hedonistic school of Greek
moralists, drew "aus dem hedonischen Prinzip eine. • .unweiger-
liche Konsequenz...; den Pessimismus ." ^ If pleasure is the
goal of life, the goal of life is unattainable. "Das Streben
nach Gliickseligkeit. . .ist unerfiillbar; keine Einsicht, kein
Reich turn schiitzt uns vor den Leiden, welche die Natur dem
2
Korper auferlegt. . ." The nearest approach man can make to
pleasure, and the goal he should strive to attain, "ist die
- 3Schmerzlosigkeit, die am sichersten im Tode winkt." Hegesias
"zeigt, dass, wenn Gliiekseligkeit, Wunschbefriedigung und Ge-
nuss der Inhalt und Zweck des Menschenlebens sein soil, es
_ 4diesen Zweek verfehlt und als wertlos fortzuwerfen ist.
Windelband, it has been shown, rejects eudaemonistic
pessimism. He does not regard happiness as the supreme goal
of life. Nevertheless, he agrees with Hegesias that the world
is ill-suited to human happiness. "Der Pessimismus ist die
letzte, aber auch die vemichtende Konsequenz des Eud&monis-
mus, seine immanente Kritik." It is possible, also, that,
despite Windelband' s bitter polemic, a hedonistic element
Q
is present in his own pessimism.
T7 GAP, 02.
2 • Lo c . ci t
•
3. Loc. ci t
.
4. LGP, 71. Cf. EP, 425.
5. See Chapter Two, above, especially, p. 24.
fi. LGP, 71.
7. See p. 24, above.
8. Note Windelband^ interest in "wunschlose FTeude,"
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Epicurus raised the question of the relation of tne evil
in the world to God. This problem Windelband considers still
unsolved. It constitutes, therefore, a significant factor in
his pessimism. "Der Frage Epikurs, ob denn Gott die Uebel
aus der Welt nicht fortschaffen wolle oder nicht fortschaffen
kftnne oder ob vielleicht beides nicht, - dieser Frage hat noch
niemand geniigend llede stehen konnen."
1
Not only does the
question of Epicurus remain unanswered; in Windelband’s
opinion, it can never be answered. In his sketch of philos-
„2
ophy of religion, "Das heilige," Windelband affirms "die
vtillige Unlosbarkeit der Probieme der Theodizee," and de-
clares that the reality of evil "steht mit der absoluten
•Sustantiali t& t und KausalitSt der Gottheit in vcJllig unver-
4
einbarem Widersp ruche." Epicurean influence seems, there-




The Stoics probably influenced Windelband at two points:
the antithesis between what is and what ought to be, and
ethical pessimism.
A. Hie antithesis between what is and wnat ought to be.
The Stoics formulated sharply "den Gegensatz zwischen
IT EP, 429.
2. PHA, II, 295-332.
3. Ibid., 315.
4. Ibid., 315-315.
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deni, was ist, unci dera, was sein soil." 1 According to the Stoics,
the world is "eine durchweg zweckvolle und verniinftige
0 r d n u n g, und sie bildet als solche die hochste
Norm, nach der sich alle Einzelwesen in ihrer Tatigkeit
zu richten haben." The wise man, who is tne Stoic ideal,
subordinates himself "im Gegensatz zu seinen sinnlichen
„ 3Neigungen" to the normative world reason. The great majority
of men, however, do not attain this standard. In fact, the
4
Stoics regard it as an "ethische Grundtha tsache" that all
all evil occurs according to nature. Nature, a somewhat am-
biguous term in Stoic usage, both exhibits the norm and hin-
ders its achievement. To this antithesis of the Stoics Windel-
band's antithesis of Norm and Natur, which is highly signif-
icant! for his pessimism, is closely related.
B. Ethical pessimism.
On the basis of the antithesis discussed above the Stoic
ethics was pessimistic. "Damit hangt auch die p e s s i -
raistische Auffassung zusammen, welche sie meistens
iiber die grosse Masse der Menschen und iiber die gegebenen
Zustande entwickeln." Windelband’s pessimism resembles that
of the Stoics in its ethical basis and scope; but it differs















5. Loc. cit. Cf. ZBG, 152.
5. GAP, 185. See
,
also, p. 40, above.
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Bohme undertook to solve the Epicurean problem of the
1 2
relation of God to evil without resorting, as Unpedocles,
3 4Plato, and Aristotle had done, to dualism. The antithesis
of good and evil extends, "wie Bohme ausfiihrt, durch die
g
ganze Welt."' Windelband quotes Bohme as follows: "Es ist
nichts in der Welt, so nicht Gutes und Bbses inne ist."
Bohme concludes that good and evil must both have their
ground in God. The task he assigns himself, therefore, is
"Gott als den me taphysischen Grand des Bosen zu begreifen,
ohne seiner Heiligkeit Abbrach zu tun." Why, he asks, is
God found "so in sich selbst gespalten, so mit sich selbst
-8in Widerspruch zu sein?" His answer is that this contradic-
tion within God is a necessary condition of God*s self-
revelation. " . . .Wie das Licht nur an der Finstemis, so ist
das Gute nur am Bbsen, so Gottes Liebe nur an seinem Zorn
9
offenbar."' Hence, "Das Reich des Zorns ist so ewig wie das
M 10Heich der Liebe."
In 1878 Windelband, it seems, regarded favorably
Bohme* s attempt to find a unitary ground of good and evil.
He then wrote of Bohme: "...Er hat mit bewunderswiirdigem
IT See p. 52, above.
2. See pp. 40-41, above.
3. See pp. 42-44, above.
4. See p. 40, above.
5. GNP, I, 114.
6. NP, 410.
7. Loc. cit. Cf. GNP, I, 114.
8. GNP, I, 114.
0. NP, 411. Cf. GNP, I, 115.
10. GNP, I, 122.
.1 * • m
















"'.J ta > r r
T
.tfo* * >' •• •>:
% A . i ,






, i . rfOJ “ f rA .f ! T>i '.•: t
T c ff> . . f p ? •,> ,? • ’ •' r n
. ifU i". ! ) ‘ ‘
• -
• I ,
•> r» ' > >ff












' f >Y! ;*:• M
t
»•
• i : J.
.




Tiefsinn den Punkt aufgezeigt, von welchem allein die Losung
m#glich erscheinen konnte. Er hat den Versuch genacht, den
Gegensatz von Gut und Bose als einen urspriinglichen und
1
ewigen in die Gottheit selbst zu verlegen." But in 1914
he referred to BShme’s attempt as futile: "Diesen Wider-
spruch konnen wir nicht uberwinden: die Dualitat ist die
„
2
gewisseste alier Ta tsachen. • For Bohme, despite his
solution of the problem of evil, **eine Rtimmung des Pessi-
mismus, der Weltverachtung und Weltvemeinung iiber dem Ganzen
_ 9
liegt." Likewise for Windelband, who considers the problem
insoluble, the outcome is pessimism.
IX. Leibniz.
There is a close relation between Windelband* s pessi-
mism and two major problems in the philosophy of Leibniz:
theodicy, and the relation of **verites etemelles** and
"verites de fait.**
A. Theodicy.
The influence of Leibniz's Theodic6e on Windelband *s
philosophy was negative but considerable. Windelband was
impressed by the fact that even Leibniz did not dare to af-
4 Mfirm the absolute goodness of the world. "Die Vollkommen-
heit der Welt ist daher nicht absolut, sondem nur relativ.
Sie ist nicht die gute Welt, sondem nur die beste unter den
IT GNP, I, 122.
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moglichen." Any possible world, must consist of finite beings.
But all such beings are of necessity imperfect. "So folgt
aus dem me taphysischen Ubel das moralische und aus diesem
2
das physische." Leibniz did not deny evil, but " er be-
o
hauptet, sie seien so gering als irgend moglich."^ He did,
however, in Windelband’ s opinion, minimize unduly the facts
of sin and evil. Windelband rejects "die leibnitsche Theodizee
mit ihrer Lehre von der metaphysischen Negativitat der Siinde
und des Ubels,"^ and maintains: "Das Bose ist zweifellose
llealitat, das lehrt gerade das religiose Bewusstsein selbst
am deutlichsten und gewissesten." "...Das religidse Be-
wusstsein kann niemals urn die Tatsache der
S ii n d e herumkomnen, sie ist ihn die gewisseste aller
„6
Ta tsachen. . Moreover, it can not be proved that the
world is even the best possible world. That, Windelband says,
can only be inferred from tne hypothesis of tne wisdom and
7
goodness of God. It seems probable, therefore, that reflec-
tion upon the failure of Leibniz’s attempt at a theodicy may
have influenced Windelband toward his own pessimistic con-
g
elusion that the problems of theodicy are insoluble.






4. PRA, II, 225.





II, 315. See, also, p. 52, above, and p. 64,
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B. The relation of "verites eternelles" and "v6rit£s de fait.”
The essence of Leibni*ian rationalism is the hypostatiza-
tion of laws of thought as laws of the world. * "Das logische
Gesetz der Unvollkommenheit der endlichen Wesen war der fatale
Zwang, weshalb die Welt trotz der gottlichen Gute so voller
2
Gebrechen ausfiel." Nevertheless, Leibniz did not overlook
the inadequacy of rationalism to account for all the phenomena
of the special sciences and of practical life. "...So findet
man ihn schon frnih bemttht, auch dem empiristischen Motive
Hechnung zu tragen und neben jenen nach georaetrischen Methode
zu entwickelenden V.Tahrheiten der Vemunft auch diejenigen der
-3Erfahrung oder der Thatsachen anzuerkennen." The a priori
truths of reason Leibniz called "verit6s eternelles;” the a
4
posteriori truths of experience, "v6rit6s de fait." These
two classes of truth are not wholly commensurable.^ Leibniz
perceived "class das Tatsachiiche niemais aus den Gesetzen allein
folgt, sondem immer ein anderes Tats&chliches voraussetzt,
aus dem es mit gesetzm&ssiger Notwendigkeit hervorgeht, u.
g
s. f. in infinitum." The metaphysical ground of the
"verit6s de fait" was, according to Leibniz, the will of
7God. This disparity between the form and the content of
o
thought, encountered already in Aristotle, becomes a sig-
IT GNP, I, 497.






5. GNP, II, 338.
6. ALE, 114. Cf. PHA, I, 162.
7. ALE, 114. Cf. PRA, II, 160.
8. See pp. 45-47, above.
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nificant factor in Windelband’s pessimism, where it assumes
the form of a thoroughgoing antinomianism. 1
X • Kant
•
Windelhand was a Kantian. This meant, in his case, two
things: a considerable dependence upon Kant, and a consider-
able independence of him. "Kant verdankt Windelhand. . .die
2
gesamte Grundiage und Grundtendenz seines Denkens..." Never-
theless, Windelhand maintained: "Kant verstehen, heisst ikher
ihn hinausgehen," 1 a "durch die Entwicklung des nachkantischen
4
Denkens gl&nzend best&tigte Satz." This "Hinausgehen iiher
Kant"' consisted chiefly in an extension of the critical
method to include history as well as natural science, in a
7
revision of the Kantian logic, and in the rejection of the
g
metaphysical elements of the Kantian philosophy. The points
of dependence upon Kant which are significant for the pessi-
mism of Windelhand are the following.
A. The main divisions of the field of philosophy.
Kant recognized four main groups of philosophical prob-
lems: the theoretical, the ethical, the esthetic, and the
religious.^ Windelhand accepted this division, and ex-
" T7 See Chapter Five, especially pp. 99-108.
2. Huge, WW, 33.
3. PHA, I, Vorwort, IV.
4. Kickert, W,“"S7
5. Leisegang, RGP, 66.
6. Loc. cit.; WZW, 17; PHA, II, 13-14; and Huge, WW, 40-41.
7. BNU, 167.
8. Huge, WW, 40-41. Cf. p. 66, helow.
9. Itickert, WW, 17-18.
10.
See EP, table of contents.
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tended his pessimism to the four fields of knowledge,
morality, art, and religion.
1
B. Philosophy of value.
The Kantian philosophy is predominantly a philosophy of
2
value. Kant’s primary objective was the "Begriindung des
3
ethischen, asthetischen und religiosen Wertlebens." 1 "Das
historisch Gegebene der Werte ist das Objekt fdr die philo-
sophische Kritik. Das ist das ABC der kritischen Philosophic -
. -4
am besten zu lernen aus Kant’s Erkenntnistheorie." Windel-
band defines Kant’s idealism as "die Lehre, dass der Sinn
der Welt in der Verwirklichung jener ’Ideen* gesucht werden
rausse, die nicht als Gegenstande der Erkenntnis gegeben, son-
,,5dem als Werte und Ziele des Lebens aufgegeben sind." The
Ideen are the universally valid norms of science, ethics,
6
and esthetics.
At this point Windelband follows Kant closely. His
7
philosophy of value stands "auf dem Boden Kants. He himself
wished to have his philosophy considered "eine Weiterbildung
-8
der Gedanken Kants." Therefore, the philosophy of value, of
which Windelband is often called the founder, can not be
regarded as entirely his own achievement. "Rchon Kant hatte
TV See p. 53, above.








7. Ricker t, WW, 18.
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den Unterschied von quaes tio facti und quaestio juris betont,
also das Tatsachliche vom Geltenden getrennt. . ."* "Entirely
in the spirit of Kant, Windelband's conception of philosophy
is based on a sharp distinction between the standpoint of
-2fact and that of validity." In this sharp distinction Win-
delband's pessimism roots.
C. Dualism.
Kant held that there is a certain mutual adaptation of
the rational and the sensuous to each other. "In gewissem
Sinne erleben wir das schon in unser Erkenntnis selbst. Ihre
beiden Momente, der Qnpfindungsstoff und die Forrnen des In-
_ 3tellekts, . . .erweisen sich als zu einander passend." The har-
monious union of the two is found in esthetic experience.
"Aber es ist nienals der Meinung gewesen, dass sich damit die
Kluft zwischen Sinnlichen und Ubersinnlichen wirklich
4
schliesse. . Even upon Kant's effort in his Kritik der
Urteilskraf
t
to discover a purposive connection between the
sensuous and the rational "fallt doch...der Schatten von der
Unerfilllbarkeit der Aufgaben, von der Unzulanglichkeit des
Wirklichen zum Ideal... In diesera Sinne beharrt Kant bei
5
seiner dualistischen Weltanschauung."’ Dualism, Windelband
T7 ltickert, WW, 21.
2. Schaub, HEP, Phil.ltev., 25(1916), 200.
3. IKW, 25. Cf . STT ," "Kant- S tudien
,
10(1905), 408.
4. IKW, 23. Cf. STI, Kant- S tudieh, 10(1905), 409.
5. IKW, 30. Cf. OLP, EanCTTtucTien, 15(1910), VI.
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maintains, is the "Kempunkt" of the Kantian philosophy. "Der
Gegensatz der sinniieh Notwendigen und des iibersinnlich Er-
2forderlichen gehdrt zum Wesen der Wirklichkeit. • ." In ethics
the antithesis takes the form of the opposition of duty and
inclination/ "Unser Gewissen lehrt uns, dass darin [in sen-
sation] eine ltealitat steckt, die dem sittlichen Zweckgesetze
widerstrebt und ihm unterworfen werden soli. Denn unser eignes
sinnliches Wesen ist nicht bloss eine Vors tel lungsform des
Ubersinnlichen, sondem dessen streitbarer Widerpart." Only
where this antithesis of inclination and duty is present is
morality possible. In epistemology the antithesis takes the
form of the opposition between reason and "Ding an sich." The
latter is a "Rest, an welchem die Vemunfterkenntnis scheitert,
...ein Unbegreifliches, eine Thatsache, die gilt* ohne er-
kannt zu sein,"' "ein undurchdringliches Geheimnis."
Windelband commends Kant for accepting this dualism as
ultimate. "Darum ist es vielleicht das Hochste von Kants
Weislieit und das Tiefste in seinem Welt- und nebensvers tand-
nis, dass er kein Griibeln darauf verschwendet hat, diesen
Dualismus, wie man sagt, zu *uberwinden,
1
hinter dies letzte
Geheimnis zu dringen, das die uniibersteigliche Grenze des
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endlichen Geistes bildet." Kant's field was the fruitful
expanse of experience, and of conscience in particular. "Er
zeigt den Menschen in dem gewaltigen Gegensatze dessen, was
ist, und dessen, was sein soli. Woher dieser Hiss in der
2
Welt stamrat, das werden wir nie ergrubeln. • It seems
clear, therefore, that Windelband's dualism, which is inti-
mately connected with his pessimism, has one of its sources
in the philosophy of Kant.
D. Metaphysical agnosticism.
In metaphysics Kant was an agnostic. Only phenomena are
knowable. Noumenal reality, the thing-in- itself, is unknowable.
That Kant, however, did not consistently exclude all meta-
physical elements from his philosophy is well known. Windel-
band sought to improve upon Kant^ by carrying out with strict
consistency the principle of metaphysical agnosticism. "In
diesem Sinne konnen wir uns Kants Lehre aneignen, wenn wir
jede metaphysische Wendung von ihr abstreifen. . . Sobald man
diesen Eoden verlasst, gerat man in die Dunkelheit der
metaphysischen Spekulation, die wir hinsichtlich der letzten
H&tsel des Daseins und vor allem unserer eigenen Stellung
darin niemals aufzuhellen die Hoffnung haben."^ Windelband's
R
rejection of metaphysics' precluded the possibility of a
solution of many of the problems he raised and pronounced
IT iinv, 31.
2. Ibid., 31-32.
3. See p. 58, above.
4. UW, 181. Cf. Huge, WW, n. 1.
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insoluble. Drews correctly observes that Winclelband J s "Kant-
ischer Standpunkt und die damit zusammenhangende Abneigung
gegen die Metaphysik ihn daran verhindert, selbst einen
eigenen Weg zu beschreiten und seine Gedankenkeime in einer
neuen Synthese vollends ausreifen zu lassen."
1
Thus Windel-
band's metaphysical agnosticism, which was a part of his
Kantian heritage, becomes a source of his pessimism.
E. Pessimism.
Kant was not a pronounced pessimist. Even his dualism
did not make him that. "Er stellt es als die letzte und un-
uberwindliche Ta tsache, . . .dass wir uns in einer solchen in
sich antagonistischen Welt befinden, und er bejaht dies Fak-
tum gerade aus der Energie des sittlichen Willens heraus.
Es ist gut so, denn nur so gibt es wirklich etwas zu tun in
2der Welt." Hartmann, who is interested in proving that Kant
is "der Vater des raodemen, d. h. eudamonologischen Pessimis-
mus," notes, however, that Kant was "keinenfalls absoluter
M 3Pessimist, ebensowenig wie er metaphysischer Pessimist war."
Nevertheless, pessimistic elements are present in Kant's
philosophy. Kant considered the world ill suited to produce
happiness, a factor, though a subordinate one, in the highest
good. In fact, the happiness of man declines as culture ad-
m 4
vances. "In dieser Einsicht ist Kant Housseau gefolgt." So




3. Hartmann, KP, Kant- Studien, 5(1900-1901), 22.
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far, therefore, as considerations of happiness are concerned,
Kant held a pessimistic view of the world.
Another pessimistic element in Kant finds expression in
his "Ueber das Misslingen aller philosophischen Versuche in der
Theodicee." He defines theodicy as "die Vertheidigung der hoeh-
sten Weisheit des Welturhebers gegen die Anklage, welche die
Vemunft aus dem Zweckwidrigen in der Welt gegen jene erhebt."^
No theodicy, he held, has reached its objective. " • • .Alle bis-
herige Theodicee [leistet] das nicht, was sie verspricht, nam-
lich die moralische Weisheit in der Weltregierung gegen die
Zweifel, die dagegen aus dem, was die Erfahrung an dieser Welt
zu erkennen gibt, gemacht werden, zu rechtfertigen; obgleich
freilich diese Zweifel als Einwiirfe. • .auch das Gegentheil nicht
m 2beireisen konnen." He even raises serious doubts concerning the
o
future of the world, in which his own transcendental optimism
is founded. "Die Vermuthung [bleibt], dass die Uebereinstimmung
des Schicksals der Menschen mit einer gtittlichen Gerechtigkeit,
nach den Begriffen, die wir uns von ihr machen, so wenig dort,
4
wie hier zu erwarten sei." With respect to the "Endabsicht
Gottes,"'
)
the world is for us " ein verschlossenes Buch."
1
Windelband accepts Kant's view of both the historical de-
6 7
cline of happiness and of the failure of theodicy. It is
IT Kant, MVT, 77.
2. Ibid., 85. Cf. Lempp , PDT, 63.
3. Hartmann, KP, Kant-Studien, 5(1900-1901), 27.
4. Kant, MVT, 85.
5. Ibid., 86.
6. See Chapter Four. Cf. EP, 355.
7. PHA, II, 315. Cf. GNP, II, 361; UW, 151. See, also,
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probable, therefore, that Kant’s pessimism was a direct
source of Windelband’s.
XI. Fichte.
The philosophy of Fichte is the source of two elements
in Windelband
1
s pessimism: voluntarism and critical teleology.
A. Voluntarism.
Fichte developed and emphasized the Kantian principle
that "das Hochste und Letzte, das eigentlich Lebensgewaltige,"
*
is not idea but "der Wille."
1
In the will are found both the
essence of personality and the ground of the world. In connec-
tion with his emphasis on the will Fichte brought " eine Philo-
sophie des ’Sollens’ ganz in der Vordergrund." Windelband was
greatly influenced by this Fichtean voluntarism. "Von Fichte
erhielt er die wichtigs ten Anregungen in Bezug auf die Anerken-
nung des Primates der praktischen Vemunft..." This voluntarism
constitutes an element in Windelband f s pessimism.
B. Critical teleology.
Fichte first introduced the principle of teleology into
4
critical philosophy. He treated "alle Axiome, alle Normen...
5
als Mittel zum Zweck der Allgemeingiltigkeit. This critical
teleology Windelband commends and accepts. "Darin besteht die
17 PDG, 59.
2. llickert, WW, 21.
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unvergangliche Grosse und zugleich die historische Wirkung
Fichtes, dass er diesen teleologischen uharakter der
kritischen Methode klar erkannte und die Aufgabe der Philo-
sophie dahin bestimmte, das System der (im teleologischen
Sinne) notwendigen Vernunfthandlungen aiifzustellen."
1
The
purposive activity of the will, however, is hindered by a
reality hostile to value. "Das hat Fichte unverriickbar fest-
2
gelegt." This view of the world as the scene of an obstructed
quest for universally valid values is essentially Windelband’s
3
view, and stands in close relation to his pessimism.




Hegel's absolute idealism, like Leibniz’s theodicy,
contributed to the pessimism of Windelband only indirectly,
if at all, by its failure to convince him of its validity.
Hegel attempted " eine restlose Auflbsung der Wirklichkeit in
5 6
Begriffe der Vemunft." His " tiefste Grundiiberzeugungrt
£
was that "alles, was ist, ist vemiinftig.” On this principle
Hegelian optimism in both history and metaphysics stood. But,
in Windelband’s opinion, Hegel’s attempt to resolve the real
into the rational was unsuccessful. "...In der Natur (traf er]
etwas der Idee Frendes, eine ’Negation, die nicht nur den




2. ALE, 119. Cf. PHA, II, 226.
3. See Chapter Five.
4. See pp. 55-56, above.
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stehende Macht der Realitat bedeutete und welche er unter dem
Namen der ’Zuf&lligkeit der Natur’ als Tatsache anerkennen
musste, ohne sie rationell begreifen zu konnen." "...Das
restlose Aufgehen der Wirkliciikeit in die ’Vemunft' 1st nur
2
ein Schein." Windelband, therefore, rejected the central
Hegelian principle, and, along with it, the optimism it had
supported. Thus Hegel’s failure to prove that all that is is
rational may have served to strengthen Windelband ’s conviction
that what is is, in part, irrational.
XIII. Herbart.




holds that Windelband depends upon Herbart
4for his principle of psychological mechanism. Following
this principle, Windelband explains "die Entstehung aller
unsrer Vors tellungen nach Form und Inhalt wie die Verkniipfung
5
(den ’Verlauf’) derselben fur einen ’notwendigen Process*
'
This precludes freedom of thought, and prevents Windelband
from recognizing "die logischen Gesetze ais wirkliche Denk-
gesetze. In consequence, Windelband was unable to
solve the problem of error. In fact, Windelband never solved
that problem. It persisted, and played a part in the produc-
17 GNP, II, 338. Cf. Ewald, PDG, Kant-Studien, 13(1910),
271. Cf., also, GDP, 188.
2. GNP, II, 337.
3. See p. 4, above.
4. Ulrici, RGE, Zeits .f .Phil.u.phil.Kr. , 65(1874), 308.
5. Ibid., 295.
6. Ibid., 300.
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tion of his pessimistic world view.
XIV. Schopenhauer.
Schopenhauer influenced Windelband but slightly. Windel-
band ’ s numerous references to Schopenhauer are, almost without
exception, hostile. Schopenhauer’s pessimism is grounded in
2 3hedonism and in a metaphysics of absolute irrationalism.'
4Windelband rejects both: hedonism is pathological, and a
metaphysics impossible. ^ Further, Schopenhauer’s absolute
irrationalism is invalidated by its failure to solve the
problem "wie man sich denken soil, dass jener unvemunftige '
Urwille die Marotte gehabt hat, in der Gestalt des vernunf-
tigen Bewusstseins zu erscheinen, - eine Frage, die gerade
so schwer wiegt, wie im umgekehrten Falle bei dem Optimismus
der theoretischen Vemunft das Problem, weshalb die giitige
Weisheit eine solche Welt von Elend und Siinde hervorgerufen
a
hat. Schopenhauer denied entirely the rationality and worth
7
of history. He parted company with Fichte in denying moral
value to the striving of the will. "Die ziige des sittlichen
Willens, den die Wissenschaftslehre zum Prinzip machte, ver-
zerren sich bei Schopenhauer zu der Unvemunft eines blinden
g
und inhaltlosen Triebes." In like manner, he omitted the
IT See Chapter Five.
2. PHA
,
II, 234; GNP, II, 361; i^GP, 520.
3. LGP, 520; MP, 508.
4. See p. 24, above.
5. See pp . 155-156, 165, below.
6. GNP, II, 358.
7. GNP, II, 363; PHA, II, 5; NP, 508.
8. GNP, II, 358.
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At three points, however, Windelband ’s pessimism approaches
Schopenhauer’s more closely. Both emphasize the irrational
character of the world; but they differ regarding the extent
of the irrational. For Schopenhauer it is absolute; for Win-
2delband it is only relative. Both stress voluntarism. Yet
even here Windelband denies dependence on Schopenhauer. "Es
wird niemand entgehen, dass dieser Ansicht. . .das schopen^-
haucrsche am nachsten steht. • . Es muss deshalb hervorgehoben
werden, dass die hier angestellte rein empirisch-psychologische
Untersuchung g&nzlich unabh&ngig ist von jener Metaphysik,
aus welcher ihr Hesultat sich als scheinbare Folgerung er-
geben konnte...”' The succession of ideas in consciousness
manifests itself "nicht als Erscheinung des Willens..., son-
dem vielmehr als ein Eigen tiimliches
,
in dessen Bewegung sich
4
nur der Wille als bestimmende Macht betatigt." Windelband
5
associates his own voluntarism with Fichte, rather than with
Schopenhauer. Finally, both Schopenhauer and Windelband reach
the position "dass interesseloses Schauen und Denken...von dem
_
6
Elend des Willens [befreien soil] • " At this point Schopen-
hauer’s influence on Windelband *s pessimism becomes clear.
IT LGP, 520.
2. See Chapter Five.
3. PM, II, 43.
4. Loc . cit.
5. Ibid., 44. See, also, p. 65, above.
6. PDG, 116. Cf. EP, 432. See, also, p. 50, above.
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Windeiband was greatly influenced by Lotze, under whom
he studied at Gottingen.
1
He characterizes Lotze as "die
weitaus bedeu tends te Erscheinung unter den Epigonen der
2deutschen Philosophic. " The Lotzean influence of signif-
icance for the pessimism of Windeiband is threefold. It re-
lates to the problems of value, validity, and the relation
o
of mechanism and teleology.
A. Philosophy of value.
Lotze made values the center and circumference of philos-
ophy. "Die Bevorzugung des Wortes Wert in der modemen philo-
-4
sophischen Sprache ist zuerst durch Lotze eingefuhrt worden..."
"In Lotzes Geiste war es schliesslich, dass die Erkenntnis des
Seins den andem Wissenschaften iiberlassen, die Erkenntnis der
—
5
—Werte fur die Philosophic in Anspruch genommen wurde." "...Lotze
hat den Begriff des Wertes energisch hervor-
gehoben und ihn an die Spitze auch der Logik und der Metaphy-
sik gestellt..." "Die Principien der Logik liegen, wie die-
-7jenigen der Metaphysik, in der Ethik." Windeiband follows
Lotze in making values the subject matter of philosophy. So
distinctly is his a philosophy of value that he is often called
"der Begriinder der Wertphilosophie." His interest in value
T7 See pp. 2-3, above.
2. LGP, 530. Cf. PUG, 378.
3. See pp. 48-50.
4. EP, 245.
5. PUG, 378.
8. LGP, 585. Cf. PRA, I, 284, and NP, 540.
7. NP, 534.
8. Leisegang, 11GP, 88. Cf. Ueberweg, GGP, IV, 440.
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stands In close relation to his pessimism.
1
B. Doctrine of validity.
In connection with his philosophy of value Lotze fonnu-
lated his doctrine of validity. Rational values are objective,
independent of individual apprehension, affirmation, or ap-
proval. "Fin Ratz wird nicht dadurch wahr, dass wir ihn be-
jahen: sondern wir sollen ihn bejahen, weil er wahr ist. Eine
Gesinnung wird nicht dadurch gut, dass wir sie billigen: son-
2dem wir sollen sie billigen, weil sie gut ist." These are,
for Lotze and Windelband, fundamental and incontestable de-
liverances of the logical and ethical conscience. "Fur diese
UnabhHngigkeit der Vemunftwerte von der Funktionen mensch-
licher Vernunft, mag diese individuell oder historisch tatig
sein, ftir dies An- sich-bes tehen der Tahrheit, das doch keine
gecieine Wirklichkeit, weder im Sinne des dinghaften Seins
noch in der Art des tatsachlichen Geschehens bedeutet, hat
g
Lotze den gliicklichen Terminus des f Geltens’ eingefiihrt.
.
Windelband accepted and developed Lotze* s doctrine of validity.
It plays a prominent part in his pessimism, where he widens
the breach, in some cases, from that between validity and
nonexistence to that between validity and impossibility of
4
existence.
1. See Chapters Four and Five.
2. PRA, I, 285.
3. Loc. cit. Cf. EP, 211.
4. See Chapter Five.
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C. The relation of mechanism and teleology.
Lotze, influenced by his training in medicine and natural
science, undertook a thoroughgoing mechanical explanation of
reality. " . • .Aber von vomherein betrachtete er diesen uni-
versellen Mechanismus nur als die Erscheinung und a Is die




" Verwj.rkl ichung der hochsten Werte" is found the final
"Sinn ihrer mechanischen Veranlassungen" ' and the "Sinn der
Welt." Lotze thought that mechanism could be shown to
serve the ends of purpose generally. Hence, he undertook to
carry out "die Vereinbarkeit eines universellen Mechanismus
-3
mit einer gleich universellen Teleologie.
.
Windelband, in his dissertation, Die Lehren vom Zufall
(1870), written under Lotze,
4
declared it possible that the
Lotzean view of the relation of mechanism and teleology
might be correct. If one were able, he says, to comprehend
concretely and in full detail the subordinate relation of
mechanism to teleology, he might find it possible to discard
completely the concept of chance.' This possibility he later
denied. A relation of partial adaptation and partial antith-
esis displaced for him the Lotzean relation of the general
subordination of natural mechanism to the purposive realiza-
tion of value. The purposiveness of the course of nature can
IT NP, 533.
2. NP, 534.
3. EP, 172. Cf. NP, 540.
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"nur als partiell giiltig angesehen werden.” Nature frustrates,
as well as realizes, purpose. It destroys, as well as conserves,
value. Emphasis upon "die dysteleologischen Tatsachen der Wirk-
2 9
lichkeit" led Windelband toward pessimism.'
XVI. Hartmann.
Windelband ’s pessimism depends at no point upon the





central principle, the metaphysics of tne unconscious. He
finds in Hartmann only a clever synthesis' of the optimism
of Leibniz and the pessimism of Schopenhauer, with pessimism
predominant. Windelband’ s view of the course of history,




Windelband ’s pessimism, unlike Schopenhauer’s, roots
deeply in history. This Chapter has indicated the results
for his pessimism of his reflections upon the history of
philosophy. Chapter Four will indicate the results for his




3. See pp. 48-50, above.
4. PllA, II, 40-42.
5. Ibid., 226-227. LGP, 558.
6. See p. 93, below.
7. See p. 68, above.


















. tfir r «**?;*»-,$ V ;r T.f n j ! v J_ *.£





.To.to< r- r); i; ' : •; i o
-
”/ rf > . •• t t • ; t- r»




, r onmo • ‘ ' M o r T 1 o . • '
!' '> ?







><»*r t 8 , 'Tf)UJ3rirroffOf{o
1 [jjmo*i oMi hoi n» in t */;m i jrf'j . /ft . no.r ’ ; r: ; vfrr >•/»
')
> \"i \ if Of * 'frxr.r » fc,tali'] i ‘ t o ,
tff I













THE PESSIMISTIC TREND IN WINDELBAND *S VIEW OF HISTORY
Windelband added history to the subject matter of criti-
cal philosophy. This constitutes one of his major departures
from Kant.
1
History, like psychology, provides for philosophy
no standards or proofs, but rather "die Gegenstande der
2
Kritik." "Psychologie und Gesciiichte miissen das Erkenntnis-
material aus seiner vorwissenschaftlichen Unbes timmtheit
soweit herausgearbeitet haben, dass die Probleme der Philosophic




In his emphasis upon the philosophical significance of
history Windelband rejects the standpoint of Schopenhauer,
and approaches that of Hegel. Schopenhauer denied all mean-
ing and worth to history. The historical individual is only
a transitory objectification of the irrational world will.
Hence, "die Vorg&nge des Geschehens, die successive Entladung
T7 See p. 58, n. 6, above.
2. PRA, II, 130.
3. Loc. cit. Cf. "Geschichte und Na turwissenschaft,"
PRA, II, 130-100
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des iinmer gleichen Willens in den Wechsel der zeitlichen Er-
scheinungen, bilden in sich und mit einander keine Entwick-
lung, keinen bedeutsanen Zusammenhang. Es ist in der Welt
iinmer dasselbe Elend, dieselbe Unlust des niemals befiriedigten
Willens. Die Personen und die Kostume wechseln, aber die
Sache ist immer dieselbe: idem sed aliter. w ^ Hegel, however,
considers history highly significant for philosophy. This
estimate Windelband approves and accepts. "Das Bleibende und
Fruchtbare an Hegels Lehre ist, dass er in der Geschichte
das Organon der Philosophic erkannt hat. Dies historische
Philosophieren ist das reife Bewusstsein des neunzehnten
Jahrhunderts ." Windelband dissented, however, from Hegel’s
historical optimism.' This optimism rests upon the theory
4 5
that history is a necessary, rational, dialectical move- .
ment advancing in a manner analogous to, and in tne main
identical with, the dialectical movement of thought. As in
reasoning each stage represents a more complete truth than
any earlier stage, so in history each stage is superior to
all that precede it. This Hegelian theory of the accord of
the historical and tne ration is rejected by Windelband.
"Von einer solchen Ubereins timmung ist auch tatsachlich
durchaus nichts zu entdecken. • . Der *List der Idee* ist nicht
jft
stark genug, sich gegen die Macht des Ilnpirischen durchzusetzen.
IT PDG, 68-69. Cf. PRA, II, 5; EP, 351.
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The historical process must be evaluated in the light of its
relation to universally valid norms. "Um ihn...zu verstehen,




das Folgende nicht als das 'Wahrere* be-
trachten, urn schliesslich bei dem Letzten als dem vorlaufig
Geltenden stille zu stehen; sondem es bedarf eben dazu des
stetigen Hinblicks auf jene Zwecke der Normalitat, die fur
die kritische Methode die allgeraeine Richtschnur bilden. 1*^
Windelband’s method thus brings axiology into close relation
with history.
I. The relation of axiology to history.
History presupposes axiology as its necessary condition.
History is not a mere chronicle of all events taken indis-
criminately, nor of a limited number of events taken at
random, nor of a temporal series of events as such. Most
events have little or no historical significance. Only those
events that involve universally valid values are material
for the science of history. In order, however, to determine
what events these are, the historian must have a principle
2
"fur Auswahl und Synthesis der Thatsachen;" and this prin-
ciple must have its ground in universally valid values. "Ge-
schichte als Wissenschaft d. h. als Kulturwissenschaft ist
3
also moglich, wenn es allgemeingiltige Werte gibt... History
IT PRA, II, 134.
2. ALE, 116.
3
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thus presupposes values, ancl In fact a system of values,
*'nach denen die geschichtliche Bedeutsamkeit des Geschehens
fc 2beurteilt wird." Further, "die Phasen historischer Entwick-
lung [konnen] nur unter Voraussetzung bestimmter Zweck- und
Wertgesichtspunkte unterschieden werden... Das h&ngt mit dem
teleologischen Grundcharakter aller geschichtlichen Forschung
„3
zusammen. History, for Windelband, requires, finally,
4
that the course of events itself be no "sinnloses Ungefahr,"
but that it have reason as its ground.
The universally valid values, which must be presupposed
as the ends of the historical process, provide, in turn, a
standard by which the success or failure, the fruitfulness or
the futility, of that process may be measured. If history
realized no such values, Schopenhauer’s estimate of it would
be correct.'^ If it realized a maximum of such values, Hegel’s
estimate of it would be correct. Windelband 's view of history,
based on its relation to universally valid values, mingles
7
elements of optimism witn elements of pessimism. The latter,
however, predominate. Moreover, as the later sections of
this Chapter will show, Windelband* s view of history became
more and more pessimistic toward the end of his life.
IT PHA, II, 20.
2. ALE, 117.
i 3. EID, Kan t~ Studien , 1(1897), 287. Of. ALE, 117.
4. gk, orT^r;
5. See pp. 74-75, above.
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II. The problem of intellectual progress.
Windelband, except during his last years, held a
^ moderately optimistic view of the intellectual progress of
mankind. In 1870 he wrote: "Immerhin werden wir daran
festhalten konnen, dass alles wissenschaftliche. . .Leben
ein unermudlicher und wenigstens an einzelnen Pune ten
_ i
stets siegreicher Kampf . . .ist." In 1876 he expressed the
opinion that "die intellektuelle Bildung der Menschheit
2
in der Geschichte die wesentlichsten Fortschritte zeigt."
In 1882 he indicated two specific lines of intellectual
progress: the clearer comprenension of norms, and the
increasing mastery of the technique of logic.
It is in the course of the historical process, accord-
ing to Windelband, that the consciousness of universally
valid norms gradually emerges. "...In ihm allrn&hlich. • •
3
[ist] das Bewusstsein der Normen zum Durchbruch gekommen..."
In his reply to Lask, in 1884, he emphasizes this point:
"Ausdriicklich habe ich darauf hingewiesen, dass die *ewigen
Wahrheiten' in der menschlichen Gattung wie im Individuum
„ 4
erst allmalig zum Bewusstsein gelangen..." In like manner
the normative consciousness grows in depth and in comprehensive-
5
ness in the " fortschreitenden Bewegung" of history. In fact,
| nothing stands in the way of regarding "dies allmahliche
IT LZ, 80.
2. PllA, II, 243.
3. PllA, I, 48.
4. UTK, Phil.Mona tsh.
, 20(1884), 169. Cf. GBP, 185.
5. PHA, t, 4'8'.
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Bewuss twerden der Normen als der eigentliche Sinn der Ge-
M 1
schichte der Philosophic.
With respect to logic, Windelband considers the fact of
historical progress equally clear. "Im allgemeinen. • • zeigt
der historische Prozess einen entscheidenen Fortschritt in
der Ausscheidung der falschen und in der Anerkennung der
richtigen Denkformen. . . Es kann kein Zweifel dartiber sein,
dass wir in dieser Hinsicht durchschnittlich viel korrekter
2
denken, als der Grieche.
In 1908 Windelband expressed the conviction tnat the
historical process results in a concentration of cultural
values. w Es gibt eine Konzentration des historischen Lebcns
der Menschheit. In der Mitteilung ihrer Errungenschaften
von Generation auf Generation, in dem mitschaffenden Nach-
erleben des jiingeren Geschlechtes steckt ein Prozess der
Auswahl des Wirksaraen und des Werthaften, der Bewahrung und
„ 3Befestigung der inneren Lebensguter. The process of
history makes it possible for humanity to develop a rational





s optimistic view of this aspect
of history received its most forceful statement. "Hegels
Wort ist zur Wahrheit geworden: die Massen avancieren. Sie
sind in die historische Bewegung eingetreten, die sich
IT PHA, I, 48. Of. LGP, 565.
2. PUA, II, 77.
3. Ibid., 256.
4. GDP, 185.
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friiher in der Hauptsache liber ihnen in einer dunnen Ober-
sicht abgespiegelt hatte." Up to this time, therefore,
Windelband held consistently the view that "der intel-
lektuelle Fortschritt in der uns iibersehbaren Geschichte
-
2des Menschengeschlechts kaum je angezweifelt werden kann."
In his Einleitung in die Philosophie (1914), however,
Windelband takes a much more pessimistic view of the in-
tellectual progress of mankind. He rejects alike "die
enthusiastischen Theorien von der unendlichen
oPerfektibilita t des Menschen"' and Schopen-
hauer’s representation "von dem ewigen Finer-
-3lei der Geschichte," and seeks the truth
between these extremes. He has become more critical of the
common assumption, which he had previously accepted, "dass
der intellektuelle Fortschritt
nicht zu leugnen sei."
4
He still recognizes the value of
the knowledge accumulated in the course of history, and
of the intellectual heritage which each generation receives
5
from the past. "Das sind zweifellos Fortschritte." But
over against these, two other considerations are now brought
forward. First: progress is "nur fur eine ganz dunne Ober-
schicht des gesellschaftlichen Ganzen." There has been
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tive methods in natural science and of critical methods in
history. " . . .Aber auch das gilt eben nur fiir den ganz
geringen Prozentsatz der wissenschaftlich denkenden
Menschen."* Second: it remains wholly uncertain whether,
in general, "die Ffthigkeit des Erkennens, die Kraft des
Denkens, . . .die Selbst&ndigkeit des Urteils im Durchschnitt
*2
wirklich gewachsen 1st. Hasty generalization and blind
trust in tradition prevail as extensively as ever. Even
in the midst of civilized peoples there is to be found,
"wie einst in dem Hordenzus tande der Menschheit, die
geistigen Hanmelherden. . . von so blindem Autorita tsdusel
wie nur je zuvor."' It is with sufficient reason, therefore,
that Drews, in his article on Windelband* s Einleitung
in die Philosophie
,
observes that "Windelband denkt, eben-
so wie Hartmann, sehr skeptisch. . .liber den intellektuellen
-4
Fortschritt der Menschheit..."
It is, however, far from clear that the facts Windel-
band recognizes in his last work fully justify his skeptical
and pessimistic view. Intellectual progress, however slow,
is being shared by an ever thickening stratum of society. As
regards this point, Windelband was more correct in 1909
than in 1914. R Blind trust in tradition is probably far
less prevalent than Windelband assumed. Finally, the mental






4. Drews, WEP, Preuss.Jahr.
,
160(1915), 399. See, also,
p. 93, below, and p. 73, above.
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III. The problem of moral progress.
Windelband was throughout his life inclined to take a
pessimistic view of the moral progress of mankind. In
1876 he wrote: " • . .Wer. . . sich lediglich an das historische
Material halten wiirde, der kflnnte, wie es uns scheint,
leicht zu dem schopenhauerschen Schlusse gelangen, dass...
in sittlicher Beziehung vielleicht mehr Klugheit und
aussere Beherrschung der Begierden, nicht aber mehr wirk-
lich innerliche Gute und wahre Charakterbildung in der
historisch iibersehbaren Zeit Platz gegriffen hat." 1 However,
he adds, the historical evidence is not entirely conclusive.
Even if it admitted of proof that during the course of history
as we know it the morality of man had changed as little
as his physique, the possibility of an extremely slow
moral development would not be excluded thereby. In this
matter, the science of history can neither open nor shut
the door of hope. Nevertheless, if in tne course of
thousands of years man has made no certain moral progress,
it is easy, as Windelband says, to draw the pessimistic
inference that man is incapable of moral progress.
In 1882 Windelband discussed the relation of morality
to survival. Moral progress, he then held, is by no means
2
as obvious as intellectual progress is. The reason may
lie, in part at least, in the fact that, unlike correct
TT PRA, II, 243.
2. See pp. 78-79, above.
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"Moralitat ist kein Vorteil im Kampfe urns Dasein;
im Gegenteil, sie ist ein Nachteil, - wenigstens so weit es
2
sich um den Kampf der Individuen handelt." The moral indi-
vidual must forego the use of means which the immoral
individual may employ effectively. Immorality, moreover,
leads bjr natural necessity to no corresponding disadvantage
in the reduction of one’s intellectual or physical powers.
Wherever, therefore, a moral man becomes involved in a
struggle with an immoral man, other -tilings being equal, "der
unsittliche [hatj die grossere Chance des Sieges. Man muss
durchaus sich klar machen, dass sittlich zu handeln kein
3
Mittel ist, um glucklich und m&chtig zu werden. • There
is no more foolish enterprise than that of the moralists
who seek to persuade people "dass er an kliigsten daran tue,
sich der sittlichen Norm zu unterwerfen: sie werden von der
4
Erfahrung alle Tage widerlegt."
It is as true, Windelband holds, for political and
social groups as for Individuals "dass die sittliche Gesin-
.. „
5
nung fur sie kein Vorteil im Kampf urns Dasein ist." In
fact, history reveaJLs a strong tendency in isolated societies
to reject morality altogether. It shows "dass jede in sich
geschlossene Gesellschaft um so mehr sittlich verwildert, je
alter sie wird; und die geschichtliche Menschheit ware l&ngst
TT PM, II, 76 .
2 • Ibid
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dem ethischen Gewissen ganz entfremdet, wenn sie nicht von
Zeit zu Zeit durch das unverdorbene Bewusstsein frischer
M 1Volker regeneriert worden ware." Only in the case of
struggle for survival between nations does the morality of
a people prove advantageous. "Im Karapf urns Dasfein der Volker
ist die Moralitat die st&rkste aller ausschlaggebenden
Kr&fte. Dadurch wird im Laufe der Jahrtausende der umge-
kehrte Vorgang, der sich zwischen den Individuen abspielt,
immer wieder ausgeglichen und das Gewissen wieder in seine
,,2
llechte eingesetzt."
That Windelband finds here only an extremely precarious
place for morality is plain. Although in the long run the
most moral nation may survive, still even that nation,
together with all others, might, in consequence of the anti-
moral evolutionary forces considered above, itself decline
morally.
In 1904 Windelband revised the view discussed above,
and eliminated its one slightly optimistic element. He
repeats his earlier declaration that morality is a disadvantage
3in the struggle of individuals for survival and happiness,'
and extends the application of this statement to whole peoples.
As regards external fortune, " Rhcksichtlosigkeit und Brutal-
ltd t"
4
are often more successful than "ehrliche und treue
Pflichterfullung. Das gilt - wir haben f s erlebt - von den
IT PHA, II, 78.
2. Loc. cit.
3. UW, 90.
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Volkern ebenso wie von den Individuen." It Is scarcely to be
expected that mankind generally will make any considerable
progress In morality In a world in which immorality proves
so advantageous.
In 1914 Windelband thought the future likely to produce
as little real progress as the past had produced. The history
of man exhibits an almost, if not entirely, uniform mixture
of good and bad. "...Es 1st sehr schwer zu beurteilen, ob mit
der Zeit dabei das Uebergewicht sich von der einen die andere
_ 2Seite merklich versclioben hat. In some cases a high degree
of true inner morality has been attained; "aber auch hier han-
delt es sich urn ausserst geringe Minorit&ten, und das moral-
ische Gepr&ge des menschlichen Durchschnitts mit seiner starken
Legal! t&tsfarbung diirfte schliesslich zu alien Zeiten ungefShr
_ 3dasselbe sein." With the increase of refinement and of the
complexity of the relations of life there appears "eine Ver-
„4feinerung und eine Verinnerlichung des Verbrechertums." The
masses of mankind, moreover, are always egoists. "Diese Individ-
ualethik. . .1st die Moral des wirklichen Lebens, diejenige,
der zweifellos zu alien Zeiten die grosse Masse der Menschen
_ 5
gehuldigt hat und immer huldigen wird. On the whole, there-
fore, the philosophy of history affords few, if any, indica-
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"Es bleibt dabei auch die Mogliehkeit fiir eine Meinung offen,
welche die Unverendertheit oder UnverSnderliohkeit des moral-
ischen Wesens des Menschen behauptet, und das ware wohl im
eigensten Sinne ein ethischer Pessimismus, der sioh iibrigens
nicht bioss bei Schopenhauer findet." 1 This "Meinung," as the
preceding discussion shows, became more and more Windelband*
s
own.
The World War seems to have confirmed the pessimistic
2
views Windelband held already. In 1915 he referred to the
erroneous character of the belief that a racial conscience
had been attained which would make it possible for nations to
adjust their differences and overcome their hostilities. But
now, he said, "wir erwachen uns aus einem sch8nen Traura und
selien uns in der fu rch tba rs ten Itealitat. Die brutalsten Leiden-
schaften sind entfesselt, und die Volker, die sich die ge-
sitteten nannten, wiiten gegen einander wie in den niedersten
qZeiten." juater, with reference to Corate’s theory of the
gradual subordination of egoism to altruism, Windelband
wrote: 11 Ob das tats&chlich der Fall ist, kann man anzweifeln;
wir komnen bei der Frage naoh dem Fortschritt in der Geschichte
4darauf zuruek." At this point death ended his writing.
Windelband’s view of the problem of moral progress gradual-
ly became, as indicated above, more and more pessimistic. The
IT EP, 427.
2. See p. 10, above.
3. GK, 6. See p. 8, above.
4. GK, 58.
5. See pp. 8 and 11, above.
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specific grounds for his increasing pessimism he nowhere in-
dicates. It is possible that a careful investigation of the
history of morals would disclose less grounds for pessimism
than Windelband assumed.
IV. The problem of esthetic progress.
History reveals considerable progress in the field of
art. Of that Windelband is convinced. There has been improve-
ment both in the excellence of artistic achievement and in
the capacity of mankind generally to appreciate the beauti-
ful. These conclusions Windelband expressed in 1882, as fol-
lows: "...Die Geschichte der Kunst zeigt...in der Zeit von
den Griechen bis zu uns eine entschiedene Verfeinerung. •
.
Eine aufsteigende Entwicklung ist auf diesem Gebiete zweifel-
los zu konstatieren. Die Nerven der Menschheit sind fein-
fuhliger geworden... Die Menschheit hat geschmackvoller zu
filhien gelernt. w:l This statement Windelband never modified.
He held, therefore, an optimistic view of the esthetic de-
velopment of the past.
A more pessimistic tone, however, characterizes Windel-
band f s statements made in 1014 concerning the possibility
of future progress in art. He was then convinced that in many
fields heights of perfection have already been achieved
which can never again be equalled, much less excelled.
n Schopfungen, wie die homeriscnen Gedichte, die Skulpturen
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des Parthenon, die platonischen Dialoge, die raphaelschen
Madonnen, der goethesche Faust oder Beethovens Musik sind in
ihrer eigenartigen Vollkomnenheit nicht ubertreffbar, nicht
einmal wieder erreichbar: sie kdnnten hbchstens durch Anders-
1
artiges ersetzt werden. This statement is, of course, dog-
p
matic. It proves nothing. Here, as elsewhere, Windelband
seems to be straining after a pessimistic interpretation of
the course of history. The facts he considers might as well,
if not better, admit of an optimistic interpretation. If
artistic perfection has been achieved already in so many
instances and in so many fields, that achievement itself
might afford grounds for hope that in the future mankind may
more and more substitute beauty for the ugliness that now
exists so generally.
V. The problem of hedonistic progress.
Windelband, as indicated above, ^ follows Kant both in
4
rejecting happiness as the ultimate goal of the moral life,
g
and in recognizing, nevertheless, the value of happiness.’
g
Man is, Windelband affirms, " ein erb&rmliches Geschftpf,"
to whom no one should deny that measure of satisfaction of
desire which it is possible for him to obtain. He who points
7






2. See pp. 81, 86, 87, above.
3. See pp. 63-64, above.
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Furthermore, "kein sittliches Prinzip fist] ausdenkbar. .
•
,




But, Windelband held in 1914, history shows no increase
in happiness. Although science has improved the general con-
ditions of life, conscious needs have multiplied at least in
2
equal measure. Consequently, "die personliche Befriedigung
[ist] in keiner Weise erhoht."' Rather it is the case "class
in einfachen und primitiven Lebenszust&nclen fur die Zufrieden-
heit des Individuums sehr viel besser gesorgt ist als in dem
vcrwickelten Kampfe urns Dasein, zu dem sich das "Leben der
zivilisierten Vdlker verscharft hat und immer mehr verschUrfen
4
wird." So far, therefore, as the value of happiness is con-
cerned, its alleged historical decline affords Windelband
additional grounds for pessimism. Here again,’ however, the
statements which support his pessimistic view remain open to
question. It is far from certain that man in "dem Naturzu-
stande" is happier than civilized man.
VI. Problems of the future.
Windelband* s view of the future, as the earlier sections
of this Chapter have shown, is often more pessimistic than
his view of the past. He expects the future to bring not
17 EP, 266-267.





4. Loc. cit. Cf. Drews, WEP, Preuss. Jahr. , 160(1915),
399.















































>rf r-i * V ' ’ 7
'
' J •«:























. •. { f.
•
*. v>±j ' •' \si •fj Tr: t • * ' *





. ( • , .• . t ,
•
•








progress but retrogression. The values the human race has
achieved in the course of history will be conserved and
increased only up to a certain point, which has perhaps been
passed already. Beyond that point cultural decline and
racial extinction await mankind. Some of the gloomier
aspects of the future course of history, as Windelband fore-
casts it, are tne following.
A. The decline of culture.
It has been indicated already that Windelband considered
the future incapable of equaling, much less of excelling, the
great masterpieces of art created in the past.
1
This, how-
ever, is but one aspect of his view that the summit of cul-
tural development generally has probably been passed already,
and that the decline which precedes its disappearance is
probably already present. "Freilich k6nnen wir nicht wissen,
ob wir solchen Hdhepunkt noch vor uns haben odor ihn schon
iiberschritten haben. Dass unsere heutige Zivilisation in vieler
Hinsiclit wieder ebenso in sich iiberlebt 1st, wie dereinst
2
die romische, dartiber ist wohl kein Zweifel mbglich..." In
any case, the decline in culture is inevitable. At most it
can only be postponed to the extent that current civiliza-
tion may spread to the limited number of still uncultured
o
peoples of the earth.'
IT See pp. 87-88, above.
2. EP, 355.
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B. The depersonalization of life.
Windelband held that current stress on democracy and
quantitative greatness depersonalizes life. He first expressed
this view in 1914. * • . .Wir [sehen] uberall und im steigenden
Masse die unvemeidliche Notwendigkei t der assoziativen
Lebensforraen, welche in ihrer Massenwirkung die Individual-
,,1itat brachlegen und die Persdnlichkeit tflten." From the
standpoint of what is essential in history this violence to
H .. , „ 2personality is "der gefahrlichs te aller Riickschritte It
threatens "uns in die primitiven Zustande der pers#nlichkei#s-
losen Sozialit&t zuriickzudrdngen. Dazu fiihrt die Denokratisier-
_ 3
ung des Lebens auf alien Linien..." Whoever considers current
h n 4history from this point of view "muss vor der Zukunft grauen,"
unless he trusts that help may come from sources of which no
one at present has any knowledge. The facts Windelband con-
siders here do forebode ill. On the whole, however, the out-
look is probably not as dark as Windelband supposed.
C. The death of mankind.
Both our planet and our race are growing old. Windel-
g
band suggested this consideration in 1876, but discussed it
for the first time in 1914. There is no way of avoiding






5. PHA, II, 243.
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h e i t." "Dies ganze bunte Reich der Gestalten [1st]
dermaleinst in der Nacht des Unendlichen unterzugehen be-
stimnit..." " The end of history is nothing. What, then, can
be the justification of history? Windelband suggests two
possible answers. First, the meaning and value of the his-
torical process are to be sought "im L e b e n selbst."
"
• • .Als Ziel des Weges [gilt] der Weg selbst..."' This,
however, Windelband characterizes as the axiology of decline,
exhaustion, and decadence. Second, the meaning and worth of
history may be sought in the traces it may reveal of eter-
nal values, the validity of which is wholly independent of
the historical process* But at this point one encounters
"das ungelBste Hdtsei, weshalb die zeitlose Wirklichkeit
noch einer Verwirklichung in den zeitlichen Vorgangen des
-4Geschehens bedarf... In the last analysis, therefore,
the meaning and the worth of the historical process remain
uncertain.
In the present Chapter the development of the pessi-
mistic trend in Windelband* s view of history has been
traced. This trend reaches its most pronounced expression,
as indicated above, in the section on "Die Geschichte" in
the Einleitung in die Philosophic (1914). Pichler in his
review of this work correctly observes: "Den realen *Fort-
schritt* in der Geschichte beurteilt Windelband nicht
IT EP, 357. Cf. Ibid., 355.
2. Ibid., 357.
3. Loc. cit.
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sch6n-f&rberisch. H Drews in an article on the same volume
says: "Der Abschnitt iiber die Geschichte klingt...an Hart-
M 2
mann an..." The significance of Windelband *s view of
history for his entire philosophy, and for his pessimism
in particular, is suggested by Huge, who characterizes the
philosophy of Windelband as w ein durch die tiefere Einsicht
in das Wesen des Historischen gemassigter, resignierender
-3
Idealismus. In Chapter Five the still more significant
bearing of Windelband* s systematic philosophy of value on
his pessimism will be investigated.
IT Pichler, REP, Kant^- Studien, 19(1914), 388.
2. Drews, WEP, Preuss ./ahr
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE PESSIMISTIC TREND IN WINDELRAND
1
S SYSTEMATIC PHILOSOPHY
On the basis of the Kantian critical philosophy* Windel-
2band developed a philosophy of value. In carrying out the
principles of this philosophy in epistemology, ethics,
esthetics, and philosophy of religion he encountered many
antitheses between the worthful and the actual which he had
to pronounce insoluble. The consequences thereof for his
pessimism are to be surveyed in the course of this Chapter.
I. The task of philosophy.
According to Windelband, it is not the task of philosophy
to explain reality. "An mehr als einer Stelle habe ich gesagt,
dass die Philosophic, wie ich sie atxffasse, niemals die Er-
klarung der Wirklichkeit zur Aufgabe hat..."" It is the
function of the special sciences to explain reality. These
sciences include "alle Gegenstande, welche liberhaupt der
menschlichen Einsicht zug&nglich sing. In dieser Hinsicht
IT See pp. 59-GO, above.
2. See p. 70, above.
3. UTK, Phil.Mona tsh. , 20(1884), 1G1 . Cf. Daniels,
gwp, itr.
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bleibt der Philosophie nichts zu tun ubrig.’’
1
Windelband
thus assigns to the special sciences the task of establish-
ing all theoretical judgments. These judgments, however,
are not without significance for philosophy. The particular
form which the riddles of life assume at any given time
” erw&chst. . .aus den Einsichten und Theorien der besonderen
_ 2
Wissenschaften. In addition, the value aspect of the
results reached by science falls within the proper sphere
of philosophy. * In general, therefore, the observation of
Drews is correct, that, according to Windelband, the
sciences have as their object the world of nature, and
4philosophy has as its the world of value.
Windelband, like Kant, makes the values and norms of
truth, goodness, and beauty "das Objekt der Philosophic.’’ *
He defines philosophy as "die kritische Wis-
senschaft von den allgemeingil-
£tigen Werten." He explains that in this defini-
tion ’universally valid values’ designates the subject
matter of philosophy; and ’critical’ describes the method
of philosophy. Judgments of value are thus made central in
philosophy. All such judgments are reactions " eines wollenden
und fithlenden Bewusstseins gegen einen bestimmten Vorstel-
a
lungsinha It.” But to some such judgments there attaches
T7 PHA, I, 34.
2. HU, 3.




4. Drews, WW, Preuss. Jahr.
, 163, ^1916), 3.
5. P1IA, I, 146^
6. Ibid., 29.
7. Ibid., 33, 34.
8. Ibid., 34.
f3
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a conviction that they are universally valid, a conviction
"class sie nicht nur ftir uns, sondern auch fUr alle anderen
als wahr gelten solle."^ " • • .Wir [jsincQ unerschiitterlich
uberzeugt, dass es gewisse Beurteilungen gibt, w e 1 c h e
ahsolut gelten, auch w e n n sie gar
nicht oder nicht allgemein t a t -
sachlich zur Anerkennung gelang-
2
e n." It is with these value judgments which claim univer-
sal validity, and with their systematic interrela tions
,
that
philosophy is chiefly concerned. Thus, "die Philosophie ist
die V*rissenschaf t von den Prinzipien der ahsoluten Beurteil-
ung. •
• ,
die Wissenschaft vom Normal-
3bewusstsei n." As such, its function is to ex-
plore the empirical consciousness to determine at what
points the claim to universal validity arises.
With respect to method, the critical philosophy presup-
3
poses axioms, "Prinzipien der absoluten Beurteilung," ' which
it cannot prove. "...Weder die sog. Denkgesetze der fomialen
Logik noch die Grundsatze aller Weltbetrachtung, die sich
aus den Kategorien entwickeln, sind irgendwie durch Erfahr-
H 4
ung zu begrunden." Nevertheless, if values possessing
general validity are to be realized, certain axioms or
standards must be recognized. "*..016 Logik kann zu einem
17 PllA, I, 37.
2. Loc. cit.
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jeden sprechen: Du wills t Wahrheit, besinne dich, du musst
die Geltung dieser Norraen anerkennen, wenn dieser Wunsch je
M 1
erfullt werden soil. Likewise, the validity of certain
axioms must be acknowledged in ethics and esthetics, if good-
ness and beauty as something more than matters of individual
taste are to be achieved. "...Fur die kritische Methode sind
diese Axiome
-
ganz gleichgiltig, wie weit ilire tatsachliche
Anerkennung reicht - Normen, welche unter der Voraussetzung
gelten sollen, dass das Denken den Zweck wahr zu sein, das
Wollen den Zweck gut zu sein, das Fiihlen den Zweck Schbnheit
zu erfassen, in allgemein anzuerkennender Vfeise erfiillen
will." From the point of view of method, therefore, "das
Problem der Philosophic ist die
oGeltung der Axiome..., die Geltung solcher
Vorstellungsverbindungen, welche, selbst unbeweisbar, allem
4
Beweisen mit unmittelbarer Evidenz zugrunde liegen.
The view of the task of philosophy presented in the
preceding paragraphs is based almost entirely upon Windel-
band’s writings from the period 1881 to 1884. His later
writings develop certain points, but indicate no significant
changes in his view. In 1892 he declared that philosophy
treats the universally valid values "nicht als Tatsachen,'
M 6
sondern als N o r m e n." By this, of course, he does not
IT PHA, II, 111.
2. Ibid., 109.
3. Ibid., 108.
4. Ibid., 109. See, also, p. Ill, below; Daniels, GWP, 16.
5. LGP, 564. See, also, p. 94, above.
6. For an exposition of Windelband f s concept of norms, see
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mean that such values are unreal. They are none the less real
for being unrealized. In 1904 he wrote: "...Die Werte des
geistigen Lefcens . .
.
£sindj ebenso lebendige Wirklichkeit. .
.
wie die Sonnensysteme." In connection with both these
statements Windelband asserts that it is through history
that we acquire a knowledge of the value of spiritual real-
2
ities. In 1910 he reaffinned his view that philosophy can
do nothing more than establish the validity of rational
values. "Dies Gelten der Vemunftwerte. • .ist der Ausserste
Punkt, bis zu welchem die Analyse der kritisclien Philosophic
vordringen kann. Ihre unmittelbare Evidenz fur das empirische
Bewusstsein zur ta tsSchlichen Geltung zu bringen, ist das
ganze Geschaft der Philosophic."' It was Windelband* s inter-
est in values generally that enabled him to pass beyond the
limits of epistemology, and still to stop short of meta-
physics. Philosophy, he wrote in 1912, must penetrate deeper
than an epistemology which abstracts from all problems of
4
content if it is to avoid relativism. An anonymous critic
states Windelband' s position thus: "La philosophic ne se
resout pas en theorie de la connaissance, mais part de la
th^orie de la connaissance pour aboutir aux valeurs ration-
nelles universellement valabies qui sont immanentes aux
divers domaines explores par les sciences."'^ Windelband's
T7 PRA, I, 167.
2. Ibid., 166, and LGP, 566. Cf. SWP, 22.
3. PHA, I, 285-286.
4. SWP, 3.
5. Anonymous, RWP, Rev. d.Met. e.d.Mor. , 21(1913), Sup-
plement, 5.
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rejection of metaphysics will be discussed in section VIII
of this Chapter.
Drews summarizes Windelband f s view of the task of philos-
ophy as follows: "Ihre Aufgabe soil darin bestehen, die ewig
geltenden Werte des Wahren, Guten, Sch5nen und Heiligen in
Logik, Ethik, Asthetik, und Religionsphilosophie fes tzustellen
und so als eine Philosonhie der Kultur, den Sinn des Daseins
1
zu bestimnen, der das letztere erst lebenswert macht. Never-
theless, philosophy, thus defined, is, according to Windel-
band, "ein Idealbegriff
,
der nicht realisiert ist und dessen
llealisierung iiberhaupt. . . immer nur in gewissen Grenzen moglich
-2ist. The task of philosophy, though narrowly delimited, is
o
still declared too difficult ever to be completed. This view,
expressed first in 1882, Windelband never rejected; rather
he emphasized more and more the limitations of what is pos-
sible in philosophy. The grounds for this position, and its
bearing on his pessimism, will be indicated in the later sec-
tions of this Chapter.
II. Antinomianism.
As Windelband developed his systematic philosophy of
value, he stressed more and more the antinomies he encountered.
Hegel had criticized Kant for limiting the number of the
antinomies of the pure reason to four. ” • . .Nicht nur in
IT Drews, WW, Preuss . Jahr.
,
1G3(1916), 4.




den vier besonderen aus der Kosmologie genommenen Gegenstanden
£befindet sichj die Antinomie. .
. ,
sondera vielmehr in alien
Gegenstanden aller Gattungen. . ."
1
But Windelband goes even
beyond Hegel. According to Hegel, "die Philosophie [erkenntj
nur das was istj sie weiss nicht solches, was nur sein soil..."
According to Windelband, philosophy is much more concerned
with what ought to be than with what is. Furthermore, it is
precisely between these two spheres, between the normative
and the actual, that one of the gravest antinomies arises.
This special problem of Windelband’ s philosophy will be
treated in the next four sections of this Chapter. The task
of the present section is to trace the general development
of the antinomian emphasis in his philosophy.
The germinal stage of Windelband's antinomianism may
be found in his dissertation. Die Lehren vom Zufall (1870).'
He remarks there that "wir fkonnenj mit aller Kenntnis der
Gesetze dem Zufall nicht entgehen, der eben in dem Eintritt
-4
unberechenbarer Nebenbedingungen besteht. This incalcula-
6
ble element emerges in connection with all particular events.
In this treatise, however, Windelband is inclined to attribute
this incalcuiability to the limitations of the human mind. He
does not so much as suggest the hypothesis that reality as a
IT Hegel, Encyclopadie der philosophischen Wissen-
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whole may have an irrational aspect. In 1873 he directed at-
tention to the incommensurability of form and content in
both logic and ethics. "Der ethische Formalismus muss dem
Inhalt des sittlichen Wollens ebensofem bleiben, als der
logische Formalismus dem Inhalt der Erkenntnis ."* In 1877
he affinned the same relation between all the leading con-
cepts in tne history of philosophy and the material of ex-
perience. "Es giebt in der Geschichte des menschlichen Denlc-
ens eine ewig wiederkehrende Tragcklie: es werden Begriffe
gebildet zur Erkl&rung der Erfahrung, und je energischer sie
durclidacht werden, um so mehr zeigt sich, dass sie die Er-
2fahrung nicht erklft ren." This is true from the 'Being* of
Parmenides to the ’Idea
1
of Hegel. "...Es ist immer derselbe
Widerspruch, mit sinnlicher Anschaulichkei t niedergelegt in
der Platonischen Ideenlehre, in tiefsinniger Abstraction
ausgesprochen in dem Dogma von der Unerkennbarkeit des
_ 3
Dinges-an- sich . In 1880 Windelband declared that every
rationalistic philosophy leaves an unexplained remainder,
which stands over against reason as something given and
foreign. This situation he now attributes not to the limita-
tions of the knowing mind but to the irrational character
of the object. "Es gibt im Grunde der Dinge etwas Incalcula-
bles, - ein geheimnisvolles Etwas, welches da ist, .. .und
welches wir doch nie begreifen ktinnen." 4
XT UGE, 72, n.
2. UKD, Viertel jahrss.f.wiss.Phil.u.Soz.
, 1(1877), 253.
3. Loc. cit.
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In 1894, in his address, "Geschichte und Naturwissen-
„1
schaft, Windelband stresses the relation of incommensura-
bility between natural laws and particular historical events,
which are always the bearers of value. These two classes of
phenomena "lassen sich nicht auf eine geneinsame Ouelle zu-
2
riickfuhren." The historical event can never be completely
reduced to, or fully explained by, general laws. "...Fur uns
pbleibt] in alien historisch und individuell Erfahrenen ein
Rest von Unbegreiflichkeit - etwas Unaussagbares, Undefinier-
_ 3
bares. Windelband illustrates this point with a reference
to personality: "So widersteht das letzte und innerste Wesen
der Perstfnlichkeit der Zergliedenang durch allgemeine Kate-
4
gorien..." But it is true generally that "der Inhalt des
„5
Wei tgeschehens ist nicht aus seiner Form zu begreifen.
All attempts to derive the particular from the general, the
many from the one, the finite from the infinite, or existence
from essence have failed. "Dies ist ein Hiss, welchen die
grossen Systeme der philosophischen Wei terklM,rung nur zu
verdecken, aber nicht auszufullen vermocht haben." Leibniz
recognized this when he attributed the "verites 6temelles"
to the divine reason, and the "verites de fait" to the divine
7
will. Kant recognized it when he saw in the fortunate but
T7 See p. G, above.
2. PHA, II, 157. Cf. Ueberweg, GGP, IV, 452.
3. PHA, II, 159.
4. Loc. cit.
5. Ibid., 1G0.
G • Loc. cit.
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incomprehensible fact that the sensuously given can be under-
stood. at all in terms of the categories an indication of a
relation expressing divine purpose, but lying outside the
limits of theoretical knowledge. ^ Windelband, however, does
not appeal to the divine for an explanation of the relation
of form and content in tne world process. He holds that no
explanation of this relation is possible. "In der Tat kann
uber diese Fragen kein Denken mehr Aufschluss geben. . • Das
Gesetz und das Ereignis bleiben als letzte, inkommensurable
2
Grosser unserer Weltvorstellung nebeneinander bestehen.
Windelband’ s antinomian emphasis grew gradually strong-
er. In 1000 he stated that the relation of form and content
presents "die tiefsten und schwersten Probleme. . .der Erkennt-
nistheorie." '* In 1002 he emphasized strongly "jene A n -
. „ 4tinomie des Bewusstseins" which is
encountered as an "unvermeidlicher Antagonismus” ^ in logic,
ethics, esthetics, and philosophy of religion. Here the
general and axiological character of Windelband ’s antinomian-
ism begins to appear. In 1004 he again described the essence
of individuality as ” etwas Unaussagbares, etwas Inkalkulables,
aller Analyse Widerstehendes . Dies Unzerlegbarc in der Person-
lichkeit macht, dass sie niemals definierbar, dass sie immer
nur erlebbar und fiihlbar ist." Consequently, the status of
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personality in the realm of reality must remain a mystery.
ff Wir werclen durch theoretische Erkenntnis niemals jene Frage
losen konnen, wie tief zuletzt im metaphysischen Wesen der
1Dmge die Wurzeln der Individualist liegen."
In 1013 Windelband began to make more frequent use of
the various forms of the term Antinomismus
,
and to specify
more definitely the grounds for his antinomian position.
The fragmentary and superficial content of human experience,
he said, does not enable the universal rational forms to
come to expression. This leads, on the formal side, "zur
logischen Forderung absoluter Gegenstande, fur die aber
_ 2
unser Erkennen keine Anschauung besitzt. On the material
side, it leads to the problem of the irrational. The result
is an insuperable antinomy, an "antinomische Unzulanglichkeit
des Seins gegenilber dem Gel ten .
”
"Dieser Antinonis-
m u s ist...im Wesen des menschlichen Erkennens unaufhebbar.
.
There are, Windelband adds, similar and even more palpable
H - 4
"Antinomien der ethischen und asthetischen Bewusstseins.
Everywhere the human mind perceives a universal validity im-
bedded in an existence and process which attach to it but can
not acquire it.
It is in his Einleitung in die Philosophic 5 (1014), that
Windelband gives his antinomianism its final and most force-
IT^JW, 155.
2. Anonymous, WPL, Logos, 4(1913), 113..
3. PL, 55.
4. Ibid., 55.
5# See p. 8, above.
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ful formulation. In the introduction of this his major sys-
tematic work, he says: "Hinsichtlich dieses Verh&ltnisses . .
.
zwischen dem Intellekt und seinem Ohjekt ist von vornherein
ein Gesichtspunkt hervorzuhehen, der hier noch nicht be-
griindet, sondern nur verkflndet werden kann, weil ihn erst
die gesamten folgenden Untersuchungen im einzelnen wie im
ganzen zu bestatigen haben: wir nennen ihn den Standpunkt
des Antinomismu s."
1
The mind and its object are
to a certain extent adapted to each other. But it is equal-
ly true that n auch eine gewisse Unangemessenhei t zwischen
2ihnen bestehen bleibt. This consideration leads to a
revision of the presuppositions of philosophy, a revision
which, for Windelband, concludes "mit der Einsicht in die
Unlosbarkeit des Problems."* Many illustrative instances
of epistemological antinomianism are cited. Individuality is
essentially irrational. " Individuum est ineffabile."
4
"...Ihr subs tantielles Individualwesen besteht schliesslich
in jener usaussagbaren, einmaligen Verkniipfung, die kein
Gegenstand des Erkennens und Wissens, sondern nur ein
Postulat des Begreifens ist und nur irrational durch eine
„ .5Intuition ergriffen werden kann." The qualitative deter-
minations of reality are equally irrational. "Nienand kann
sagen, weshalb zu 450 Billionen Aetherschwingungen in der
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gehSrt." Tliis is true of the entire relation of the physical
and the psychical. "Nienand kann erklaren, wie es kommt,
dass ein gewisser physikalisch-chemisch zu definierender
Erregungszustand des Sehnerven eine bestimmte Farbenenp-
findung mit sich ftthrt." In insight into the reason why
these phenomena are related as they are modern science, Win-
delband says, has not advanced beyond Empedocles.' Every-
where the incommensurability of reason and the content of
experience is encountered. For Windelband this disparity is
final. It indicates, he thinks, a fundamental dualism. "An
diesem Unterschied zwischen der logisch-mathema tischen Form
und den davon unabhangigen Inhalt der Realltat bleiben wir als
4
an einer letzten nicht weiter auflcisbaren Dualit&t stehen."
In his review of the English translation of Windelband *s
Einleitung in die Philosophic Thilly states this antinomian
conclusion thus: "We come to a stop at this distinction be-
tween the logical mathematical form and the content of real-
ity independent of it, as a final and insoluble dualism."
He then observes: "We meet with dualisms everywhere; we
cannot reduce the two spheres of reality, mind and matter,
to a unity, or derive them from a unity; they remain an un-
deniable dualistic fact... In the end we seem to be left
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essence of which we do not understand." For Windelband, with
his emphasis on the value of truth, this conclusion, which pre-
cludes the possibility of certainty and completeness in the
realm of material truth, led inevitably toward pessimism.
It is in his axiology, however, ratner than in his epis-
temology, that Windelband^ antinomianism becomes most pro-
nounced. "Das ganze Wertleben. . . zeigte eine Unerfiillthei t oder
gar Unerfiillbarkeit der Anforderungen, die nicht nur an die
Vorstellungen vom Wirklichen, sondern an die Wirklichkeit
selbst gestellt werden: und solche unerfiillten Anforderungen
treffen nicht nur menschliche Zustande und Tatigkeiten, son-
dern auch die Dinge und Verhaltnisse, worauf sich diese be-
2
ziehen." Windelband bases this conclusion upon tne not un-
questionable hypothesis that the incommensurability of value
and reality is a necessary condition of all experience of
value. "S o 1 1 e n und S e i n, Wert und Wirklichkeit
miissen verschieden sein. Fielen Norm und Wirklichkeit zusam-
men, so horte alles Werten auf..."' The laws of obligation and
necessity must neither completely contradict each other nor
completely coincide witu each other. "So gelangen wir von jenem
subjektiven Antinoraismus, der sich
in alien philosophischen Problembildungen bekundet, zu einem
objektiven Antinoraismus, der die Dualitat
IT Tliilly, op. cit. , 297.
2. EP, 423.
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selbst in die Wirklichkeit verlegt und. der jenen subjektiven
An tinomi sinus daclurch begreiflich macht, dass er nur einen
Spezialfall davon darstellt. Zu der Tatsache des Wertens ge-
hort notwendig die Dua.litiit des Werthaften und des Wertwidri-
-1gen in der Wirklichkeit. Reality itself is antinomian in
character. That is the most significant of all the factors
that contribute to the pessimism of Windelband.
Windelbancl's treatment of this antinomy of value and
reality wij.1 be investigated more fully in section ITT of
this Chapter. The consequences of this antinomy for knowledge,
morality, art, and religion will be investigated in sections
IV to VII of this Chapter.
III. The antinomy of norms and nature.
The central concept of Windelbancl’s systematic philos-
2
ophy is the Nom. Each sphere of value has its nonns. Hence,
there are logical norms, ethical norms, and esthetic nonns.
The relation between these norms and natural laws constitutes
one of the major problems of Windelband’ s philosophy. His
attempts to solve this problem turned him more and more in
the direction of pessimism.
A. Nonns.
o
Nonns are not natural laws/ but ideal standards of value.
The nonns, "welche wir in unsenn logischen, ethischen, und
IT EP, 423-424.
2. P1U, II, 88.
3. PM, I, 44-45. See, also, p. 17, above.
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as thetischen Gewissen vorfinden," have nothing whatever to
do with the theoretical explanation of the facts to which
they relate. w Sie sagen nur aus, wie diese Tatsachen beschaf-
fen sein sollen, damit sie in allgeneingil tiger Weise als
wahr, als gut, als schdn gehilligt werden konnen. Sie sind
also keine Gesetze, nach denen das Geschehen objektiv sich
vollzichen muss oder subjektiv begriffen werden kann, sondem
ideale Norraen, nach denen der Wert dessen, was natumotwendig
„2geschieht, beurteilt wird. Values, V/indelband holds, are
objective realities. For example, that validity of a proposi-
tion, by virtue of which it is true, can never depend upon
whether the empirical processes of human thought have actually
led to a comprehension of it. "Ein schwieriger Satz der
Zahlcntheorie ist wahr gewesen, langst ehe ihn ein Ma thema-
tiker gedacht und bewiesen hat. Die Wahrheit gilt ihrem
Y/esen nach zeitlos . . ." ' This objective, timeless validity
of a proposition is the ground for holding it to be true.
4
Goodness and beauty are no less objectively real than truth.
Norms are the standards or rules to which conformity is
necessary in order that the objective values of truth, good-
ness, and beauty may be apprehended and achieved. w Es gibt
ausser den Na turgesetzen N o r m e n, die nicht wirklich
sind, sondem gelten, und sie allein verliehen unsenn Wollen
und Fiihlen ebenso wie unserra theore tischen Denlcen den festen Halt?
IT PRA, II, G7.
2 • Lo c . c1 1
.
3. WZW, 13. Cf. UGE, 31; Daniels, GWP, 5.
4. PRA, II, 122.
5. Rickert, WW, 19.
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The teleological character of norms.
Nonas, as suggested in the preceding paragraph, are
teleological in character. They presuppose the purpose to
realize universally valid values.' The norms of logic are
those principles of thought necessary to an apprehension
of truth, those principles ” ohne welche es kein allgemein-
2
giltiges Denken wfirde geben konnen.” Similarly, "die
Normen der Ethik entwickeln sich als die Mittei zur Herbei-
fiihrung eines Wollens und Handelns, welches allgenieine
,3
Billigung verdient. A philosophy of beauty compels the
consideration "dass, wenn Schftnheit etwas anderes sein soil
als individuelle Wohlgefftlligkeit, wir eine allgcmeingiltige
4
Norm fur sie anerkennen milssen." The universal validity of
certain modes of relation and arrangement is necessary in
order that a logic be possible. Certain norms must be valid
irrespective of what the empirical determinations of our
motives may be in order that there may be an ethics.
Definite rules must prevail in the relation of intuitions
to the feelings they call forth in order that there may be
an esthetics. In brief, "alle Normen erweisen sich... als
Mittei zun Zweck der Allgemeingiltigkeit H Ihre Geltung
JdnussJ unbedingt anerkannt werden. . . , wenn anders gewisse
Zwecke erfiillt werden sollen. H This critical teleology,
17 P1IA, II, 131. Cf. Daniels, GWP, 20-21.




n. Ibid., 109. See, also, pp. 90-97, above.
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however, is, Winrlelhand points out, not to he confused with
dogmatic teleology. In the latter * soil die erfahrbare Wirk-
lichkeit durch ihre Zweckmilssigkeit erklSrt werden;"^ in the
former "soil der Geltung der Nomen durch ihre Angemessen-
heit zu allgemeingiltigen Zwecken einleuchtend gemacht
H 1
werden. From this teleological point of view, the validity
of norms, once they are clearly grasped, is immediately
2
evident. It is the task of philosophy, therefore, not to
deduce the norms, hut to discover them, not to prove them,
hut to disclose their immediately evident validity. "Ein
Satz, wie der logische des Yriderspruchs, ein Prinzip, wie
das moralische des Pflichtbewusstseins, sind nicht zu be-
H 4
weisen..." Acceptance of them must follow from the per-
ception of the immediately evident character of their validity.
2.
The concept of a "Bewusstsein ilberhaupt."
Windelband f s theories of norms, and of their teleolog-
ical character, were developed early,' and were retained
essentially unchanged. Hence, in the two preceding para-
graphs, those theories have been discussed without refer-
ence to chronology. The concept of a "Bewusstsein ubcrhaupt,"
however, is a less stable one.
The term "Bewuss tsein uberhaupt," borrowed from Kant,





80, 98, 103, 109, 122, 102.
3. UTK, Phil.Mona tsh.
,
20(1884), 104. PHA, II, 74.
4. PHA, t, 43.
5. In the first edition of the Praludien, 1884.
0. PHA, I, 44.
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was used by Windelband in 1882 to designate the system of
norms as a whole. "Dies Bewusstsein uberhaupt* ist also
ein System von Norraen, welche, wie sie objelctiv gelten, so
auch subjektiv gelten sollen, aber in der empirischen Wirk-
iichkeit des menschlichen Geis teslebens nur teilweise
„1gelten. So conceived, the consciousness in general is
"ein Ideal, daran der Wert aHer empirischen Wirklichkeit
,2gemessen werden soil. For the huinan mind this normative
consciousness must always remain an ideal. For " eine voll-
stfindige Erfassung des Ganzen des Norma lbewusstseins durch
wissenschaftliche Einsicht ist uns versagt."' Furthermore,
the reality of a "Bewusstsein ttberhaupt" may only be ac-
4
cepted on faith; it can not be established by science.
In 1914 Windelband approached the concept of a ">ie-
wusstsein tiberhaupt" by another route, in which epistemology
and axiology converge. "Da es Gegenst&nde nur fur ein vor-
steliendes und erkennendes Bewusstsein gibt, so wies der
Gegenstand, die der Norm der Wahrheit bilden sollte, auf
ein '•Bewusstsein iiberhaupt* als auf dasjenige hin, fiir
tj
das er Gegenstand sein sollte." The situation is similar
in axiology. "...Da es Wert nur in Beziehung auf ein





3. Ibid., 54. Cf. Ueberweg, GGP , IV, 451-452.
4. PHA, I, 54.
5. EP, 254. Cf. Thilly, HIP, Phil. Rev., 31(1922),
294-295.
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auf dasselbe Norma lbewusstsein hln, das der Erkenntnis-
theorie als Korrelat zu dem Gegenstand-an-sich vorschwebt."
^
Nevertheless, Windelband refuses to follow the route to an
idealistic metaphysics upon which he here enters. For him,
the epistemological and axiological reference to a "Bewusst-
sein uberhaupt" is, at most, "ein Postulat, aber
„2keine metaphysische Erkenntnis. Windelband seems, there-
fore, to hold a view like that he had attributed to Otto
Liebmann. "...Das ’Bewusstsein Uberhaupt* fasst Liebmann
lediglich als logisches Subjekt und ebensowenig als liber-
personliche wie als individuelle Realitat."
B. The relation of norms to natural laws.
Windelband 1 s interest in the relation of norms to
4
natural laws appears as early as 1873. In 1874, in a review
of Sigwart’s Logik, he observes that Sigwart investigates
"die Bedingungen, unter denen diese Naturgesetze des Denkens
5
zu Normalgesetzen werden konnen." He then adds parentheti-
cally: "Es sei hier nur darauf hingedeutet, wie fruchtbar
dieser Weg vielleicht auch ftir die in ganz Shnlicher Lage
.. I-
0
befindliche Ethik werden konnte."
In 1882 Windelband discussed at length his conception
T7 EP, 254. Cf. Thilly
,
HIP, Phil. Rev., 31(1022), 298.
2. EP, 254. HU, 17.
3. 01P, Kant-Studien, 15(1910), IX. Cf. Ewald, DP,
Kan t- S tudien
,
1 3 (1 90 8 ) , 218.
4. UgE, 03-64. See, also, p. 121, below.
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of the relation of norms to natural laws. He devoted an
entire essay, "Nonnen und Naturgesetze,"
1
to this problem.
He observes that both the necessity of conforming to natural
law and the obligation to confonn to known norms are given
together in experience. "Einen Zwang fuhl ’ ich in mir,
wonach, wie der Stein dem Gesetze der Schwere folgt, not-
wendig und unabSnderlich mein Vorstellen, mein Fiihlen, mein
Wollen sich gestaltet: und das Hewusstsein eines Gebotes
2
trage ich in mir, nach dem ich denken, fiihlen, wollen soli."
What, Windelband then inquires, iS the meaning of this com-
bination of compulsion and command? If everything must hap-
pen as it does, what is the meaning of obligation? Why should
that be demanded which must take place of necessity? Or why
Should that be demanded which can not take place at all?
Windelband replies that the obligation to conform to
norms is "eine hohere Notwendigkeit,"' "die Notwendigkeit
-4des Sollens," which appears within those movements of the
empirical consciousness which follow natural laws. From the
genetic point of view, therefore, imperatives may be con-
.5
sidered a "Produkt der Na tumotwendigkeit." To this higher
necessity of the ’ought 1 natural processes may or may not





3. PHA, I, 45. Cf. Ibid., 48, 49.
4. Ibid., 42.
5. Ibid., 53.
fi ; T):i& fWi) ' . »vsJ a
9
mvt?., 9*1 -wr n ' if oi i " VI/ -)9 09 fio±;I r, cfo arid nn I
H± riot *1 . • *19





ad.-dol p.'iCft*' rr r v?.! -* n;.'foT ?v.:>
r







-rfw! laurn snJbitfyroTO II tfiitmtaoo bfta aolnlLkpnoo lo noldenid






• .rjorr lo oo si " I t m:. i xloxil’" * » r > f r, >1 ori J aid
V l£,'. J a oor.la o-.p ' j i naa laid.' V> r '.r •; op mi d m’; r Cuoi'ft
ot Bfio'lxxoo od ^otd rr« X rdo aift dorfd BotEqoa linjsd’IaJutjtlf
.V ” . f»rxoi “
arid lo Bdnanavoin oeorid rtXifd ;**•<< j tl.' jxpr ” t aoXioH
• anal Imudxut wollol rfolriw eaortaj am




























.i r) .<** ,x t .
.
•
t . i; . P
K .
116
er braucht es nicht zu tun." Natural laws do not compel
conformity to the nonns. "Kein Naturgesetz zwingt den
Menschen, immer so zu denizen, so zu wollen, so zu ftthlen,
wie er nach der logischen, der ethischen und den ftsthetischen
2Notwendigkeit immer denken, wollen, ftthlen sollteJ" From a
functional point of view norms and natural laws are com-
plementary. "Aus den Na turgesetzen begreifen wir die Tat-
sachen, nach den Normen haben wir sie zu billigen oder zu
„ 3
missbilligen. Norms are never principles of explanation.
Natural laws are never principles of evaluation. Their rela-
tion, therefore, is neither that of identity nor that of
4
complete difference. The norms are not laws of mind to
which empirical intellectual processes must conform under
all conditions. On the other hand, however, "das Gewissen
kann nichts verlangen, was in der na tumotwendigen Pestimmt-
heit des seelischen Lebens unmoglich und von ihr vbllig
5
ausgeschlossen w&re." The true relation of norms and
natural laws, therefore, must lie between the extremes of
identity and complete difference.
Hence, Windelband concludes, norms represent a selec-
tion within the range of natural possibilities. "Alle Normen
sind also besondere Formen der Verwirklichung von Natur-
gesetzen. "Die Gesetze der Logik sind eine Auswahl aus
TT PitA, II, GO.
2. PHA, I, 42. Cf. PRA, II, G7-G8.




5. Ibid., G8 . Cf. Ibid., 74.
G. Ibid., 72.









<- ' J !' t :r ( V . < : */: o \ >
*.
"i . A ; • . • - r ;• »r., i ; -* , ' fr; j; r. \V.
V»
* ’ f '
'
; • ' r* .
fi:: "
’
r ux ' ' • ! rfJ ! :'•>
'
’
* <iY flD if* . >
.
'if* j- • !,-} « ':di ,f- d ;• r . • ’> rr*(, i • £ , »*i iv- ,r . .' t
J*
oJ fcfTHr to nv/jj.l . o
0 80886301 ff IfUtfOOil* > «
rtoa i 'of) ?=- «.*}
*
w tir r<»rf f >r u imfd’O » f: rr .aitoxJVr o IIb
-
* :
'i • ' »• i- r
,
•















. t / y t
. * or o*r- • r> » :








, 'I '! * ’ W ?
J \ { ‘ 3t>- ' 0 » I : 1 ^ M .
l •
den moglichen Foraen der Vorstellungsassozia tion, die Gesetze
der Ethilc sind eine Auswahl aus den moglichen Formen der
j
Motivation, die Gesetze der Xsthetik sind eine Auswahl aus
den mflglichen Fornen der Geftihlst& tigkeit." ^ The character-
istic which distinguishes the normative within the manifold
of the naturally possible is stated by Windelband as follows:
"Normen sind diejenigen Formen
der Verwirlclichung von Naturge-
setzen, welche unter Voraussetzung
des Zwecks der Allgemeingiltig-
2keit gebilligt werden solle n."
9
The system of norms, therefore, is neitner identical with
nor contradictory to the system of natural law. The former
is simply a part of the latter. This view involves a rejec-
tion of the Kantian dualism of the sphere of freedom in
which norms are realized and the sphere of nature in which
necessity prevails. "Es musste begreiflich gemacht werden,
wie mitten im lteiche der Na tumotwendigkeit die Norm zur
„3
Geitung und Herrschaft gelangen kann."
There is, however, another emphasis in Windelband*
s
treatment of this problem, one which he never succeeded
m
in harmonizing with that discussed above. As early as
1S82 he admitted a measure of independence and even of
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contradiction in the relation of norms and natural laws.
As indicated above, ^ morality, so far from being an advan-
tage in the struggle for existence, is, Windelband declares,
a disadvantage. "Daruin kann man aber auch nicht davon
sprechen, dass die Anerkennung der Normen des sittlichen
Bewusstseins durch die naturliche Auswahl herbeigefuhrt
2
werde... Nevertheless, these nonas have been recognized.
A similar phenomenon is encountered in the historical de-
velopment and refinement of the esthetic capacity of man-
3 .kind. It is hardly to be supposed, Windelband says, "dass
diese Gewohnung an feineres Fuhlen, diese Abstreifung ur-
spriinglicher Gesclimacklosigkeit ein Produkt der ndturlichen
4Selektion sein sollte." This fact, that norms which have
no relation, or even a negative relation, to the natural
laws of survival maintain their place, and in some instances
even undergo development and refinement, leads Windelband to
the conclusion that norms depend upon a power independent
of natural law, a power which in the form of conscience
5
enters as a new factor into consciousness.
Furthermore, Windelband recognized that the same
natural necessity which brings some norms to consciousness
hinders others from ever coming to consciousness. The human




3. See p. 87, above.
4. PllA, II, 79.
5. Ibid., 80.
; • r
.3 "af ' > : : J >*i f
r
;









‘ TV, f ' ' ' ti !
n .'•>
'






























. r k t
K> fo ,r
’
' JJ r * ^ * fj •’ '* > O ' dO i r
'> rloiifr' ;<
,









n > o i »*r J tr > •. * > • v r /•.
i 'fowon :/lo«rii rioqofc BiO












08X100 o) nnrft.fi orn.a * * ' • r.’ on
• •








. . i .
113
mind can apprehend the normative consciousness only partial-
ly
1
because it is to such a large extent subject to natural
necessity. w ...Er unterliegt den Gesetzen seiner natumot-
wendigen Bewegung, und nur hier und da fiihrt sie zu einem
llesultate, in welchem die unmittelbare Evidenz der normativen
„ 2Geltung zustande kommt. In like manner, natural laws make
possible the realization of some known norms, and hinder the
realization of others. In logic, ethics, and esthetics alike
"der Antagonismus einer natttrlichen und einer normativen
g
Gesetzgebung" ' is encountered. "...Es ist in alien drei Fallen
der Gegensatz eines Gebots gegen die psychologische Notwendig-
4
keit. w This antagonism results in persistent and painful
violations of duty in every sphere of value. The man of cul-
ture knows, "er empfindet mit Schmerz und Beschamung, wie
oft der natumotwendige Lauf seines inneren Eebens diese
Pflichten verletzt."
In his later writings Windelband stressed more and more
the antithetical aspect of the relation between norms and
natural laws. In 1902 he emphasized strongly "jene A n -
tinomie des Bewusstseins, welche in
dem Verhaltnis zwischen dem Solien und dem Milssen, zwischen
den Norraen und den Naturgesetzen zutage tritt." Between
T7 See p. 112, above.




6. PHA, II, 300.
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norms and natural laws "ein notwendiger, im Wesen der Sache
begriindeter und unverraeidlicher Antagonlsmus besteht."
1
The
same person who carries within himself a consciousness of the
norm necessarily acts contrary to it. "...Gerade darin be-
steht das Qu&lende des Gewissens, dass das Verfehlen nicht
zufallig, sondern notwendig ist... Der Ernst des Gewissens
zeigt der Norm gegeniiber die naturgesetzmassige Notwendigkeit
2ihrer Verletzung." Evil is rooted as deeply as good. The
superficial and optimistic, who regard the good as real and
the evil as unreal, and the skeptical and pessimistic, who
consider evil the outcome of necessity and good the result of
chance, are both in error. Good and evil stand in the same
relation to man. "Wir mttssen uns klar machen, dass das Norm-
widrige ebenso notwendig unserem Wesen entspringt wie das
3
Normgerechte . . . It is not so much evil as the necessity of
evil that constitutes the central problem of philosophy.
"Diese Naturnotwendigkeit des Norm-
widrigen in den empirischen Funktionen der Vemunft
ist die allgeneine Fundamentaltaasache, von der die kritische
4
Philosophic in alien ihren Disziplinen ausgeht..." After
1902 Windelband retained essentially unchanged this view of
the relation of norms and natural laws. It is obvious that
this position is much nearer pessimism than the one he held
in 1882.
IT PllA, II, 300.
2. Loc . cit.
3. Ibid., 300-301.
4. Ibid., 302. Cf. Huge, WW, 39.
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For Windelband, the antinomy of norms and natural laws
has significant consequences for logic, ethics, and esthetics.
"Die drei philosophischen Grundwissenschaften* zeigen auf den
drei Gebieten des Seelenlebens iiberall den Gegensatz zwischen
dem psychologisch Wirkliehen und dem Norma len, zwischen dem
llealen und dem Idealen, zwischen dem zeitlich Geschehenden
2
und dem zeitlos Geltenden." The ’ideal’ and the ’eternally
valid’ are those values which are worthy of universal recogni-
tion, "die Wahrheit im Denken, die Gutheit im Wollen und
3
Handeln, die Schonheit im Fiihlen.” Tire realization of all
these values is for the man of culture a matter of con-
4
science. But the purpose to realize them is to a large ex-
tent frustrated by the irrational elements in nature. "Gutes
und B8ses, Normgemasses und Normwidriges zeigt uns das
Menschenleben in alien seinen Schichten, und dariiber hinaus
begegnet uns auch in der Natur uberall neben dem sinn- und
5
zweckvoll Vernttnftigen das sinnlos und zwecklos Unvemiinftige.”
In the next three sections of this chapter the consequences
of this antinomy of norms and natural laws for logic, ethics,
and esthetics will be investigated. In the next section
thereafter the significance of this antinomy for philosophy
of religion will be considered.
T7 Cf. PHA, I, 40.
2. PHA, II, 300.
3. Ibid., 122.
4. Ibid., 64. Cf. PHA, I, 140. See, also, p. 118, above.
5. EP, 130.
;! 'J « ' ' I ' A ' o < v :
'
•











nartogoD mb anf)cf9lifaIoo?. a
• )
<»
1 1 X no
'
u ,xio - » . tX XXoilatlnV •<
’




-noo M •» o *• . ; . tt * i >Jl. 9 > .
.
K
-ro outs k oJ’ 8± riorP os. '.I. .j or • <iq >i t ' . o ::o -




mu -ir Jfcn i * r ICxr: rf ri 1 • > : i(orr; . u tor o «rf
^ X t'lrnmovn aolifoo
-x 'im Holruri nr,'- ct'>. \ty$nflr. rT o / II ,y:ic> * •••
393 fJIl t'J.'noD 01 li ‘toll .'O n.f lU Mo colrJo >8 OOT-'J i: »fl w ' I
• .
« o ” HJbV .sOitf OffcMo lints




. ; .'.noo >
r r '
.


























IV. The significance of the antinomy of norms and natural
laws for truth.
Windelband defines logic as the nonnative science of
thought. The norms of thought constitute the subject matter
1 H
of logic. "Die Logik...hat es gamicht mit dem Denken und
seiner Erlcl&rung zu thun: sondem der Begriff, urn den sich
in ihr Alles dreht, ist derjenige des richtigen
_ 2
Denkens, der Erkenntnis." This distinguishes logic from
psychology, the function of which is to describe the em-
pirical processes of thought without reference to their
validity. The laws of psychology are natural laws, according
o
to which one must think.' The rules of logic are norms,
4 *
according to which one should think. "Die Beziehung auf
die Wahrheit als Zweck unterscheidet die logische Betrachtung
„ 5des Denkens von der psychologischen." From the standpoint
ft
of mechanism and natural law there is no norm. On the basis
of psychology alone "hort der Begriff der Wahrheit. . .liberhaupt
auf... Sollen die logischen Gesetze nur eine Art der psycholog-
ischen, sollen sie nur die Naturgesetze des Denkens sein, so
giebt es weder Wahrheit noch Irrthum; denn nach Naturgesetzen
7
denkt auch der Wahnsinn." This conception of logic, stated




4. Ibid., 64. Cf. lliehl, HGE, Phil .Mona tsh. , 9(1873),
294.
5. ZL, Phil.Mona tsh. , 10(1874), 35.
6. UGE,“£!n




. Mmi T t’i ». jrj; I
1 v oo toa oyM/ >n Arft f: 3 I: of • >r; Jt # » * • rH ' *>/*«.!






*3 rJJ ,rU-'f;i')' T *f
(( O £ J" if o < •- •*>
'
r-'f/r >,' » ,
v


















•! f »•' •; r>





• rfjJ- ilr- rtj • xio i;\of > : ' J<b.h - ro >Ji r u >lao **! • L •; :7 rji!»





















* n [" i • • • ” . • • • .
, :


















t . 1 . ; . I .
122
In 1913 he declared, that the essence of all logical consider-
ation "besteht darin, class wir zwischen unsern Vors tellungen
den Yfertunterschied des Wahren und des Falschen machen."
1
Logic prescribes norms for thought which aims to attain truth.
But the attempt to discover truth is seriously obstructed
by the relation of incommensurability and antithesis which
exists between the normative and the natural factors in the
2process of knowing. To the ultimate presuppositions of all
truth, sensations and axioms, immediate certainty attaches.
"Diese unmittelbare Gewissheit trifft also jene beiden diametral
einander gegenliberstehenden Ausgangspunk te: die Rnpfindungen
und die allgemeinen SStze, nach denen die Verhlil tnisse des
Empfunclenen aufgefasst werden sollen."' Truths such as *1
have a sensation of redness, * and *A can not be non-A, 1 are,
Windelband holds, immediately and absolutely certain. All
other truth must be mediate and hypothetical, since it must
be derived from "der logischen Unterordnung von Empfindungen
unter Axiome," 4 a subordination which can never be carried
out completely because the sensuous content and the rational
form prove to be incommensurable quantities. " . • . Zwischen
den Voraussetzungen, welche als ,Kategorien l in der norma tiven
Gesetzmassigkeit des Intellekts angelegt sind, und dem Tat-
sachenraa terial der Erfahrung, zu dessen Deutung und Verar-
17 PL, 5.
2. See discussion of antinomianism, pp. 99-108, above.
3. PllA, II, 103-104.
4. Ibid., 104.
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beitung sie berufen sind, [bestehtj eine niemals ganz auszu-
fiillende Kluft..." On the formal side, logical necessity
is a guarantee of objective certainty. But logical neces-
sity leads only to formal truth. "Dasjenige, was in unserer
Erlcenntnis aus den logischen Gesetzen stammt, ist lediglich
die Form deraelben... Der Grundcharakter aller logischen
Beweise ist daher in Rticksicht des Inhalts ein hypothetischer. .
.
Die objektive Gewissheit der logischen Gesetze ist nur formal,
N 3
nicht material. Ulrici, referring to this statement, cor-
rectly observes: "Es bleibt mithin trotz dieger Gewissheit
durchaus ungewiss, ob dem Inhalt unser Vorstellung Objektivi-
tat zukomme. Die objektive Gewissheit der logischen Gesetze
„
4
bringt uns der Erkenntnis noch um keinen Rchritt niiher.
Windelband himself attaches great importance to this point,
which, in his opinion, completely invalidates dogmatic
metaphysics. Formal logic "erkl&rt, wie wir denken, aber
nicht... was wir denken." Of necessity it disregards the
content of thought, and, in consequence, it becomes "dem
„7lebendigen Streben nach realer Erkenntniss fremd. To this
view, first expressed in 1873 and 1874, Windelband adhered




2. UGE, 31-32. ZL, Phil.Mona tsh. , 10(1874), 35.
lliehl, UGE, Phil .Mona t“slf DTT873 ) , 294.
3. UGE, 70-71.
4. Ulrici, HGE, Zeits .f.Phil.u.phil.Kr. , 85(1874), 301.
5. UGE, 71-72. Pl(A/ TT7 TCT^TTf?).'' LGP ,~449- 450 . EP, 237.
f>. UGE, 10.
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schied zwischen der logisch-ma thema tischen Form und dem davon
unabhftngigen Inhalt der ltealitat bleihen wir als an einer
letzten nicht Reiter aufl&sbaren Dualit&t stehen."
1
Formal
logic, therefore, provides no criterion of material truth,
and opens no way to knowledge of reality.
Pragmatism, according to Windelband, provides no solu-
tion of the problem of knowledge. Utility is not identical
with truth. "Es gibt sehr brauchbare, sehr wirksame und
sehr zweckmassige Unwahrheiten, - und es gibt sehr nutzlose,
sehr unbrauchbare, sehr unzweckmassige Wahrheiten. Die
Brauchbarkeit ist ein Merkmal, das der Wahrheit anhaften
und fur den Willen zu ihr als Motiv wirken kann, aber nicht
2
etwas, was zu ihrem Wesen und ihrem Begriff gehtfrt." Truth
is an end in itself, as well as a means to an end other than
itself. A cultured person loves "das Wahre wie das Cute urn
3
-ihrer selbst willen." "Logisch betrachtet, ist also der
„4
Pragma tismus eine groteske Verwechslung von Zweck und Mittel..."
_ 5
"Das letzte Kriterium der Wahrheit," Windelband con-
cludes, is the coherence of thought with itself. An idea
is true if it coheres with the coherent whole of thought.
"...Die letzte Gewissheit besteht fur jeden einzelnen nur
in der widerspruchslosen Ubereinstimmung, mit der er sich
IT EP, 238.
2. WZW, 8. Cf. EP, 202.
3. WZW, 7.
4. EP, 202.
5. ZL, Phil.Mona tsh., 10(1874), 37. Cf. UGE, 60.
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dem Zusemmenhange des Ganzen einfugt.""
1
But difficulty is
encountered even here. The fullest possible human knowledge
2is but a fragmentary account of reality as a whole. Within
this fragmentary account, moreover, complete coherence is
never attained. Consequently, this partial coherence within
the limited range of human knowledge may fall far short of
the truth about reality itself - may, indeed, lead to error
rather than truth. The latter outcome is especially probable
when the natural striving of the mind after unity among its
ideas leads to conclusions on the basis of data more meager
3than even human limitations require.' These considerations
make the outlook for the realization of the value of truth
dismal enough. But there are others still.
Will and feeling are closely related to the thought
process, and exercise a significant influence upon it. As
early as 1873 Windelband stated that the fact that we think
at all must be explained in otner than logical tenns. wAus
blosser Logik ist nicht einzusehen, weshalb uberhaupt ein
Schluss gemacht werden, weshalb die beiden Pramissen nicht
so ruhig nebeneinander stehen bleiben sollen. Dass sie es
nicht thun, davon ist der zureichende Grund nicht ein log-
„4ischer, sondem ein psychologischer Vorgang." We think
IT PRA, II, 28.
2. LZ, 68-69. UGE, 38. SWP, 33. PL, 60. Anonymous, WPL,
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"weil es unsere Interessen verlangen."
Windelband developed his voluntarism in his Freiburg
inaugural address, w ih>er Denken und Nachdenken," S (1877).
In it he affirms that by the influence of feeling the course
of thought is constantly disturbed and diverted from the
q
course it would otherwise have followed. Feeling, the
unconscious will, plays "die Hauptrolle ,f
4
in all thinking.
” In dem Tumiere des Seelenlebens sind die Vorstellungen nur
die Masken, hinter denen sich die wahren Streiter, die Ge-
fiihle, vor dem Auge des Bewusstseins verbergen." 4 The course
5
of ideas is completely dependent upon the influence of feeling.
In like manner, our needs unconsciously shape our thoughts.
"Unwillkurlich gestalten sich alluberall unsere Gedanken
nach unseren Bediirfnissen, ohne dass uns diese selbst dabei
njedesmal zum Bewusstsein kommen." Spinoza’s philosophy is
cited as a product of a profound moral and spiritual need.
Consciously or unconsciously, every movement of thought
is determined by the will.
8
"Alles Denken befindet sich in
seinem Verlaufe ausnahnslos unter dem Einflusse des Willens."^
The influence of the conscious will over thought is distin-
IT UGE, 43.
2. PHA, II, 24-98. See, also, p. 18, above.
3. PHA, II, 37. Cf. Ibid., 38.
4. Ibid., 40. Windelband claims to have notning in com-
mon here tiftth Eduard von Hartmann'* s view.
5. Ibid., 43. Cf. Ibid., 44-45.
8. Ibid., 44. Cf. Ibid., 45.
7. PHA, I, 95.
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guished from that of the unconscious will by its greater
1
strength. In self-feeling tiiere is present a concentrated
precipitate of the entire development of the feeling and
will of the psychical organism. Upon it the course and value
2
of voluntary thought constantly depend. " In fact, thought,
in order to reach its goal, must be guided and sustained
by earnest moral purpose. "Denn das natiirliche Denken des
Menschen hat einen unverwtistlichen Hang zum Spazierengehen,
und nur der sittliche Ernst der Wahrhei tsforschung kann es
auf den rechten Weg bringen und darauf festhalten bis ans
Ende.”
^
In 1884 Windelband expressed the view that the quality
g
of judgments is closely related to feeling and will.' In
1904 he stated that in philosophy the practical motive is as
strong as the theoretical, and in most instances even
stronger. In 1909 he emphasized again the relation of the
ty
will to judgment, and added that the will by virtue of its
influence upon selective attention and the processes of





s Einleitung in die Philosophic (1914) adds
nothing new to his voluntaristic view. He stresses once
17 PHA, II, 51.
2. Ibid., 52-53.





ft • UW, 3.
7. WZW, 10-11.
8. Ibid., 14-15.
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more the close relation of knowing and willing. They are
"die untrennbar verknupften. . .Seiten eines und desselhen an
sich unteilbaren Wesens und Lebens."
1
Each influences the
other intimately. Knowledge exercises power over the will,
and the will determines the direction and objective of
thought.^ The relation of the "BedUrfnisse des Herzens"^
4to philosophy is further illustrated by reference to Kant,
and to Plato. The practical aspect of the judgment is
emphasized as strongly as ever.
But this voluntaristic element which makes thought pos-
sible also places formidable obstacles in its way, and makes
error all but inevitable. The possibility of error, Windel-
band stated in 1878, lies in the fact that in the individual
7
mind with its necessarily limited fund of ideas the natural
striving after unity proceeds wmit genau derselben Gesetz-
massigkeit. .
. ,
wie es bei der Vollstandigkeit aller moglichen
Vorsteilungen in einem allumfassenden Geiste sich geltend
machen wurde."® This mistaking the incomplete for the coro-
9
plete is the fundamental error of all errors. Furthermore,
it is by no means certain that individuals can make up this
deficiency by a general exchange of ideas, for it is not im-
IT EP, 20.
2. Loc. cit.
3. Ibid., 23. Reference to Pascal in LGP, 331.
4. Loc. cit.
5. Ibid., 33.
G. Ibid., 19G. Cf. Thilly, HIP, Phil. Rev., 31(1922), 295.
7. See p. 125, above.
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possible "dass wesentliche Vorstellungen in alien Einzelnen
fehlen und in Folge dessen sich in Allen ein Hesultat er-
giebt, welches. . .objektiv durchaus falsch ist."
1
This posi-
tion, Ulrici corectly observes, makes error inevitable, and
knowledge impossible: "...Wenn der erkennenden Seele immer
nur ein mangelliaftes, unvollkomnenes Material vorliegt, und
sie doch innerhalb desselben die Einheit sucht und findet,
die mit der subjektiven Gewissheit in Eins zusammenfallt, so
muss die erkennende Seele offenbar immer irren: der
Irrthum ist nicht nur mfiglich, sondem in jedem Falle so
2
unvermeidlich, dass es gar keine Erkenntnis geben kann.
Tlie influence of interest, likewise, makes for error.
With few exceptions, thought is under the direct influence
g
of personal interests. Beings who were merely rational
would reserve their judgments until adequate grounds for
them were apparent. " • • .Aber wir vollen, ja wir ndssen
urtheilen, weil es unsere Tnteressen verlangen, und darum
4
urtheilen wir falsch." In this univeral preponderance
of interest, no less than in the universal deficiency of
ideas discussed above, "die Moglichkeit und die psycholog-
e
ische Notwendigkeit des Irrihums [istj vorhanden. . ." Inter-
A
est at once make thought possible, and truth, to a large
extent at least, impossible.
t: UGE, 41
.




6. See p. 33, above.
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Windelband declared in 1873 that error is possible only
if logical laws are different from psychological laws. "Waren
die logischen Gesetze nur eine Art der psychologischen,
herrschten sie in Folge dessen mit der volls tandigen All-
geneinheit eines Na turgesetzes
,
so wSre das Problem des
Irrthums entweder nicht vorhanden oder unaufloslich. . . Sind
also die logischen Gesetze nur psychologischer Natur, so
gibt es keinen Denkfehler, keinen Irrthum."* But how they
differ with respect to determinism is not made clear, for
Windelband rejects the concept of freedom altogether* "Fur
uns heisst ein Problem durch den Begriff der Freiheit er-
klfiren, nur, eine grdssere Unbegreiflichkeit an die Stelle
- M 2des fruheren setzen. This position Ulrici criticizes con-
vincingly. There must be, he says, "neben der logischen
Denknotwendigkei t ein Gebiet der Freiheit, .. .info lge dessen
« 3der Irrthum mbglich 1st." He argues that the concept of
necessity, of which Windelband makes such extensive use,
presupposes freedom as its necessary condition. Only as we
attempt to overcome an existing necessity, to think contrary
to the law of identity and contradiction, for example, and
only as we find it impossible to do what we thus attempt, do
we arrive at a concept of necessity. "Ein solcher Versuch aber
w&re offenbar schlechthin unmdglich, wenn der 'gesamte' Denk-
process unter dem Banne der Notwendigkeit stande. Consequent-
TT"UGE, 62-03.
2. Ibid., 36.
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ly> "jecler Versuch, die bestehende Notwendigkeit, sey sie
eine logische Oder psychologisclie zu durchbrechen, ist mithin
ein tats&chlicher Beweis, dass neben der Denknotwendigkeit
eine nicht necessitirte S e 1 b s t th&tigkeit des Denkens
1
existirt, die wir Freiheit nennen." This doctrine of the
speculative significance of freedom, and of the relation of
freedom and error, is more fully developed in the philosophy
2
of Borden Parker Bowne.
Windelband ’ s later writings do little more than empha-
size the antithesis of logical norms and psychological laws
discussed above. In 1877 he reviewed the antithetical rela-
tions of interest and thought. On the one hand, thought is
impossible without interest. Even the purpose to think at
all vanishes "wenn sie nicht in einem wahren und emsten
Interesse des Denkenden ihren ltuckhalt hat.” Further, the
4
vigor of thought is proportional to the degree of interest.
On the other hand, interest is "eine der allgemeinsten Ur-
IT Ulrici, op. cit., 294.
2. Introduction to Psychological Theory, 225-227.
New York: Ifarper and b rotifers. isSS
•
Theory of Thought and Knowledge , 241-244.
New York: American Book Gro. 1897
.
Metaphysics, 400-408, 417.
New York: American Book Co. 1898.
Theism, 124-125.
New~York: American Book Co. 1902.
Personalism, 200-202.
New York: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1908.
See, also, Hildebrand, Carroll Dewitt, Borden P.
Bowne’s Teaching Concerning the Speculative Sig-
nificance of Freedom. Unpublished dissertation.
Boston University.' 1929
•
3. PRA, II, 54. See, also, pp. 33, 129, above.
4. PHA, II, 49.
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sachen der menschlichen Irrtumer," because it diverts thought
from the actual character of its object to what is wished,
hoped, and feared. Nowhere is error more frequent, and no-
where are judgments less trustworthy, than in matters that
involve personal interest. " .. .Unsere verderblichs ten T&usch-
2
ungen wurzeln darin, dass wir glauben, was wir wiinschen..."
According to this view, truth is most easily achieved where it
is most trivial, and most difficult to achieve where it is most
vital. Even that striving after truth which roots deeply in
moral purpose is "seiner ErfuIIung durchaus nicht gewiss. Wie
zahllose Denker, die vom reinsten Erkenntnistrieb beseelt waren,
hat die Geschichte in den Wirrsalen trauriger Irrtiimer enden
sehen J"
^
In 1882 Windelband expressed the view that psychological
laws, on the whole, are more favorable to error than to truth.
Of the great number of possible associations of ideas only a
few possess logical validity. Yet all alike are under the sway
of natural necessity. "Es gibt. . . solche Formen der natumotwen-
digen Vors tel lungsverknupfungen, welche den Irrtum unausweich-
lich zu ihrera Resultate haben. Mit derselben Natumotwendigkeit,
* 4
mit welcher der eine richtig denkt, denkt der andere falsch.
"Der Fehlschluss kommt ebenso notwendig zustande wie der rich-
tige Schluss; aber von denselben Pr&missen her ist nur ein
























































korrekter Schluss moglich, der Fehlschlusse dagegen viele."
Natural necessity, therefore, tends to make error *far more
probable than truth.
Windelband, however, does recognize a modifying factor,
the influence of consciousness of norms upon the movement of
2
thought. The presence in consciousness of the idea of a
nonn gives rise to a feeling which, in turn, influences the
3
movement of thought. Thus thought by a kind of psychological
necessity moves in the direction of the conscious norm. In
this way a consciousness of norms enters as an efficient
cause into the naturally necessitated movements of the
4psychical life. Yet Windelband expresses no conviction,
or even hope, that thought thus influenced by a consciousness
of norms can overcome the obstacles that remain in its way,
and to any satisfying degree attain its goal.
In 1902 he reaffirmed the view that tne processes of
5
sensation and association are decidedly favorable to error.
In 1914 he declared once more that the voluntaristic factor
in thought is at once "die Kraft der Wahrhei t" and "der
Grund des Irrtums." On the whole, it is clear that Windel-
band recognizes the major difficulties encountered in the
quest for theoretical certainty, and that he finds no solution
for them. It is not surprising, therefore, that this outcome
IT PRA, II, 70.
2. Ibid., 70, 80, 85-87.
3. Ibid., 85. See, also, p. 120, above.
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turned him definitely in the direction of pessimism.
V. The significance of the antinomy of norms and natural laws
for goodness.
In general, according to Windelband, the consequences
of the antinomy of norms and natural laws for goodness and
beauty are the same as for truth. But he discusses the moral
consequences far less thoroughly than the logical and the
epistemological. The consequences for art he usually only
mentions in connection with logical and ethical discussions.
This is probably due to the varying range of certainty re-
garding universal validity in these realms of value. He in-
dicates this variation thus: "Am gross ten ist der Umfang des
Allgemeingiltigen, das wir mit voller kritischer Sicherheit
behaupten diirfen, zweifellos in der Logik: er ist schon
wesentlich geringer in der Ethik, und er ist am geringsten
-
-1in der Asthetik.
In 1870 Windelband held already the deterministic posi-
2
tion in ethics, which he never surrendered. Already, too,
he had raised the problem of the antithesis of natural
mechanism and human purpose. The former is often "das
3
Zweckwidrige, " which as something "Xusserliche, Stttrende,
g
Fremde"' opposes itself to moral endeavor, and causes pur-
posive activity to issue in unintended results. The note
TT PltA, II, 135.
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of pessimism, however, is not heard. The moral task is said
to consist in making purposes more noble, and in making actions
conform to moral standards in spite of all the contingency
with which natural mechanism menaces the will.
1
"So ist es
das sittliche Ideal, dass der Zweckgedanke sich das Zufal-
-
2
lige unterwerfe. • • "
In 1882 Windelband expressed the view that natural law
alone makes the unmoral as necessary as the moral. "Unter
der ganzen Masse der wirklichen Willensentscheidungen gibt
es solche, in denen die sog. 'moralischen 1 Motive die Ent-
scheidung bestimmt haben: andere und mehr gibt es, in denen
die entgegengesetzten gesiegt haben. Geschehen ist das eine
.3
so na tumotwendig wie das andere..." The consciousness of
norms may stand in the same causal relation to the course
4
of moral activity as to the course of logical thought. Rut
the strength thus imparted by no means always suffices to
make moral purpose triumphant. The ideally complete deter-
mination of action by the consciousness of moral norms is
what Windelband means by freedom. "Freiheit ist Herrschaft
des Gewissens. Das, was allein diesen Namen verdient, ist
die Bestimmung des empirischen
Bewusstseins durch das Normal-






4. See p. 133, above.
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136
acterized as "clas relfste Produkt der Na tumo twendigkei t, w
and as "die Autonoraie, mit welcher das individuelle Bewusst-
sein eine von ihm selbst erkannte und anerkannte Nom zur
Maxine seiner Tatigkeit macht."^ It is clear, however, that
Windelband*s thought at this point is very confused. Natural
necessity and individual autonomy can stand in no such re-
lation as that which he here ascribes to them. According to
Windelband, Vler vollkommene Mensch ware derjenige, dessen
T&tigkeiten stets der Norm entspr&chen und auf allgemeine
2
Anerkennung Anspruch h&tten." But the possibility of such
perfection is precluded by many considerations, such as the




and the obstacles encountered in
the form of natural law.
In 1883 Windelband undertook to formulate a fundamental
principle of morals. He followed Kant in considering the
Consciousness of duty normative. "Das Pflichtbe-
wusstsein ist insofem das Prinzip der Moral, als es
die oberste Bedingung ist, untcr der sittliches Leben mog-
M 4lich ist. But consciousness of duty is " ein lediglich
„ 5formales Prinzip. It assigns no content to duty. Therefore,
it is inadequate. Formal duties are only means to the real-
ization of moral value. The concept of value is thus made
17 PllA, II, 88.
2. Ibid., 97.
3. See p. 134, above.
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central in Windelhand f s ethics. "Oh ein Individuum existiert
Oder nicht, ist sittlich gleichgiltig, solange es nicht
einen bestinmten Wert repr&sentiert : und ganz ehenso ist es
sittlich gleichgiltig, oh eine ganze Gesellschaft existiert
Oder nicht, solange sie noch nicht und sohald sie nicht mehr
«1
einen bestimmten Wert besitzt. The essence of moral value
lies, according to Windelhand, in a system of culture. The
creation of a culture is the task of every society. *Mit
diesem ihrem Kultursystem steht und fallt der sittliche
Wert jeder Gesellschaft: den letzten Rchweiss- und Bluts-
tropfen hat sie da ran zu setzen, uni es zu erzeugen und zu
„ 2
erhalten. It is the duty of the individual to aid society
in accomplishing this task. "Das materiale Prinzip der Ethik
lautet: tue das deine, damit in der Gesellschaft, der du an-
gehOrst, ihr gemeinsamer geistiger Gehalt zum Bewusstsein
„ 3
und zur Herrschaft gelange. In the empirical world society
and its interests are final. " . . .Uber sie hinaus w i s s e n
wir nichts... Die Kette der Finalitat scheint bei ihr ge-
M 4
schlossen zu sein." TJiis position was later given a pessi-
mistic turn by Windelhand f s convictions regarding tne decline
5
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In 1002 Windelband noted again* that human nature tends
with equal necessity to good and bad. It is evident, said he,
"class der natilrliche Motivationsprozess als solcher ethisch
indifferent ist, dass er Gutes und B’dses gleich notwendig
hervortreibt, und dass die Natur des Menschen in diesem
Sinne * jenseits von gut und bose* ist." ' In 1904 he dis-
tinguished between psychological and ethical freedom. "Der
eine bedeutet Freiheit von Hemmung in der Wahl, der andere
Freiheit von der Herrschaft unverniinftiger Motive..."' These
4
two types of freedom may either coincide or diverge. Psycho-
logical freedom is, Windelband affirms, an empirical fact.
n 5
"Der Mensch kann wcihlen und handeln, was er will..." Moral
ft
freedom, however, "ist ein Wertbegriff, ein Ideal." It is
" ein Wertbegriff der Herrschaft der Vemunft
7
liber das natiirliche Gefuhls- und Triebsystem des Menschen."
Zombek calls attention to the radical character of Windel-
band f s departure at this point from the generally accepted
meaning of the term, ^oral freedom, ’ and from the generally
accepted views of the relation of responsibility and morality.
"Nach dieser Betrachtungsweise ist also sehr wohl ein Wollen,
das erzwungen, also psychologisch unfrei ist, ethisch frei, wenn
IT See p. 135, above.
2. PllA, II, 301-302. Cf. EP, 410.
3. UW, 88.
4. Ibid., 88, 04.
5. Ibid., 00.
0. Messer, WJW, Kant-Studien, 10(1905), 104.
7. UW, 80.
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es der ethischen Nonn entspricht, und ein sonst durchaus
freies Wollen ethisch unfrei, wenn es der ethischen Norm
widerspricht."
1
Windelband, however, has not solved his prob-
lem by giving new meanings to old terms. He is still con-
fronted by "dem unvermeidlichen Gegensatze, der zwischen der
sittlichen Norm und den natiirlichen Hichtungen des Gemtits-
lebens einmal besteht." His later writings add little that
is significant. In 1900 he referred to the great difficulty
of defining a criterion of material goodness. "...In der
Ethik ist es die schwierige, vielleicht l*tzthin unlosbare
Aufgabe, in allgemeingiiltiger Weise inlialtlich das Kriterium
alles dessen zu bestimmen, was gut heissen soli." Windelband
was never able to reach a satisfactory solution of the prob-
lems he encountered in ethics.
VI. The significance of the antinomy of norms and natural laws
for beauty.
For Windelband the outlook for the realization of the
value of beauty is essentially the same as for the realiza-
tion of the values of truth and goodness. In the esthetic
sphere a special difficulty is encountered, that of deter-
mining with any degree of completeness the content of the
universally valid. ^ "...Es gibt keine asthet-
ischen Imperative, wie es logische oder
IT Zombek, WJW, 55-56.
2. UW, 80.
3. WZW, 9.
4. See p. 134, above.
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i
moralische gibt... Furthermore, the experience of beauty
is precluded by natural necessity from all except a small
sector of the life of feeling. In 1882 Windelband wrote:
"...Die ftsthetische Norm ist also eine unter den vielen
Gefiihisweisen, welche durch den na turnotwendigen Prozess des
Seelenlebens mftglich gemacht und in den einzelnen Individuen,
2je nach den Umstanden, herbeigefiihrt oder unterdriickt werden."
In 1902 he emphasized again this antithesis of the normative
and the natural: "...Der na tumotwendige Entwicklungsgang der
Gefiihle mit der Verschlingung der Interessen [ermoglicht] nur
selten den freien Zustand des asthetischen Gestaltens und
Geniessens und gefahrdet ihn stets wieder durch den Ernst des
3
Lebens in seinem dauerenden Eestande." Even the artistic
genius, Windelband declared in 1914, must wrest esthetic
H 4
value from "der widers trebenden Wirklichkei t . The combina-
tion of these considerations with the historical view of
esthetic progress outlined above’ rendered Windelband f s
esthetic outlook far from hopeful.
VII. The significance of the antinomy of norms and natural laws
for religion.
It is in connection with religion that Windelband gives
the antinomy of the normative and the natural its final, its
T7 EP, 368.
2. PM, II, 72. Cf. Ibid., 70.
3. Ibid., 302.
4. EP, 387.
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most forceful, and, from the point of view of his pessimism,
its most significant formulation. The religious phase of his
antinomianism, however, was developed much later than the
logical, ethical, and esthetic phases. It first came to
clear expression in 1902.
In 1883 Windelband wrote a brief essay, mystical in
character, and entitled "Sub specie aetemitatis. In it
he equated the norm with the eternal. All tnings which we
can know as real are temporal. They come into existence, and
2pass away. " Zeitlos- ewig ist nichts von dem, was - im
„3Sinne der empirischen Erkenntnis - ist. It is the norm
that is eternal. " Ewig- zeitlos ist ftir mein Denken und Ver-
stehen nur dasjenige, was gilt, ohne sein
4
zu mussen." Since knowledge is limited to what
actually is, the norm lies outside its scope. How, then, does
it come to consciousness? Windelband answers: "Mein Gewissen
ist es, was mich die zeitlosen Bes timmungen lehrt, die liber
aller Bewegung der in die Zeit getauchten Wirklichkeit gelten.
Das Licht der Ewigkeit leuchtet mir nichts im Wissen, son-
dern im Gewissen. The eternal, the ever valid, can be ap-
proached, experienced, enjoyed through the strict subordina-
tion of one’s thoughts and wishes to the norms of science,
morality, and art. Such self-identification with the
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eternal nora elevates the individual above the temporal.
w Indem mein Bewusstsein an dem Ewigen Teil gewinnt, erhehe
ich mich selbst ilber alle Zeit und Zeitbewegung; dann
herrscht in mir etwas, was keine Zeit erzeugen und keine
Zeit vernichten kann, etwas, was...seinem Inhalt nach zeit-
* 1los gilt." This experience of the eternal is one of supreme
worth. "...Hit meinem ganzen Sein in dies ewige Sollen auf-
zugehen - das ist meine wahre und vollkonmene, meine ein-
zige Seligkeit. Allein selten genug sind freilich diese
Momente, in denen die zeitliohe Welt mir entschwindet und
mein Dasein in die Ewigkeit sich emporhebt. Ihr Wert ent-
2
s chetdigt fiir die Kurze ihrer Dauer. w This experience, which
seems clearly to be that of mystical ecstasy, is said to be
rare at best, and wholly unknown to the great majority.'
This mystical elevation above the temporal, this identifica-
tion of seif witli the overindividual
4
eternal, is the es-
5
sence of immortality.' Witte correctly observes that one
„ -0finds here "den Tonen eines ethischen Pantheismus." In this
essay the distinction between the normative and tne natural
is clearly present. Yet Windelband lays no stress on the
pessimistic implications which might be found in this dis-
tinction. In fact. Hie possibility of conforming to the






3. Ibid., 343, 344.
4. Ibid., 344.
5. Loc. cit. See, also, p. 150, below.
0. Witte, HP, Phil.Mona tsh. , 20U884), 005.
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might be considered a sufficient basis for a fundamental op-
timism .
In w Das Heilige,”
1
written in 1902, Windelband developed
the significance for religion of the antinomy of norms and
natural laws. Beside science, morality, and art there stands,
says Windelband, w eine andere Kulturnacht, vielleicht die
gross te, die Religion. Ihren Zweck, ihre Norm, ihr Ideal nen-
o
nen wir das H e i 1 i g e.'1 ^ Religion, however, is not a
fourth unique realm of value. The content of the holy is the
sum of the values of trutn, goodness, and beauty. These values
are "das Hflchste und Letztc, was wir in den gesanten Inhalt
unseres Bewusstseins besitzen: uber sie hinaus wissen wir
nichts . " Tliese values are holy by virtue of the fact that,
instead of being produced by individuals or even by society,
they are " Wertinhalte einer hoheren Vernunftwirklichkeit, an
der uns teilzuhaben, die in uns zu erleben uns vergftnnt ist.
Das Heilige ist also das Nonnalbewxlsstsein des Wahren, Guten
und Sclionen, erlebt als transszendente
W i r k 1 i c h k e i t." 4 The essence of religion is con-
formity to these transcendent norms. "Religion ist
transszen dentes L e b e n..." R It is erroneous,
therefore, to restrict philosophy of religion to any one
sphere of value. " . . .Vielmehr muss die Religionspliilosophie
rr PRA., II, 295-332.
£. Ibid., 297.
3. Ibid., 305.
4. lioc. cit. Cf. Ueberweg, GGP, IV, 452.
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ihren Ausgang von demjenigen Grundverhaltnisse nehmen, welches
dem logischen, dem ethischen und dem &s thetischen Bewusstsein
gemeinsam ist..."
1
"Dies kann aher nicht anderes seln,
a Is jene Antinonie des Bewusstseins,
welche In dew Verh&ltnis zwischen dew Sollen und dew ITussen,
2
zwischen den Normen und den Na turgesetzen zutage tritt.""
This antinomy comes to consciousness w als Rchuldgefiihl, als
M 3Gewissen, as consciousness divided against itself; hut it
4
extends also to every sphere of objective nalue. In this
antinomy philosophy of religion has its point of departure.
"Diese Naturnotwendigkeit des N o r m -
widrigen ...ist, in dieser Allgemeinheit gefasst, das
Problem aller Problewe und zugleich der Springpunkt der
N 5Religionsphilosophie.
Tlie task of philosophy of religion is to explain those
experiences which have a reference to the superewpirical.
The first of these is the feeling of absolute dependence,
which Schleiemacher wade central for religion. This feel-
ing is aroused by the powers of nature, by the relation be-
tween the empirical consciousness and the normative, and by
the shocking impression of the fate of mankind. But philos-
ophy can not explain the feelin^ of absolute dependence. This
feeling is "geradezu das Bewusstsein der Abh&ngigkeit von





0. Ibid., 298, 300.
7. Ibid., 300-308.
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einem unfassbaren, unaussagbaren Etwas, und es gehSrt zu dem
Wesen des fromnen Geffthls, dass dies Geheimnisvolle, Uner-
1forschliche inmer darin bestehen bleib t. w The result is
"die entscheidende Antinomie des religiosen Lebens: denn
damit stellt das frorame Geftihl dem Vorstellen eine uniosbare
Aufgabe. Das Unbestiramte soli im Bewusstsein bestimmt, das
Unaussagbare soil ausgesagt, das Unfassbare soil begriffen
„ 2
werden. This contradiction arises from the finite charac-
ter of the human reason, "und ist ihm w e s e n t -
-3lie h. However, the fact that the object of the feeling
of absolute dependence is inconceivable is an essential con-
dition of religion. "Es ist das Tnteresse der Religion, dass




? der gewusst werden kann, ist kein Gott mehr. Hence, the
consciousness of the intellectual unapp reachability of the
holy remains even when the religious feeling of dependence
gives rise to the impulse to define its object. A complete
knowledge of the holy would render religion impossible. This
is, doubtless, an extreme view. It is true, as Brighbnan says,
that "there must always be something incomplete and unsatisfac-
„ 5
tory about any human view of God. This is due to the limita-
tions of the finite mind. But it does not follow, as Windel-
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4. hoc. cit.
5. Brightman: FG, 18. Cf. Ibid., 35.

14(5
band holds, that religion is essentially conditioned upon such
partial knowledge. If there is a God who is worthy of being
worshiped, a complete knowledge of him should promote worship
rather than preclude it.
The finite mind, Windelband maintains, unable, on the one
hand, to grasp as such the indefinite and inexpressible object
of religious feeling, reduces it, on the other hand, to the
level of the finite, and conceives it as a person. w Im fromnen
Gefiihl tritt der Hensch zu dem Unendlichen in eine geistige
Lebensgeraeinschaft : eine solche aber kennen wir empirisch nur
als ein Verldiltnis von Person zu Person. Deshalb muss das Ob-
1jekt des fromnen Gefuhls als Person vorgestellt werden. Here,
however, another antinomy is encountered. Personality is
known empirically only as limited and finite, " ja sie ist der
2
hochste Typus des in sich Geschlossenen und Begrenzten." " The
self is always limited by the not-self. Hence, the superempir-
ical and infinite must be superpersonal. w • . oUnd doch soil nun
das Unendliche als Persftnlichkeit vorgestellt werden; ja, das
religiose Lcben gerat, wie die Geschichte unweigerlich zeigt,
in hilflose Verkiimmerung, wenn es der personlichen Auffassung
des Gcittlichen entraten zu ktfnnen meint. Dieser nie ganz zu
lftsende Antagonismus steckt in dem Begriffe der absoluten
Persttnlichkeit. Denn was ist als ihr Inhait zu denken?"
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The difficulty Windelband encounters here is not in-
superable. A self, as Brightraan has shown, is not necessarily
opposed to, and limited by, a not- self. "A seif, in order
to know and be, does not need to refer to a not-self... When
I know my own sensations, or hopes, or yesterdays, the act
of knowing and the object known are distinct; yet both fall
-1
within the self. The object of the religious feeling of
dependence may, therefore, so far as Windelband* s difficulty
is concerned, be a Supreme Person. The object as given in
religious feeling is not infinite, as Windelband says, but
indefinite. Whether that indefiniteness implies infinity
reflective thought must determine.
For Windelband, therefore, it is in the relation of the
normative to the natural that "die Antinomie des religifisen
Bewusstseins am starksten zutage [trittj ." On the one hand,
God is the sura of the highest values, the normative con-
sciousness, "diejenige Persflnlichkeit, in der alles wirklich
ist, was sein soil: die Wirklichkeit aller Tdeale. Darin be-
steht die Heiligkeit Gottes." On the other hand, God is
the ground of the natural world. But this involves the con-
tradiction that that which is the norm of all that ought to
be also is, or produces, the actual, and the antagonism to
the normative which the actual contains. "Das Heilige soli
Substanz und Ursache seines Gegenteils sein. Hierauf beruht
" IT Brightman, ITP, 210-211.
2. PRA, XI, 312
.
3. Ibid., 314. See, also, pp . 143-144, above.
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die vollige UnlSsbarkeit der Probleme der Tneodizee, der Fra-
*
* 1gen nach dem Ursprung des Ubels in der Welt." Evil can not
be explained away as mere appearance, or as mere absence of
2
the good. Nature abounds in purposelessness, cruelty, horror,
sorrow, and ethical indifference. "Das..., worum die Theodizee
nie herumkommen kann, ist die Rea li tat des Bbsen und damit
des Nomwidrigen iiberhaupt. Rie steht mit der absoluten Rub-
stantialitat und Kausalitat der Gottheit in v8llig unverein-
barem Widersoruclie. The religious consciousness itself tes-
tifies in the clearest fashion to the unquestionable reality
of evil. "Wie aber ist diese Realitat mbglich in einer Welt,
deren ganzes Sein, deren einzige Kausalitat in der absoluten
Personlichkeit, in dem allmachtigen Normalbewuss tsein beruht?
Diese Frage ist fur menschliche Einsicht vollig unbeantwort-
bar..." Hie essence and cause of evil, as Plato pointed out,
can not be sought in God. But if it be external to God, then
God ceases "die einzige Realitat und die einzige Kausalitat
zu sein." The result is a dualism which can not withstand the
7
monistic tendency in metaphysical representation. rTir stehen
hier vor einem der Falle, wo wir die Unmtfglichkeit der Lftsung
einer doch unentfliehbaren Aufgabe mit ailer Richerheit ein-
T7 PRA, II, 315. Of. uempp, PDT, 53, 53. Ree, also, p.
54, above.
2. PRA, II, 315.
3. Ibid., 315-315.
4. Ibid. 315.
5. Ree p. 43, above.
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fach aufzuweisen vermogen; es ist die Quadra tur des Kreises
1
im religiosen Bewusstsein.” Windelband suggests that it
would not be surprising if some, wrestling with this riddle
of religion, should propose the view that the religious life
of man consists "in seiner Mitarbeit an der Erltisung, mit
dcr Gott in sich selbst duruh die Vemunft das Normwidrige
.. „2
uberwinde. This interesting anticipation of the point of
o
view of Brightman’s theory of ” The Given”' Wlndelband never
developed.
In the period between 1902 and 1914 Windelband wrote
but little on religion. In 1904 he continued to hold that
the enigma of evil is insoluble. ^ In 1910 he wrote a short
g
essay,’ in which he showed less sympathy with mysticism than
in 1883
In his Einleitung in die Philosophic (1914) Windelband
treated religion at considerable length. Tne ultimate problem
for philosophy, he says here, is the nature of the relation
of existence to value. "Daraus ergeben sich...als Abschluss
der axiologischen Gruppe die religiosen Probleme. He re-
tains his earlier views of the content of religion, and of the
O





3. Brightman, PG, 113.
4. UW, 151.
5. "Von der Mystik unserer Zeit,” PM, I, 290-299.
0. See pp. 141-143, above.
7. EP, 24.
8. Ibid., 388-390. Cf. Pichler, HEP, Kant-Studien ,
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inventions. They have a superempirical reference. "In diesem
Sinne verlangt das Wertleben eine metaphysische
V erankerung, und wenn man jenen ubererfahrungsmassigen
Lebenszusammenhang der Personliehkci ten mit dem Nanen der
Gottheit bezeichnet, so kann man sagen, dass ihre
Realitftt mit dem Gewissen selbst gegeben ist. So real wie
das Gewissen, so real ist Gott."
1
The feeling of absolute
dependence is discussed in a manner very similar to that of
p1902. The experience of value justifies the desire to secure
for the human personality a significance which extends beyond
gthe world of sense. Such significance is achieved in the
realization of the values of truth, goodness, and beauty. Rut




The central and most baffling problem remains that of
the relation of the evil of the actual world to norms, values,
and God.
,P
* There is much good in the world, and also much
evil. Religion itself finds the world which bears the stamp
of divine creation full of imperfection, sorrow, and sin.
What is the explanation? "Wie verhalt sich das gottliche
Wesen, das der Tr&ger einer ubersinnlichen Welt der Werte ist,
zu dieger Sinnenweit, welche eben diese Werte vielleicht zum
Teil verwirklicht, zum Teil aber auch sicher in der offen-
IT EP, 392. See, also, p. 143, above.
2. EP, 397-398, 403-404. See, also, pp. 144-140, above.
3. EP, 405. See, also, p. 142, above.
4. Drews, WEP, Preuss . Jahr.
,
100(1915), 399. Cf. EP, 415.
5. See pp. 147- 1 49' , above
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kundigsten Weise verneint? Wle verhalt slch das Sollen zum
Sein, die Welt der zeitlos geltenden Werte zu der Welt der
Dinge und des zeitlichen Geschehens? Das ist das letzte
H 1Problem. The answer to these questions, Windelband now
declares, must be given in terms of dualism. The insoluble
antinomies encountered in the life of value point to an
objective antinomy, to a dualism of good and bad, in reality
2itself. ' "Was als sichere Erkenntnis iiberall. . . zuruckbleibt,
ist allein die Wertdualitat des W 1 r k -
H 3
1 i c h e n. Physical and moral evils abound, and can not
4be explained away. "Gerade das religiose Bewusstsein kann
niemals uni die Tatsache der S u n d e herum-
kommen, sie ist ihm die gewisseste aller Tatsachen, und ent-
halt als solche den Ursprung fur alle Inbrunst des Erlosungs-
beditrfnisses . Und dies ist nun der Punkt, wo der Drang zu
einem einheitlichen Weltverstandnis vor dem unlosbaren Hatsel
M 5
steht. The world of value and the world of reality are not
wholly foreign to each other; neither are they identical
with each other. "Durch die Wirklichkeit geht ein Hiss: in ihr
steckt neben den Werten die sich in ihr verwirklichen, eine
dunkle Macht des Wertgleichgultigen und des Wertwidrigen."
These antithetical aspects of the world can not be traced to
1. EP, 422. Cf. Ibid., 24. See, also, p. 149, above.
2. EP, 423, 424. See, also, pp. 107-108, above.
3. EP, 428.
4. Ibid., 428-429. See, also, p. 148, above.
5. EP, 430.
0. Ibid., 431. Cf. PLAT, 109. See, also, pp. 43-44,
above.
4
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any unitary principle as their common source. For it is "nie-
mals zu begreifen, wie es sich in eine solclie Dualitat spaltet,
1
mit der es sich selbst widerspricht. Monotheism is, there-
fore, untenable. "Die Duality t ist die gewisseste aller Tat>-
sachen, und der Kenismus ist die fes teste aller Voraussetzungen
2
unseres Weltdenkens . No further insight into this ultimate
dualism is possible. "...Dies letzte Problem [ist] unlosbar.
Es ist das heilige Geheimnis, an dem wir die Schranken
„ 3
unseres Wesens und Erkennens erfahren. The human mind can
comprehend a world thus divided within itself as little as
4
the human will can oversome that division. What remains is
resignation and the "wunschlose Freud
e
w ° of contemplation,
wherein eternal values are revealed. According to Windel-
band, therefore, the outlook from the standpoint of religion
is gloomy, indeed. Evil is as deeply rooted in reality as
good is. It would seem, therefore, that sin can never be
overcome, that redemption can never be realized. Because the
universe is divided against itself, the struggle between good
and evil is as interminable as it is inevitable. It is at this
point that Windelband’s pessimism becomes most pronounced.
The world, as he saw it from the point of view of logic,
ethics, and esthetics, was dismal enough. From the point of
view of religion it is more dismal still.
IT EP, 431.
2. Loc. cit.
3 . ho c . cit.
4. Ibid., 432.
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VIII. The bearing of Windelband * s view of metaphysics on his
pessimism.
As early as 1873 Windelband rejected altogether the dog-
matic metaphysics which identifies logical consistency with
existence. Logical consistency guarantees possibility only,
"niemals . . .Wirklichkeit, deren Kriterien auf ganz anderen
Gebieten liegen."
1
In 1882 he wrote: "Die Metaphysik ist ein
„ 2Unding. Tnis statement he later revised, so that it now
reads: "Die Metaphysik in dem alten Sinne eines dogma tischen
Wissens von den letzten Griinden aller Wirklichkeit ist ein
3
Unding... In 1883 Windelband declared that a metaphysics,
if such were possible, would make plain the moral mission of
society. "Die Metaphysik, d. h. die vollstandige Erkenntnis
des Wei tails, wiirde uns in den Stand setzen, auch die Aufgabe
zu verstehen, welche im Weltplan die Gesellschaft zu erfiillen
hat."^ But a metaphysics can be no more than an unproved
faith. "...Die Metaphysik mit ihrem Weltplan ist als Wissen-
schaft unraoglich und als Glaube nicht beweisbar." ^ In 1884
Windelband in his reply to Lass's criticism^ of the Praludien
said: "...An mehr als einer Stelle (z. B. Pral. 39. 307) habe
7
ich die Metaphysik als unmdglich abgelehnt... In 1904 he
declared he could accept even Kant's teaching only when it had
17 UGE, 20. Cf. Ibid., 61.
2. Praludien (1884), 39.
3. PllA, I, 40
.
4. PllA, II, 188.
5. Ibid., 189.
6. See p. 0, above.
7. UTK, Phil.Mona tsh.
,
20(1884), 161.
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been purged of every trace of metaphysics. Huge, therefore,
correctly says: "Die Metaphysik ist beiseite geschoben, das
von Aris to teles ubernomriene forraalis tische Schema des Auf-
baues und der Ableitung philosophischer Einteilungsgriinde
M 2
vielfach durchbrochen.
Nevertheless, Windelband*s own writings, as Hickert ob-
M 3
serves, "sind...von netaphysischen Bestandteilen nicht frei.
In 1873 he regarded metaphysics as a necessary complement to
4
epistemology, since epistemology raises many questions of an
essentially metaphysical character. In 1009, speaking before
the Third International congress of Philosophy, he again em-
phasized this relation. "Man denkt nicht ilber das Verhaltnis
des Bewusstseins zum Sein, ohne uber das Rein selbst zu denken:
und in diesem Sinne gibt es keine Erkenntnis theorie, die nicht
eine Metaphysik bedeutet." B In 1904 he pronounced the problem
of freedom capable of solution only by determining "die Stel-
lung, die der Persbniichkeit im ganzen Umfange und in den
„ A
tiefsten Wurzeln des Wirklichen gebuhrt. This problem he
7
had already approached from the religious standpoint in 1902.
Value experience in general has a superempirical reference, and
g
requires a metaphysical anchorage. This Windelband endeavors to
IT UW, 181. See, also, p. 62, above.
2. Huge, WW, 34.




7. See pp. 146-147, above.
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provide in the postulate of a "Bewusstsein uberhaupt." But
a "Bewusstsein uberhaupt," for which, according to Windelband,
the norms of value exist as objects, must lie beyond the realm
of logical abstraction. It is w ein Stuck Metaphysik." ^ Drews
correctly observes that a "Bewusstsein uberhaupt,” in order to
serve the purpose Windelband assigns to it, must be conceived
as personal. "Vom Standpunkte des ’Bewuss tseins uberhaupt
1
aus





' Finally, Windeiband f s objective antinomianism
4
and dualism are themselves essentially metaphysical views.
Nevertheless, Windelband holds that a metaphysics in any
sense other than n Erkenntnistheorie, • . .die kritische Unter-
H 5
suchung der logischen Formen des Wirklichen, is impossible.
That tnis is the case is due, he holds, to the fragmentariness
of human knowledge. Out of the totality of the given the in-
tellect, guided by its own interests, selects fractional parts
here and there. The sciences deal with selected and isolated
aspects of the whole of reality. 7 Between these fragments of
reality with which the sciences deal there are areas of which
little or nothing can be known. The whole of reality is never
T7 See pp. 111-113, above.
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,
100(1915), 400.
4. See pp. 107- lOS , 151, above.
5. EP, 237-238.
0. ZBG, 173-174. Cf. Bergmann, HPL, Zeits.f.Phil.n.phil.
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known. "...Dies Ganze, von den wlr nie mehr als wenige Bruck-
stucke kennen werden, ist unsenn Wissen verschlossen." ^ Hence,
2
metaphysics, "die vollst&ndige Erkenntnis des Wei tails," is
impossible. By way of criticism of this position, it may be
said that a knowledge of the whole of reality, instead of
constituting a condition of metaphysics, would render any
metaphysics other than itself superfluous and invalid. The
true function of metaphysics is to form the most adequate and
consistent theory of reality possible on tne basis of a
necessarily limited human experience and insight. In this
sense, a large portion of Windelband ’ s own philosophy is
metaphysics. It was his intention, however, to avoid meta-
physics. In consequence, he was constantly raising vital
Q
problems' only to pronounce them insoluble. This agnostic
attitude, as indicated above, contributed greatly to his
pessimism
.
IT PL, GO. Cf. ZBG, 172, and EP, 208.
2. PllA, II, 188. See, also, p. Ih3, above.
3. This Chapter affords many illustrations of this pro-
cedure. See pp. 98-99, 101-102, 10G, 123, 124, 145-
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WINDELBAND 1 S PESSIMISTIC CONCLUSIONS
This Chapter contains a summary and a criticism of Win-
delband's pessimistic conclusions. In each section tne first
paragraph contains a summary of a pessimistic conclusion
reached by Windelband; and the second paragraph contains a
criticism of that conclusion.
1. Intellectually, mankind has made but little progress
in the course of history.'1' There has been an increase in
scientific knowledge, but only "fur eine ganz dunne Ober-
„ 2
schicht des gesellschaftlichen Ganzen. It is highly un-
certain whether there has been any increase in intellectual
capacity
.
Two considerations show that there is little, if any,
foundation for pessimism here. First: It is not true, in
the modern era at least, that increase in knowledge has been
confined to a thin upper stratum of society. More and more the
masses of mankind are sharing that increase. An intellectual
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aristocracy is always needed to constitute the vanguard of
intellectual progress. In its train, however, an increasingly
intellectual democracy may, and does, follow. Second: All un-
certainty regarding an increase in man’s intellectual capacity
vanishes if modem man is compared not with the great minds
of Greece, hut with ancestors much more ancient. Furthermore,
it is probable that the present latent capacities of the human
mind would, of themselves, if fully developed, make much
progress possible.
II. Morally, mankind has made but little, if any, progress
in the course of history. An extremely small minority has at-
tained a high degree of true inner morality. The average, how-
ever, remains always about the same.*
It is, doubtless, true that the moral progress of mankind,
if any, has been slow. Windelband’s conclusion, however, that
in inner moral excellence mankind, with rare exceptions, has
made no advance in the course of history, is little more than
an assumption. It is not proved; and, in the nature of the case,
it can not be proved. "Improvement in human character" is,
Todd declares, "a highly debatable question. There may be an
’ameliorative drift* running through the ages, but we have
_ 2
no ins truments .. .delicate enough to measure it." If appeal
is made to more objective criteria of progress, advance be-
comes apparent. There has been progress in the definition of
the moral ideal. "What is clear," Urban writes, "is that the
TT See pp. 85-88, above.





























































idea of wha t is right . > .has increasingly broadened and deepened.
There is no respect in which moral progress can be more clearly
seen than in the deepening views men are led to take, not only
of their duties but of their virtues." 1 Todd affirms that "man
has progressed morally, in the sense that moral standards have
been refined and extended, while moral values have risen and
grown more sensitive." " There has been progress, too, in the
incorporation of the moral ideal in social institutions. The
o
monogamous family may be cited as an instance.' Windelband
would grant the fact of progress in ideas and institutions.
But he would consider it scientific and legal, not moral.
III. Esthetically
,
mankind has advanced in both apprecia-
tion and achievement. But the probability of future progress
is slight, because many works of art already produced are
so perfect that they can never be equalled, much less ex-
4
celled. A brief criticism of this strange point of view is
4given above.
IV. History shows no increase, but rather a decrease,
in happiness. Personal satisfaction was much better provided
for under primitive conditions than in the complicated strug-
gle for existence among civilized peoples.
TT Urban, FOE, 432.
2. Todd, TSP, 535. Cf. Ibid., 127, 139; Schiller, ROS,
121-122 .
3. Urban, FOE, 430-431. Todd, TSP, 90.
4. See pp. 87-88, above.
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It would be difficult to verify this conclusion. "Pleas-
ure and happiness are too subjective and relative to measure
in any fashion..."* Furthermore, the degree of happiness
enjoyed by primitive man was probably narrowly limited. "If
his ignorance spelled bliss it was joy so interlarded with
vague uncertainties and terrors that it was at least dubious
2
and paradoxical. It remains, therefore, far from certain
tiiat man in a primitive state was happier than civilized man.
V. The future will bring eventually, if not immediately,
a decline in culture, and after that the death of mankind.'
Aside from the expected aging of tne earth, there seems
to be no adequate grounds for the conclusion that culture
must decline. Furthermore, contrary to Windelband’s assump-
tion, it is not certain that the principle of degradation of
energy is valid for the universe as a whole. 4 Finally, if
personal immortality be possible, the cooling of the sun
or the disintegration of the earth would necessarily result
in neither the death of mankind nor in any destruction or
decrease of values.
VI. Jleason and its object, the content of experience,
are to a large extent incommensurable. The speculative reason
IT Urban, FOE, 427.
2. Todd, TSP, 87.
3. See pp. 90-93, above.
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encounters an irrational element in the relation of mind and
matter, in the particular event, and in the essence of in-
dividuality. The practical reason encounters such an element
in those aspects of the world "which are indifferent or hos-
tile to value. 1
This is a significant consideration. So far as reason
is baffled and resisted by reality, there is a firm basis
for a pessimistic world view. But reason is not always baf-
fled and resisted. Nowhere is it completely baffled. Progress
has been made in understanding the world, and in the increase
and conservation of values. The progress made has been slow,
to be sure, and its price has been great. The latter con-
siderations justify a degree of pessimism; the foraer, a
larger degree of optimism. Findelband emphasizes disproportion-
ately the inability of reason to understand and improve the
world, and too readily pronounces problems insoluble. The
hostility of empirical reality to the practical reason will
o
be discussed below.
VII. lleality resists, and to a great extent frustrates,
the efforts of mankind to realize intellectual values. The
powers of the human mind are limited. The psychological laws
of sensation and association are more favorable to error than
to truth. Interest is at once a condition of all thought,
and a formidable obstacle to valid thought. Formal logic
T7 See pp. 104-108, above.
2. See pp. 104-105, below.
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affords no criterion of material truth. Tne criterion of
coherence is the best possible, but, due to the limitations
of human experience, even it nay fall far short of truth.
The ultimate problems of thought are insoluble."
Windelband f s difficulty here is due, in part, to his
psychological determinism. The effective criticism of Win-
delband's rejection of the concept of freedom in epistemology,
formulated by Ulrici, and later developed by Bowne, has been
o
indicated above. Recognition of the speculative signifi-
cance of freedom modifies radically the bearing of psycholog-
ical laws and interest on the course and outcome of thought.
The coherence criterion, when critically applied to the
widest range of human experience possible, may be trusted
to lead in the direction of ultimate truth. Many problems
once considered insoluble have been solved. Some now regarded
as insoluble may prove soluble. But, even if some do not,
it by no means follows that life in a world containing some
impenetrable mysteries must be devoid of sufficient intel-
lectual value, and of sufficient increase of such value, to
make it worth while.
VIII. Reality resists, and to a great extent frustrates,
the efforts of mankind to realize moral values. The natural
process of motivation is ethically indifferent. There is
moral freedom only in the sense of conformity to ethical
T7 See pp. 121-134, above.
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norms. A criterion of material goodness is probably impossible.
The highest moral task of the individual, and of society,
is the creation of a culture which, as stated above, 1 must
2decline and disappear.
Here, again, Windelband ’ s determinism increases his dif-
ficulty. If man is free to review his motives and choose be-
tween them, a hypothesis at least as sound as determinism,
the barrier to the realization of moral values presented by
the process of natural motivation is less formidable than
Windelband supposed. A critical and comprehensive applica-
tion of the principle of the ideal of personality to the
problems of life provides a criterion of material goodness.
According to tnis principle, the moral task is the achievement
of ideal personality generally. If personal immortality be
possible, the values thus achieved may be conserved. The
moral situation, therefore, is less depressing than Windel-
band supposed it to be.
IX. Reality resists, and to a great extent frustrates,
g
the efforts of mankind to realize esthetic values.'
Windelband* s ora view of esthetic progress in the
course of history** should modify this conclusion sufficient-
ly to render it inadequate as a basis for pessimism.
" IT See p. 180, above.
2. See pp. 134-130, above.
3. See pp. 139-140, above.
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X. Evil is rooted as deeply in reality as is good. It is
w eine clunkle Macht cles Wertgleiehgiiltigen unci des Wertwidri-
.1
|
gen." The universe is divided against itself. The hostility
of evil to good, and the frustration of good by evil, promises
to be as interminable as it is inevitable. Evil and good
Can not be traced to the same source. Hence, monotheism is
impossible; and henism is the best hypothesis. Any ultimate
solution of the problem of evil is impossible.^
Evil does root deeply. That is undeniable. One of the
chief values of Windelband ’ s philosophy of religion lies in
his clear comprehension and forceful formulation of the
gravity of the problem of evil. It is probable, however, that
evil does not root so deeply in reality as good does. "The
faith that the power of the universe is on the side of growth
in goodness is supported by the fact that goodness has a
genuine growth and development, whereas sin is a deadly and
repetitious monotony... Value reveals itself as the true and
„ 3
eternal purpose of life; evil as futility and distortion."
Furthermore, it is possible to recognize fully the fact of
evil without resorting to an ultimate dualism, a resort which
always raises more difficulties than it overcomes, difficul-
ties which are ill disposed of by dismissing them as insolu-
ble. In this connection, Brightman ’s theory of a "Given" in
God is especially worthy of note. 4 "...There is in God’s
17 EP, 431.
2. See pp. 143-152, above.
3. Brightman, FG, 190-191.
4. Brightman develops this theory in PG and FG. See p.
149, above, for an anticipation of it in Windelband.
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very nature something which makes the effort and pain of life
necessary. There is within him, in addition to his reason and
his active creative will, a passive element which enters into
every one of his conscious stages, as sensation, instinct, and
impulse enter into ours, and constitutes a problem for him.
This element we call The Given. The evils of life and the
delays in the attainment of value, in so far as they come
from God and not from human freedom, are thus due to his na-
1ture, yet not w'holly to his deliberate choice. This theory
is optimistic concerning the progress and outcome of tne
2
world process." It is clear, therefore, that recognition of
the fact of evil need not lead as far in the direction of
pessimism as Windelband believed.
3
XI. Personal immortality is not to be expected.' There
is no life for man beyond this earthly life.^
This conclusion cancels tnat measure of meaning, value,
and hope which a rationally grounded belief in immortality
is capable of lending to life. Weighty considerations, which
need not be stated here, support the view that there are
adequate grounds for a belief in personal immortality.'
XII. A metaphysics is impossible.
Windelband* s inconsistency in this connection, and the
IT Brightman, PG, 113.
2. Brightman, PG, 137, 183; FG, 115, 177.
3. EP, 405, 415. See, also, p. 150, above.
4. See pp. 91-92, 100, above.
5. Brightman, ITP, 346-351.
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invalidity of his conclusion have been discussed briefly a-
bove.
*
XIII. There remains for mankind only resignation to its
fate of being baffled, to a large extent at least, in all
its attempts to realize ideal values, and of being itself
eventually annihilated. The bitterness of this fate may be
relieved somewhat by the delight derived from desireless
contemplation of those eternal values which reality reveals
2
to our gaze but withholds from our grasp.
This conclusion follows from the others reached by V»rin-
delband. But in so far as tney have been shown to be unsound
this lacks validity.
IT See p. 1 56 , above.
2. See pp. 50, 01-02, 152, above.
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CONCLUSIONS OF THE DISSERTATION
The preceding Chapters of this Dissertation lead to the
following conclusions.
I. Conclusions regarding the development of Windelband’s pes-
simism.
A. Windelband never applied the term pessimism* to his
own philosophical position. Rut the fact that his world view
is pessimistic is obvious.
B. Windelband’s pessimism was developed gradually. It
was probably intensified during the last years of his life
by broken health, by forced abandonment of long cherished
plans, and by discouragement and bereavement brought him by
the World War.
C. Windelband' s early attempt to prove that all pessimism
is unphilosophical was unsuccessful. Consciousness of his
failure may have made him more receptive to considerations
tv?ia n t ciaho
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I D. Windelband was influenced in the direction of pessi-
mism by his studies in the history of philosophy. He derived
certain elements of his pessimistic world view from Heracli-
tus, Einpedocles, Plato, Aristotle, Hegesias, Epicurus, the
Stoics, Bohme, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Herbart,
Schopenhauer, and Lotze.
E. Windelband considered the systematic grounds of his
pessimism more fundamental than the historical. History, he
thinks, shows only that the efforts of mankind to realize
ideal values have been seriously impeded; whereas, systematic
considerations show that such efforts must always be thus
impeded.
II. Conclusions regarding Windelband* s basis for pessimism
in the philosophy of the history of culture.
A. History affords no adequate grounds for pessimism
regarding the possibility of progress in knowledge, morality,
or art.
B. History affords no adequate grounds for pessimism
^
regarding the effect of civilization on the happiness of man-
kind .
C. Neither history nor science in general affords ade-
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and of the human race.
III. Conclusions regarding Windelband's speculative basis for
pessimism.
A. Windelband's position that it is the task of philos-
ophy not to explain the world as it is, but only to render
explicit the immediate evidence for the validity of norms
and values is untenable. He himself was unable to adhere to
it. The province of philosophy is neither exclusively what
is (Hegel), nor exclusively what ought to be (Windelband),
but both what is and what ought to be. The proper function
of philosophy is both to explain and to evaluate the world
given in experience.
B. In consideration of the progress already made in
understanding the world, and in controlling it in order to
produce and conserve value, the presence of an irrational
element in the world does not afford adequate grounds for
pessimism regarding the possibility of progress in rational
understanding and control of the world.
C. The natural obstacles to the achievement of knowledge,
goodness, and beauty are not great enough to afford adequate
grounds for pessimism.
D. The problem of evil does not compel resort to pessi-
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God than by Yfindelband *s dualism. The former theory provides
a basis for optimism.
E. Y/indelband * s denial of personal immortality is un-
warranted. It is based upon the assumptions that the princi-
ple of the degradation af energy holds for the universe as a
whole, that the life of mind depends for its existence upon
the life of the body, and that the highest form of reality
must be impersonal. Windelband*s treatment of this subject
is hasty and superficial. For all that Windelband proves to
the contrary, the hypothesis of personal immortality remains
as tenable as before.
F. Windelband* s treatment of metaphysics is inconsistent
and inadequate. A large part of his own philosophy is meta-
physics. Nevertheless, he holds that the fragmentary charac-
ter of all knowledge renders a rationally grounded metaphysics
impossible. This objection, however, is invalid. The fragmen-
tary character of knowledge requires, rather than precludes,
a metaphysics for its own explanation. At least a hypothetical
metaphysics is possible.
G. Y/inde lband. * s doctrine of a "Bewusstsein uberhaupt"
logically commits him to a personalistic metaphysics. Suoh a
)
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Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915) studied under Euno
Fischer and Hemann Lotze. Fischer aroused in him a perma-
nent interest in history of philosophy; Lotze, in system-
atic philosophy. Windelband was Priva tdozent at Leipzig
(1873-1878), and professor at Zurich ^1878-1877), at
Freiburg (1877-1882), at Strassburg (1882-1903), and at
Heidelberg (1903-1915). His numerous writings won for him
high rank both as a historian of philosophy and as a sys-
tematic thinker. Toward the end of his life he had to
abandon plans for further works on account of broken health.
Windelband founded the "Southwest German School" of Neo-
Kantians. Among his noted students may be named Georg
Jellinek, Julius Hinder, Hnil Lask, Heinrich llickert,
Bruno Bauch, Hugo Miinsterberg, and Ernst Troeltsch.
In his early period Windelband was interested in, but
hostile to, pessimism. In 1878 he criticized pessimism,
which was at that time prevalent in philosophy, as a mere
subjective mood, pathological when extreme. The evaluation
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Hence, as a world view, pessimism is groundless. This, how-
ever, neither precludes, nor denies the value of, ethical
pessimism with reference to particular conditions of human
life. So far as it concerns the generalization of a mood
into a world view, Windelband 1 s criticism is valid. With
reference to the possibility of a philosophically grounded
pessimism, however, it is invalid. He incorrectly assumes,
first, that all thought that can claim objective validity
must be entirely free from interest, a position which would
preclude from philosophy all problems of value and disvalue;
and, second, that pessimism presupposes knowledge of a pur-
pose, external to the universe itself, which the universe
should realize. Windelband fails to prove that pessimism
can be no more than a subjective mood.
Windelband was influenced in the direction of pessimism
by his studies in the history of philosophy. Some of the
historical sources of his pessimism are the following:
1) Heraclitus: dualism of the world process, and pessimism
in ethics. 2) Empedocles: axiological dualism. 3) Plato: pre-
eminence of value in philosophy, dualism, and pessimism.
4) Aristotle: the limitations of logic, the antithesis of
teleology and mechanism, and the concept of contemplation as
the highest good. 5) Hegesias: rejection of hedonism. 6) Ep-
icurus: the problem of the relation of God to the evil in
the world. 7) The Stoics: the antithesis between what is and
what ought to be, and ethical pessimism. 8) Bohme: the prob-
.>r • jJOJtf* t or *i h '
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lem of grounding evil in God. 9) Leibniz: theodicy, and the
relation of "verites etemelles* to "verites de fait." 10)
Kant: the division of the field of philosophy, emphasis on
value, dualism, metaphysical agnosticism, and pessimism.
11) Fichte: voluntarism, and teleology. 12) Hegel: the
relation of the real to the rational. 13) Herbart: psycho-
logical determinism. 14) Schopenhauer: the irrational,
voluntarism, and contemplation. 15) Lotze: the central place
of value in philosophy, and the concept of validity.
Windelband held an increasingly pessimistic view of
history generally. The course of history reveals little
progress in the realization of the universally valid values
of truth, goodness, and beauty. From 1870 to 1909 Windelband
held a moderately optimistic view of the intellectual progress
made by mankind. In 1914 his view became pessimistic. His
view of moral progress, always somewhat pessimistic, became
more and more pessimistic as time passed. He expressed in
1914, for the first time, a pessimistic view of esthetic
progress. Another novel pessimistic emphasis in 1914 is based
on the decrease of happiness which, according to Rousseau,
Kant, and Windelband, accompanies the advance of civilization.
Windelband expects the future course of history to annihilate
whatever achievements have been made in the past. Culture will
decline, and the human race will become extinct. All that per-







Windelband held an increasingly pessimistic view of the
world. The task of philosophy, he held, is only to render
explicit the immediate evidence for the validity of noms
and values. This task, however, can never he more than par-
tially accomplished. The world is largely irrational. Windel-
band *s emphasis on the antinomiam character of the world in-
creased steadily from 1870 to 1914. The whole relation of mind
and matter, all particular events, and every instance of in-
dividuality present insoluble problems for the theoretical
reason. Furthermore, the practical reason in its efforts to
realize value is greatly hindered by the irrational element
in reality. To a large extent man can not do what he ought.
The world of natural necessity is largely antithetical to
norms and values. In every realm of value, in science, moral-
ity, art, and religion, the antinomy of ’ought* and ’must* is
encountered. The attempt to apprehend truth is, to a large
extent, rendered futile by the limitations of the human mind,
by laws of sensation and association that, on the whole, are
more favorable to error than to truth, by the distraction of
interest, by the lack of an absolute criterion of material
truth, and by the insolubility of many ultimate problems.
The world reveals in us a standard of truth, but prevents us
from conforming fully to it. The situation is similar with re-
spect to moral and esthetic values. The natural order makes
only a partial realization of them possible, and threatens all
that is achieved with eventual annihilation.
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Windelband * s earliest essay on religion (1883) is
mystical and pantheistic in tone. In 1902 he extended the
antinomy of the normative and tne naturally necessitated
to the sphere of religion. The necessary hostility of nature
to the norais of value, which is experienced as a feeling of
guilt, is made the point of departure for philosophy of re-
ligion. Man experiences a sense of dependence upon a super-
empirical reality, but he can not define the nature of that
reality. Following the only analogy experience affords, re-
ligion regards, and must regard, its object as a person. But
Windelband, for insufficient reasons, rejected the view that
God is a person. Evil, furthermore, presents an altogether
insoluble problem. In 1914 Windelband proposed a fundamental
dualism as a solution of the problem of evil, and henism
as the best hypothesis for philosophy of religion. But this
solution, he himself saw, becomes in turn a problem that at
once demands and defies solution. In a world thus fundamental,
ly divided against itself with reference to the values of
truth, goodness, beauty, and salvation from sin, there re-
mains for mankind only resignation to fate, and what delight
can be derived from the contemplation of values that can be
seen but never fully secured.
The view of history upon which Windelband bases his
pessimistic conclusions is, in large measure, invalidated
by too narrow limitations, and by the admission of highly
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which he bases pessimistic conclusions are more substantial.
But V’indelband *s psychological determinism, his rejection of
metaphysics, his disproportionate emphasis upon the negative
aspects of reality, and his too great readiness to pronounce
difficulties insuperable greatly complicate the problem to
be solved, and lead to conclusions not required by the prob-
lems themselves. The valid elements in the historical and
systematic considerations to which Windelband appeals are

































One. Windelband 1 s works, in chronological order.













Part One. Windelband’s works. In chronological order.
Die Lehren vom Zufall LZ
fieri in : Henschel . 1870.
Ueber die Gewissheit der Erkenntnis UGE
Berlin: V. Henebbo1 . 1 873“
.'
"Franz Henschel" (Nekrolog) NFTI
Philosophische Monatshefte, 10(1874), 47-48.
Berlin: Verlag Von F. enschel
.
"Zur Logik" ZL
Philosophische Monatshefte, 10(1874), 38-42,
8'S-Ol,' KL8-110.
Berlin: Verlag von F. Henschel.
Uber den gegenwartigen Stand der psychologischen
Fors chung PF
Leipzig : Dmck und Verlag von Breitkopf und
H&rtel. 1870.
"Ueber die verschiedenen Phasen der Kantischen
Lehre von Ding- an- si ch" UICD
Viertei jahrsschrift fur wissenschaftliche Philo-
sophie und Sozioiogie, 1 vIstV ) , £24-20(4
.
Leinzig: Vues * s’ verlag v H - ITeisland)
Die Geschichte der neueren Philosophic (2 vols.) GNP
Leipzig: Breitkopf uricT H&rtel, (TffTJT, 1880) 1899.
PrSludien (2 vols. in later editions) PITA
Tilbingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul 8iebeck)
(1884) 1915.
"Beitrage zur Lehre vom negativen Urteil" BNU
Strassburger Festschrift fur E. Zeller
Tilbingen : Verlag von J.u.fiV Mohr (Paul Riebeck)
U«S4) 1921.
h'f i I*o£rio£f>J nio aJt t * 1 '* ^
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UTK"Ueber den teleologischen Kritizismus"
Philosophische Mona tshefte
, 20^1884), 101-109.
Heidelberg: Verlag von Georg Yfeiss.
Geschichte der alien Philosophie




Allgeneine Encyklopadie der Wissenschaf ten und
Kiins te (t’dited by J . S . Ersch and j.tH Gruber)!
Vol . 43, pp. 2-12.
Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus. 1889.
Fichte’s Idee des deutschen Staates
Tubingen : Verlag Von J.uYRY "HoTir (Paul Siebeck).
(1890) 1921.
Lehrbuch der Geschicnte der Philosophie
Tubingen: verlag Von jYl.HY Hohr (Haul Siebeck).
(1892) 1910.
"Deutsche Litteratur des letzten Jahre uber vorkant-
ische neuere Philosophie"
Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie, 19(1890),
—
Berlin: Druck und Verlag von Georg Reimer.
n Kuno Fischer und sein Kant"
Kant-Studien, 2(1897), 1-10.
Leipzig: Verlag von Leopold Voss.
"Eckoff, William J. D. Ph., Kant’s Inaugural Disserta^
tion of 1770 . . ."
Kant-Studien, 1(1897), 204-208.
Leipzig: Verlag von Leopold Voss.
Pla ton
Stuttgart: Fr. Frommans Verlag. (1898) 1901.
"Vom System der Kategorien”
Philosophische Abhandlungen (Festschrift fur
Sigwart
)
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" Zu Pla ton ’ s Phaidon"
Strassburger Festschrift zur XLVI. Versammlung
deutschen dhilologon unci ’Schuiraanner, 287-297
.
dtrassburg: Verlag von Karl J. TrTTbner. 1001.
"Zur Wissenschaftsgeschiehte der romanischen VSlker"
Grundriss der roraanischen Philologie (edited by




Strassburg: Karl J. Trtibner. 1901.
Immanuel Kant und seine Weltanschauung




Die WoChe, 0(1904), 1259-1201.
UerTinT Druck und Verlag von August Scherl.
" Logik"
Die Philosophie im Beginn des zwanzigsten Jahr-




Heidelberg: Carl Winter’s Universita tsbuch-
handlung. 1904.
Ueber Wiliensfreiheit
lilbingen : Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
(1904) 1918.
"Die gegenwartige Aufgabe der Logik und Erkenntnis-
theorie in Bezug auf Kultur- und Naturwissen-
schaften"
Congres Internationale de Philosophie, 104-119.
Gendve: henry iftindig . 1905.
”
"Fichte und Comte"
CongrSs Internationale de Philosophie, 287-292.
Gendve: Henry Eiindig. lOOn.
"Geschichte der Philosophie"
Die Philosophie im Beginn des zwanzigsten Jahr-
hunderts (edited bv Wilhelm Windeiband) II. feand
,
rTTCTTfO.
Heidelberg: Carl Winter’s Universita tsbuch-
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Schiller und die Gegenwart





Berlin: Verlag von Heuther & Heichard.
guno Fischer
Heidelberg : ^arl Winter’s Universi ta tsbuchhandlung.
1907.
"Wilhelm von Humboldt"
Internationale Wochenschrif t filr Wissenschaf t,
Hun's t unci Technik, 1 (T907), 807-810.
lltinclien: Druck' und Verlag der Bayerischen
Druckerei und Verlagsans talt
.
" Einleitung"
Bergson’s Materie und Gedachtnis
Jena: 1908
.
(Mentioned by Huge. Unavailable.)
Der Wille zur Wahrheit
Heidelberg: Oniversita ts-Buchdruckerei von J.
Horning. 1909.
"Die neuere Philosophie"
Allgemeine Geschic.ite der Philosophie (edited by
' l^aifT Tfinneb'e"rg
)"
Berlin: Druck und Verlag von B.G. Tuebner. 1909.
Die Philosophie im deutschen Geistesleben des XIX.
jahrhunderts
l*ftbingen : verlag von J.C.B. Kohr (Paul Siebeck).
1909.
"Eroffnungsworte des Prasidenten"
Bericht iiber den III. Interna tionalen Kongress
fiir Philosophie (edited by Th. Elserihans), 37
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"Ansprache des lira sidentens des III. Interna tionalen
Kongresses"
Bericht fiber den III. Interna tionalen Kongress
far Phi 1 os op^iie (edi ted by Thf Kisenhans)
,
53- 81
Heidelberg: uarl Winter’s University tsbuchhand.
lung. 1909.
"Zurn Begriff des Gesetzes"
Eericht uber den III. Interna tionalen Kongress




Heidelberg: Carl Winter’s Universitatsbuch-
handlung. 1909.
"Otto Liebmanns Philosophic' 1
Kant- Studien, 15(1910), III-X.
Berlin: Verlag von Reuther & Rei chard.
"Platon"
Handwdrterbuch der Rtaa tswissens chaften (edited by
Conrad, 171 Ulster, W. Lexis, TcTgT"Loening )
,
VI. Band, 1043-1048.
Jena: Verlag von Gustav Fischer. 1910.
Ueber Gleichlieit und Identitat




Georg Jellinek’s Ausgewiihlte Schriften. 1911.
(Mentioned by Huge . Unavailable.
)
"Die philosophischen Richtungen der Gegenwart"
Grosse Denker (edited by E. von Aster), II. Band,
—rTfli'-vrr .
—
Leipzig: Verlag Quelle & Meyer. 1912.
Uber Sinn und Wert des Phanomenalismus
Heidelberg: Carl Winter's Universi’ta tsbuchhandlung
1912.
Die Prinzipien der Logik
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Einleitung in die Philosophic HP
Tubingen: Verlag von J.c.B. Mohr OPaul Siebeck).
1914.
Die Hypo these des Unbewussten HU
Heidelberg: Carl Winter^ Universita tsbuchhancllung.
1914.
Geschichtsphilosophie, eine Kriegsvorlesung GK




Huge lists a work by Windelband entitled Die Wandlungen
des deutschen Geistes in 19. Jahrhundert . Concerning it,
Wilhelm Heims, bookseller in Leipzig, writes to the author
of this Dissertation: "Es gibt keine separate Schrift mit dem
Xitel: Die Wandlungen des deut. Geistes im 19. Jahrh..."
Huge also lists an article by Windelband on "Home" in
Allgemeine Encyklop?idie der Wissenschaften und Kdnste
,
edited
by J.S. Ersch and J.G. Gruber. There is no such article. The
article on "Hume" in this work was written in 1835. It is pos-
sible that the article, which Huge says he has not seen, is on
'’Henry More." This supposition is based on the fact that Huge
refers in a note to "Henry Home," and on the fact that Windel-
band makes numerous references to Henry More. (See LGP, 330,
330, 338, 304, 377, 421; and SWP, 9.) The volume of the
Allgemeine Encyklop&die der Wissenschaften und Kimste which
should contain the article on "Henry More" is, however, miss-
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Part Two . Works of other authors, in alphabetical order.
Adamson, H.
nA History of Philosophy .. .By Dr. W. Windelband. . ." WHP
RCind, N.S. 3(1894), 383-389.
London: Williams and Norgate.
Anonymous
"Uber Sinn und Wert des Phenomena lismus" HWP
Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale, 21(1913),
Supplement, 5-6.
Paris: Libraire Armand Colin.
Anonymous
"Wilhelm Windelband, Pr&ludien. . ." WWP
Logos: Internationale Zeitschrift fur Pliilosophie
' tier I“uTtur/ '2\19'll-l'9r^T,‘ fT77’-'2V8 .
Tlitj'ingen : Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
Anonymous
"Windelbands Prinzipien der Logik"
_
WPL
Logos: Internationale Zeitschrift fur Philosophie
der ivultur, 4(1913), ii2-ll3.
Tffb’ingen : Verlag von J.l.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
Barker, H.
"An Introduction to Philosophy. By Wilhelm Windel-
band."
Mind, N.S. .31(1922), 521-525.
London: Macmillan & Co.
Bauch, Bruno
Immanuel Kant (Sammlung GcJschen) IK







Berlin: Verlag von Reuther und Reichard.
Bergmann, Hugo
" Windelband, Wilhelm: Die Prinzipien der Logik" RPL
Zeitschrift fdr Philosophie und philosophische
Kri't'ikV 1 52(1913 )
,'
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An introduction to Philosophy
New" York: Henry' Molt and Company. 1925.
Brightman, Edgar Sheffield
The Problem of God
hew York: The Abingdon Press. 1920.
Brightman, Edgar Sheffield
The Finding of God
New York' : The Abingdon Press. 1921.
Creighton, J. E.
"Die Philosophic im deutschen Geisteslehen des XIX.
Jahrhunderts. . . von Wilhelm Windelband"
The Philosophical Review, 19(1910), 007-008.




Das Gel tungsproblen in Windelbands Philosophic
Berlin: l&iil' Ebering. lT)29.
Domer
" Windelband, W., Uber Sinn und Wert des Phanomenal-
ismus"
Theologische Li tera turzei tung, 28(1912), 022-022
Leipzig: J.C. hinrich ’sche’ bu chhandlung
.
Drews, Arthur
"Die Hypothese des Unbewussten"
Preussische Jahrbiicher, 158(1914), 292-404.
Berlin: Verlag von Georg Stilke.
Drews, Arthur
"Eine neue Einfuhrung in die philosophischen
Studien"
Preussische Jahrbiicher, 100vl91u), 290-401.
Berlin: Verlag von Georg Stilke.
Drews, Arthur
"Zum Tode Wilhelm Windelbands"
Preussische Jahrbiicher, 102(1910), 1-12.
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"W. Windelbands Elnfluss unter den Siidslaven"
Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und philosonhische
Kri til;
,
lAO CL9l8 )’ / 'S'4D'-‘g41 .
"
Leipzig : Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Barth.
Ewald, Oskar
"Die deutschc Philosophie im Jahre 1907"
Kant-Studien, 13(1908), 197-237.
Serxin: Verlag von Heuther & Hei chard.
Ewald, Oskar
"Windelband, Wilhelm. Die Philosophie im deutschen
Geistesleben des XIX Jahrhunderts"
Kant-Studien, 15 v1910), 270-271.
Berlin: Verlag von Heuther & Heichard.
Falckenberg, Hichard
"Die Geschichte der neueren Philosophie .. .von
W . WindeIband"
Philosophische Monatshefte, 19(1883), 188-201.
Peiclelberg: Verlag von Georg Weiss.
Frommel, Otto
" Gedachtnisrede flir Wilhelm Windelband"
Die Chris tliche Welt, 29(1915), 919-920.
Ilarburg.
Fullerton, George S.
"A History of Ancient Philosophy. By Dr. W. Windel-
band"
The Philosoj)hioal Ileview, 9(1900), 193-198.
Hew York: The Macmillan Co.
Hammond, Wm. A.
"Platon. Von Wilhelm Windelband"
The Philosophical Heview, 10(1901), 430-438.
Hew York: The ) [a cmi 1 lan Co.
Hartanann, Eduard von
"Kant und der Pessimismus"
Kant-Studien, 5(1900-1901), 21-29.
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Zur Geschichte unci Begrundung des Pessimismus




” Immanuel Kant und seine We 1 tans chaining. . .Von
Wilhelm Windelband”
Mind, N.S. 14(1905), 126-127.





"Windelband on ’The principle of morality. ’"
The Philosophical Review, 5(1896), 623-627.
Boston: dfnn & Co.
Kant, Immanuel
"Ueber das Misslingen aller philosophischen Ver-
suche in der Theodicee"
Immanuel Kant’s S&ramtliche Werke (edited by
G. Hartenstein) VI. Band, 75-93
.
Leipzig: Leopold Voss. 1868.
Krueger, Felix
"Windelband, Wilhelm, Platon”
Viertel jahrsschrif t fur wissenschaftliche
Philosophic u. Soziologie, 22
(




”Dr. Wilhelm Windelband: Die Lehren vom Zufall"
Philosophische Monatshefte, 5v.l870), 436-442.
beriin: Otto ^oewens tein.
Lass, E.
”Ueber teleologischen Kriticismus"
Viertel jahrsschrift fiir wissenschaftliche
Philosophie unci Sozioiogie, 8(1884)', TZV7 .





”Die Philosophic dm Beginn des zwanzigsten Jahr-
hunderts”
The Philosophical Review, 14(1905), 706-710.
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Berlin: Junker unci Dttnnhaupt Verlag. 1030.
Lempp, Otto
Das Problem der Theodicee in der Philosophic und
Litera tur cLes 18 . Jahrhunderts bis auf Iran t unci
ScHTTTer
Leipzig: Verlag der Diirr’schen Buchhandlung.
1910.
Messer, August
"Uber Grundfragen der Philosophic der Gegenwart”
Kant-Studien, 20(1915), 05-00.
Berlin : Verlag von lleuther & Hei chard.
Messer, August
" Wilhelm Windelband, Pr&ludien. . . 5. Aufl."




"Windelband, Wilh. Uber Willensfreiheit"
Kant-Studien, 10(1905), 103-100.
Berlin : Verlag von Heuther & lleichard.
Muirhead, J.H.
"History of Ancient Philosophy. By Dr. W. Windel-
band"
Mind, N. S. 9(1900), 540-542.
uonden: Williams and Norgate.
Natarp, P.
"Geschichte der alten Philosophic von W. Windel-
band"
"Geschichte der Philosophic von W. Windelband.
Erste Liefcrung. . ."
Philosophische Monatshefte, 20(1800), 350-302.
Heidelberg: Verlag von Georg Weiss.
Pelikan, Ferdinand
" W . Windelband"
Zeitschrift fur Philosophic und philosophische
KriTftT lf>'Oii'OTO-)7Tl"l"-THr:
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Picard, Maurice
Values Immediate and Contributory and their Inter-
New York: The New York University Press. 1920.
Pichler, Hans
"W. Windelbands Einleitung in die Philosophic"
Kant-Studien, 19(1914), 370-389.
Berlin: Verlag von Heuther 8• Hei chard.
Hcgler, Walther
"Windelband, W., Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philo-
sophic. 3., durchgesehene Auflage..."
Viertcl jahrsschrift fi\r wissenschaftliche
Miilosophie und fjoziologie, 29 (100 5 ) , 115-116.
Leipzig: 0 . It . Heislancl
.
llichter, A.
"Beitr&ge zur Lehre vom negativen Urtheil, von
W. Windelband"
Philosophisclie Monatshefte, 21(1885), 435-438.
toeictelLerg: Verlag von Georg Weiss.
ltickert, Heinrich
Wilhelm Windelband
Ttilbingen: Verlag von J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Riebeck).
1915.
lliehl, A.
"Uber die Gewissheit der Erkenntnis . . . von Dr. Wilh.
Windelband. • ."
Philosophische Monatshefte, 9(1873), 292-290.
Berlin: Verlag von P. Henschel.
Horetz, Karl von
"Nekrolog. Wilhelm Windelband"
Zeitschrift fur die osterreichischen Gymnasien,
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w Einleitung in die Philosophie. Von Vilhelm Windel-
band"
The Philosophioal Review, 25(1910), 197-200.
New VorkY .Longmans, Green, & Co.
Schiller, F. C. S.
"Platon. Von Wilhelm Windelband*
Mind, N. S. 9(1900), 555-556.
London: Williams and Norgate.
Schiller, F. C. S.
Riddles of the Sphinx
London: Macmillan and Co. (1891) 1912.
Somio, Felix
"Das Wertproblem"
Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und philosophische
Ivri’tik'
, kT9T2 )', OOLTO'
.
Leipzig: Verlag von Johann Ambrosius Barth.
Spenglcr, Gustav
"W. Windelband, Geschichte der antiken Philosophie.
3. Aufl ."




"Windelbands Stellung zu den Gottesbeweisen"
Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Gorresgesellschaft,
(ipifl )/ *564- 278'
.
Fulda: Druck und Komnissionsverlag der Fuldaer
Actiendruckerei.
Thilly, Frank
"An Introduction to Philosophy. By Wilhelm Windel-
band"
The Philosophical Review, 31(1922), 290-297#
New York: "Longmans, Green, & Co.
Thorraeyer, Paul
Philosophisches Worterbuch










































































Theories of Social Progress TSP
to'cV York: The Macmillan Co. 1919.
Ueberweg, Friedrich
Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie GGP
Berlin: E. S. Tli tiler & Sohri. 1923.
Ulrici, Hermann
"Ueber die Gevrissheit der Erkenntnis. . .yon Dr.
Wilhelm Windelband* • ." HGE
Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und philosonhischc
“Xri'tTkV ATiT8’J^7,‘'“S?8 , -f£- ,008 . ~
!ha lie : C. E. II. Pfeffer.
Urban, Wilbur Marshall
Fundamentals of Ethics FOE
New York: Henry bolt and Company. 1930.
Witte, J.
"Fichtes Idee des deutschen Staates . . . von Dr. W.
Windelband" HFI
Philosophisuhe Monatshefte, 28(1893), 814-815.
Berlin: PhiLosophiscli-lifs torischer Verlag von
Dr. H. Salinger.
Witte, J.
"Praludien. . . von W. Windelband" HP
Philosophische Monatshefte, 20(1884), 593-805.
Heidelberg: Verlag von Oeorg Weiss.
Zombek, Erich
Wille und Willensfreiheit bei Karl Joel und
Willelm Windclbancl WJW
Greifswald: Buclidruckerei Hans Adler. 1913.
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Standard. Abbreviations for Periodicals



























Itevue do Metaphysique et de Morale
,
Itev.d.Met. e.d.Mor.




















































Zeitschrift fur die 5s terreichischen Gymnasicn
,
Zeits»f .d.flst.Gym.
Zeitschrift fiir Philosophic und philosophische Kritik,
Zeits.f.Phil.u.phil.Kr.
-.





Autobiographical Sketch of the Author.
I, Arthur Allen Schoolcraft, son of Charles F. and.
Dolly (Cottrill) Schoolcraft, was bom March 23, 1397, at
Euclid, West Virginia. I studied in elementary school un-
til 1913. From 1913 to 1918 I taught in the elementary
schools of West Virginia. In 1919 I was licensed to preach
in the Methodist Episcopal Church, and was assigned to a
pastoral charge in the West Virginia Conference. From 1920
to 1922 I studied with the University of Chicago High School,
Extension Department. From 1922 to 1920 I studied in
Marietta College, where I was awarded the A. B. degree,
summa cum laude. In 1920 I was ordained an Elder in the
11 e th octi s t Ipis copa 1 church. From 1920 to 1929 I studied
in Boston University School of Theology, where I was
awarded the S. T. B. degree summa cum laude. I was also
elected lloswell R. llobinson Fellow for the year 1929-1930.
From 1929 to 1932 I have studied in Boston University
Graduate School. In 1929-1930 I pursued studies at Harvard
College, also; and, during the summer semester of 1930, at
Friedrich Wilhelms University t in Berlin. In 1931 I was
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